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Abstract 
 
This dissertation employs a combination of diplomatic and intelligence history to 
challenge established narratives about the relations between Nationalist China and the 
Third Reich during WWII. This approach allows for the exploration of how Chiang Kai-
shek’s wartime diplomacy influenced Chinese foreign policy in regards to the Axis 
Powers. Archival documents reveal that in the fight for China’s survival pragmatism, 
rather than ideology, was the most important force behind Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign 
policy strategy.  
As earlier research has shown, Republican Chinese foreign policy had many 
pragmatic traits, and in this project it becomes evident that diplomatic communication 
was maintained by Chiang Kai-shek with as many countries as possible. This foreign 
policy approach was influenced by the experience of having unreliable allies throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s. This approach resulted in the maintenance of communication 
with Germany, even beyond the crucial official break in diplomatic relations between 
the two countries in July 1941.  
This project explores how clandestine back channels emerged as the preferred 
tool for fostering Sino-German relations, and how these back channels continued from 
1942 until 1945 in Switzerland. Special envoys with intelligence links, appointed by 
Chiang Kai-shek, conversed with representatives of the German party intelligence 
service, the RSHA, and with the German Resistance movement of 20 July 1944. These 
back channels reflected Chiang Kai-shek’s pragmatic foreign policy, and these 
connections subsequently contributed to the difficulties that arose between the Western 
Allies and China at the end of the war.
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Note on Romanisation and referencing of archival sources 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have chosen to use the Hanyu Pinyin System of 
Romanisation for all Chinese words, names and proper nouns. The only exceptions are 
the names of individuals which are commonly provided in other Romanisation systems, 
such as Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), and T.V. 
Soong (Song Ziwen) amongst others.  
While the required Harvard System of referencing has been used throughout 
the dissertation, archival references have been provided in footnotes, in keeping with 
the practice employed in a number of scholarly journals, such as the Asian Studies 
Review. Information on the specific guidelines of referencing applied in this dissertation 
is available as part of the Information Skills Resource of the University of Sheffield.  
 
The referencing style of archival sources in this dissertation follows the 
guidelines provided by the different archives. These guidelines may differ in their 
approach, hence the different styles. Information on the guidelines is usually provided 
by the archives themselves on their online platform.      
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Introduction to the Project 
 
Many aspects of the Second World War (hereafter WWII) continue to grip 
academic and public attention; this is also true for foreign relations. In this dissertation, 
I will explore specific aspects of Republican China’s foreign policy during WWII. In the 
process, I intend to shed light on hitherto unknown clandestine communication back 
channels between the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek and Nazi Germany. 
As a result, this dissertation contributes to the current wave of research re-evaluating 
Republican Chinese history by highligting the extreme pragmatism that characterised 
Chiang Kai-shek's wartime foreign policy. 
Indeed, the decade-long narrative of Chiang Kai-shek breaking contact with the 
Third Reich, following the end of official diplomatic relations in July 1941, cannot be 
upheld. My challenge to the established research will be substantiated with reference 
to extensive archival sources and a re-evaluation of existing scholarship. In particular, I 
have identified a gap in research on Sino-German relations, especially on Chongqing-
German relations after July 1941. It is not my intention to question established 
narratives of Chiang Kai-shek’s alliance with the Western Democracies. Chiang’s war 
objectives in this regard are clear; an alliance with the US and the inclusion of China in 
the Big Four. However, by combining a diplomatic and intelligence history approach, I 
intend to raise awareness of the fact that in wartime, Nationalist China's diplomatic 
relations with Germany survived through numerous clandestine channels.  
The existence of these clandestine Sino-German channels should not 
necessarily come as a surprise to scholars of wartime Chinese historiography, 
especially since such channels are known to have existed between Japan and 
Chongqing China in 1940 (Boyle, 1972). However, while the use of clandestine 
channels with Japan (at that time Chongqing China’s primary enemy) seems logical, 
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the channels to Germany have hitherto not been studied and can contribute to a 
deeper understanding of Republican China’s wartime relations. The fact that 
clandestine Sino-German back channels during WWII have not been studied before is 
due to the possibility that scholars did not expect Chiang Kai-shek to deal with Nazi 
Germany, especially after Chongqing China joined the Allies. This becomes clearer in 
Chapter Two.  
 
Official relations between the Third Reich and other states have always 
fascinated scholars and the public alike. Sino-German relations are no exception, even 
though much of Western academia’s focus has been on Sino-US-Japanese relations, 
Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-British relations. A widely covered field, Republican 
Chinese official diplomacy has since become an important part of university research, 
but has failed to uncover all aspects of Chongqing China’s diplomacy. As other 
research on foreign diplomacy shows, research on merely front-channel diplomacy is 
insufficient and cannot provide us with the whole picture. As a result, scholars of 
foreign diplomacy have increasingly turned to diplomacy through back channels. 
Several major back channels have so far been identified and researched in general 
diplomatic history. The diplomatic-intelligence history combination in this dissertation 
focuses on Back-Channel Diplomacy (hereafter BCD), which allows this dissertation to 
look further beyond the official face of diplomacy. Championed by scholars such as 
Bungert (2001, 1140), a diplomatic-intelligence history combination allows for further 
insight into events and behind-the-scene developments.  
My main focus in this dissertation is with BCD between the Third Reich and 
Nationalist China. I will not revisit official German foreign policy in detail and will only 
provide information on this where necessary, as much research has already been 
carried out in this field and need not be repeated in detail here. In contrast, it is 
paramount to discuss Chiang Kai-shek’s official foreign policy, as expressed in wartime 
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speeches, in order to highlight the discrepancy between the official statement that 
Chongqing China was at war with Nazi Germany and the archival findings.  
Archival research represents the backbone of this project, and has been carried 
out in Europe and East Asia. Due to the complexity of wartime Sino-German 
clandestine communications, I have had to adopt a transnational approach to my 
archival research. By this, I am referring to an approach that does not focus on one 
single individual, institution or country. Instead, this research explores the role of 
German and Chinese individuals equally and from as objective a position as possible. 
In particular, because of the complexity of this topic and the un-official nature of back 
channels, a transnational approach allows us to explore the intricate clandestine Sino-
German communication channels.  
As I hope to show, Sino-German relations were complicated during the war 
years. This dissertation intends to show that Chiang Kai-sek himself got involved in the 
maintenance of wartime Sino-German relations, and communicated through back 
channels via special representatives. These special representatives were located in 
Switzerland after July 1941, where they maintained contact with two German groups.  
The first German group is termed “Berlin”, and refers to a number of individuals 
at the heart of the Nazi German government. “Berlin” mainly includes agents of the 
RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Main Security Office) and their superiors 
Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich. The latter headed the RSHA and the 
Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, SD), while Himmler, as the head of the German 
police and the SS, controlled Heydrich (Büchler, 1986, 11). The RSHA was an 
intelligence service linked to the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
(hereafter NSDAP, National Socialist German Workers Party). This group does not 
include other leading Nazis, such as Adolf Hitler and Foreign Minister Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, but may have involved Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring at some stage. 
This may appear odd, but as it became clear during research, not all information 
passing through the “Berlin” channel actually reached the Führer.  
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The second group I term the “German Resistance”. As is commonly known, 
several Resistance groups existed in Nazi Germany across the political spectrum 
(Hoffmann, 1988, 55). These groups were often persecuted by the Gestapo and their 
members killed. However, the one high-level resistance group with the potential to 
overthrow the Hitler government was an alliance of individuals within the German army, 
civil service and industry which included members of the Kreisauer Kreis (Kreisau 
Circle), such as Helmuth Graf von Molthke, members of the German state secret 
service Abwehr (Defence), such as Hans Oster, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and Hans 
Bernd Gisevius, and members of the General Staff of the German army 
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW), such as Count Claus von Stauffenberg. Their 
most well-known assassination attempt on Hitler took place on 20 July 1944. In this 
dissertation, this movement will be referred to simply as the “German Resistance” or 
“the Resistance movement”. It is not my intention to discredit or overlook other 
Resistance groups in Germany; this nomenclature has been chosen purely for reasons 
of clarity and simplicity.  
On several occasions below, terms such as “German-friendly” or “Chinese-
friendly” will also be used to describe factions within, for example, the German 
government that sympathised with China, and would have liked to see a German East 
Asian foreign policy in support of China. Similarly, German-friendly Chinese refers to 
Chinese individuals in Chongqing that sympathised with Germany, who had received 
training in Germany, and who were in favour of better relations with the European 
nation. However, it is important to clarify at this step that these terms do not imply that 
German-friendly Chinese were Nazis, or that they favoured fascism over democracy.  
This is the same case with individuals that received, for example, training in the US, 
and can, thus, be classified as US-friendly. Moreover, these terms do not imply that 
any of these Chinese individuals valued the foreign country they sympathised with as 
more important than China.  
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Before going into more detail, I will outline the structure of this dissertation, and 
present the theoretical framework which underpins it.  
 
 
Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation comprises eight chapters. The initial chapter is split into three 
sections. The first section includes an introduction to the dissertation and clarifies the 
content and research focus, as well as the definition of certain important terms. In the 
second section, I present the structure of this dissertation, and briefly explain the 
content of each chapter. The third section deals with the theoretical framework which 
underpins the project. It introduces the reader initially to two theories of un-official 
diplomacy: Secret and Back-Channel Diplomacy (BCD). After careful consideration and 
evaluation, I will explain why I have adopted the BCD theory to explore aspects of 
clandestine Sino-German relations. Besides BCD theory more generally, information 
on aspects of mediation theory has been added to help understand whether the 
mediation attempts carried out through these clandestine Sino-German channels had 
any chance for success. 
Chapter Two is a literature review. It also establishes the gap in research which 
I am hoping to fill through this project. It starts with a "note on research", in which I 
highlight the challenges I encountered during my fieldwork, in particular in China. 
Moreover, the literature review underlines the shortcomings in previous research, 
amongst others the limitation of the research time frame to the summer of 1941 and not 
beyond. Chapter Two ends with a justification of the project, and some thoughts on the 
contributions it makes to the field of the history of Republican Chinese foreign relations.  
As the last part of preparation for the main body of this dissertation and 
theoretical discussion, the historical overview (Chapter Three) covers the 1930s, 
leading up to the events of WWII in China and Germany. My aim in this section will be 
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to provide an understanding of how events in both China and Germany in the 1930s 
and before would come to play a role in shaping Sino-German relations into the 1940s. 
This goes in particular for changes in German East Asian foreign policy and for 
Chinese foreign policy respectively. Developments in both official Chinese and German 
foreign policy coincided with changes in the international community. It is of particular 
interest to this project to ascertain how a certain type of rhetoric was used in 
Chongqing, and to compare this with the actual events undertaken by the Nationalist 
leader Chiang Kai-shek after China’s declaration of war on Germany. Hence, Chapter 
Four provides a selection of wartime Chongqing Chinese propaganda and speeches 
held by Chiang Kai-shek that highlight the official Nationalist Chinese foreign policy. 
Moreover, the second section in Chapter Four provides historical evidence for Chiang 
Kai-shek’s use of back channels to conduct a foreign policy that operated separately 
from the Chinese Foreign Office.  
As I will lay out below in the sections on theory, BCD relies on individuals’ 
actions, rather than on that of an organisation (such as a foreign office). But the 
importance of individuals to BCD means that I will also need to introduce the main 
players in the Sino-German relationship to the reader, and this calls for a separate 
chapter in which they are introduced. Chapter Five will therefore lay the foundation of 
the Sino-German communication network, and ensure that the many different names 
will not cause any confusion as the dissertation proceeds. The two different back 
channels to Chiang Kai-shek will be introduced, and the chapter starts with a brief 
section on Chiang Kai-shek, who, as the only common element of both channels, will 
be discussed separately. In the next step, the chapter will introduce the Chinese and 
German agents of the “Berlin-Chiang Channel”: Gui Yongqing and Kurt Jahnke. After 
that follows the description of the “German Resistance-Chiang Channel” agents: Qi Jun 
and several members of the German Resistance, with whom Qi was in contact in Berlin 
and Switzerland.  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
7 
 
All these individuals play a role in the story that will be explored in Chapter Six, 
in which the findings from my archival research will be presented. The story starts in 
1938/39 and shows how early signs of BCD began to take place between China, 
Germany and Japan at this early stage of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Over the course 
of time, the importance of official diplomatic channels decreased (due to changes in the 
domestic German political landscape), and efforts to foster Sino-German relations 
shifted to back channels in Berlin that were established and maintained by Gui and Qi 
until summer 1941. This ultimately paid off when Sino-German relations came to an 
end and communications continued through clandestine channels in Switzerland, again 
through Qi and Gui. The discussions running through these channels included topics 
on mediation, foreign relations and Sino-German relations.  
The presentation of findings in Chapter Six clearly raises several questions 
which need to be discussed in Chapter Seven. Questions about the nature of Sino-
German relations, and the pragmatic nature of Chinese foreign policy. How much 
influence did German-friendly lobbyists inside the Chongqing government have, and at 
which point in time were such voices at their strongest? How did the existence of 
German-friendly individuals influence Chiang Kai-shek’s position among the Allies? 
More broadly, I will also consider what all these questions and their answers tell us 
about BCD, and explore whether or not we need to amend our understanding of this 
theory. This discussion will then be summarised and brought to a conclusion in Chapter 
Eight, where a final statement will be provided.  
 
 
Theoretical framework 
Diplomacy conducted through back channels has attracted the attention of 
many researchers over the last few years, and also partially inspired this dissertation. 
In order to explain clandestine diplomatic relations between Chongqing China and the 
Third Reich, there are two theories that appear most suitable. These are Back-Channel 
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Diplomacy and Secret Diplomacy, which I shall introduce and evaluate below. Although 
I have chosen BCD to explore aspects of clandestine Sino-German relations, it is still 
necessary to explain why this is the case, and why BCD offers a more convincing 
theoretical framework than Secret Diplomacy. Due to the fact that mediation plays a 
large role in BCD and recent research on BCD, I have decided to include certain 
aspects of mediation theory as well.  The application of mediation theory as a whole 
would be too narrow for the exploration of Sino-German back channels, thus I decided 
to use certain aspects of mediation theory. BCD will provide the primary theoretical 
framework for this dissertation; however, the inclusion of mediation theory will help to 
highlight the low chances for success of the conflict-solution BCD mediation efforts that 
were part of Sino-German back channels (see Bercovitch 2011). 
 
Back-Channel Diplomacy (BCD) 
A back channel in diplomacy refers to a “line of diplomatic communication which 
bypasses” an official diplomatic front channel (Berridge and James, 2003, 18). In more 
recent years, this approach in diplomacy has been widely linked with back channels 
that solved or attempted to solve major conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 
or the conflict between the British government and the IRA. 
Foremost, however, diplomacy through back channels refers to clandestine 
communication that excludes official diplomatic channels. This definition is further 
specified by Wanis-St. John (2006, 120), and refers to official negotiations that are 
conducted in secrecy. The parties involved in BCD are sometimes in a conflict with 
each other, and may not even acknowledge each other's legitimacy (Ò Dorchtaraigh, 
2011, 768). This state of conflict can refer to two states, or to a state and a terrorist 
organisation, such as Hamas or the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (hereafter PLO) 
during the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Pruitt, 2006, 372). Other examples often cited in 
research into BCD include the Northern Ireland conflict between the IRA and the British 
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government, during which BCD was used to settle a decades-long conflict (see Ò 
Dorchtaraigh, 2011).1 
The initiation of talks originates either with the two conflicting parties at the 
highest levels, or can be proposed by a neutral intermediary, such as Norway did prior 
to the Oslo Peace Process in summer 1992 (Waage, 2005, 8). Only a handful of 
individuals know and participate in meetings, which take place in secrecy at neutral 
locations. The background of these participants can range from private individuals to 
active diplomatic staff (Wanis-St. John, 2006, 120).   
At the same time, diplomacy through front channels may still take place, as the 
example of the early 1970s US-Soviet arms control negotiations highlights (Berridge 
and James, 2003, 18).The benefits of this system are that the two parties can discuss 
issues of conflict away from the often harmful influence of the audience, as it would 
otherwise put pressure on the two sides not to agree to too many compromises. As a 
result, BCD is the preferred means of communication when elements, such as an 
audience or political opponents, have to be excluded from the negotiation process (Ò 
Dorchtaraigh, 2011, 768; Wanis-St. John, 2006, 138), particularly when it comes to 
solving emotionally charged issues or conflicts. The term “audience” can refer to the 
public, or to official political opponents (which includes other countries as well) (Ò 
Dorchtaraigh, 2011, 768).  
The best-researched BCD process is the Israeli-Palestinian talks in Oslo in 
1992/1993. These took place for almost a year, resulting in the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles in September 1993. I will use these back-channel negotiations 
as an example to show how the theory of BCD is applied in practice. 
Before any negotiations start, a willingness to talk has to be sought from both 
sides. In a BCD process, the conflicting parties then meet in neutral locations and in 
secrecy, with such meetings either facilitated through a neutral intermediary or on their 
                                               
1 More examples of the use of BCD will follow in this chapter.  
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own accord. Authorised by their leaders 2  to conduct negotiations and to make 
commitments (Wanis-St.  John, 2006, 121), agents of the conflicting parties work on a 
solution, while continuing to inform their superiors of any developments. In the process 
of back-channel negotiations the two sides build up trust, which is crucial for the 
successful outcome of such a diplomatic approach (Putnam and Carcasson, 1997, 
261). The role of the neutral mediator is to facilitate such talks, but also to smooth out 
any issues which might arise in the course of the negotiations. The Norway case 
followed a similar pattern, in which the Norwegian mediators facilitated meetings and 
fostered an intimate atmosphere between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Waage, 
2005, 9). The Israeli and Palestinian agents had the backing of their respective highest 
government leaders,3 and the more the negotiations proceeded, the more high-level 
these agents became. After initial success, Israel upgraded the talks and these were 
taken over by diplomats on the Israeli side (Waage, 2005, 10). At the same time, the 
Norwegian foreign minister became actively involved in negotiations, especially when 
these were threatened by collapse (Waage, 2005, 12).4  In the following weeks and 
months the two conflicting parties were brought back to the table and a deal was 
hammered out, brokered through Norwegian mediation. In the end, the Declaration of 
Principle was signed, and this laid the foundation for new negotiations and set a 
timetable during which these had to be conducted (Wanis-St. John, 2006, 131).  
 As the above information suggests, current research on BCD focuses largely on 
clandestine mediation efforts through diplomatic back channels. In general, the term 
mediation refers to a “conflict management tool” that is applied in divorces as much as 
in peace negotiations between two states (Greig and Diehl, 2012, 2). Mediation in 
state-to-to-state conflicts “tends to be used in disputes characterized by high 
complexity… long duration, and unequal fractionated parties, and where the 
                                               
2 As Wanis-St. John (2006, 121) noted, the head of government in some cases is not aware of back-
channel negotiations, but the negotiating agents have the support of some official decision makers.  
3 Israeli Prime Minister YItzak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres only learned about the BCD 
negotiations in Norway after the end of the first round of talks. During the first round, only Deputy Foreign 
Minister Beilin was aware of the talks (Waage, 2005, 8). 
4 Waage (2005) describes this role of a negotiator in detail, and relies heavily on interviews conducted with 
the individuals that were present during the Oslo talks.  
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willingness… to settle [a conflict] peacefully is in doubt” (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2011, 
153). Parties to a conflict that accept mediation may follow alternative objectives, which 
might not include solving the conflict. Instead, the mediation could be used to buy time, 
or to maintain the relationship with the third party (mediator) (Richard, 1998, in Greig 
and Diehl, 2012, 3). Without wanting to go into detail here, Chiang Kai-shek’s and his 
aides’ approach to the German back channels seems to fit in this last group. In order to 
further explore this theory, I will look at those back channels in this dissertation that 
constitute conflict-solution back channels similar to the Oslo Peace Process using 
factors of mediation that influence the success or failure of mediation, as theorised by 
Bercovitch (2011). There are certain factors that are seen as important to mediation, 
which are also crucial for BCD efforts, such as the neutrality of the mediator and (in 
some cases) the element of secrecy. Greig and Diehl (2012, 106) argue that the 
determination of the success or failure of a mediation efforts relies on the 
achievements made by the parties during the mediation stages, as well as the positive 
changes that occurred in the relationship between the two parties following a medition 
effort. In regard to the conflict-solution cases in this dissertation, however, the ultimate 
outcome is known: failure. Chongqing China joined the Allies as one of the Big Four 
and emerged victorious from the Sino-Japanese conflict. As a result, it is my intention 
to look at what an analysis of the chances for success and failure of these conflict-
solution back channels tell us about the objectives on the German and the Chinese 
side.  
Bercovitch’s (2011, 8) research into the factors relevant for mediation success, 
in combination with BCD theory, will help to shed light on the conflict-solution efforts. 
Without wanting to go into too much detail at this point, three conflict-solution back 
channels in this dissertation will be explored using BCD and mediation theory aspects, 
ranging from German mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict to Chinese mediation 
between the Washington administration and the German Resistance movement. As will 
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become clear in Chapters Six and Seven, the mediation attempts explored in this 
dissertation were all unlikely to be successful.  
According to Bercovitch (2011, 8), the four elements common to mediation 
efforts with great influence on the outcome, are the parties, the mediator, the context of 
the conflict and the nature of the dispute. The parties to a conflict clearly play an 
important role in defining “the nature of the conflict and any subsequent approaches to 
it” (Bercovitch, 2011, 6). Chances for success in mediation depend on whether the 
parties in conflict accept the attempt, and on their internal situation. In regard to the 
Oslo Talks, the internal and external situation faced by Israel and the PLO meant the 
time for talks was ripe, a fact that aided the set up of back channel mediation 
(Bercovitch, 2011, 138-140). As Greig and Diehl (2012, 136) argue, the wrong time is 
often chosen by the third party mediator. As will become evident in Chapters Six to 
Seven, the German mediation approaches to China and Japan, however, took place 
when the time to negotiate was only ripe for one of sides. Additionally, the perception of 
an issue by the parties in conflict and possible power asymmetries further hamper 
mediation efforts (Bercovitch and Houston, 2011, 41-43).  
Another factor that influences mediation success is the fact that the more a 
government is split into factions or fights for legitimacy, the lower the chances for a 
success in mediation (Bercovitch, 2011, 6). Even though Chiang Kai-shek was the 
highest Chinese decision maker, his government was notoriously split along factions, 
who competed over control and the Generalissimo’s support. While factions inside the 
Chinese government might have had an influence on German mediation efforts 
between 1938 and 1942, the question of legitimacy possibly carried more weight. 
Legitimacy tends to be connected to territorial disputes. According to Bercovitch (2011, 
7) territorial, ideological and religious conflicts fall under the nature of a conflict. In such 
conflicts mediation success rates are very low (Bercovitch, 2011, 7). The Oslo talks 
clearly touched on territorial issues, and it has proven to be very difficult to resolve this 
conflict. Similarly, the Sino-Japanese conflict was also a territorial conflict. The question 
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of sovereignty and return of Japanese-occupied land to China were important 
questions, which more than once derailed mediation attempts. As already mentioned 
above, the nature of the mediator is supposed to be impartial and neutral (Bercovitch, 
2011, 7). The question of mediator neutrality in BCD mediations is one that will be 
raised again below, and put into the context with other issues that can influence BCD 
mediation efforts. 
 
As the example of the Oslo Peace Talks shows us, the outcome of BCD can be 
successful in the short run, but long-term results are difficult to predict. While the 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process is still not resolved, other conflicts negotiated 
through BCD have been solved, such as the Northern Ireland conflict. BCD mediation 
clearly has its benefits and is suitable for solving conflicts that are emotionally charged 
on both sides. With the exclusion of the public and domestic political opponents, BCD 
participants are able to find a compromise that both parties can accept, often facilitated 
through a mediator. Moreover, the secrecy of back channels allows the parties enough 
time to facilitate such an agreement. This time is indeed needed, as a political backlash 
from opposition parties and the public is inevitable and can have negative 
consequences.5    
In addition, there are other issues that can influence BCD. While earlier work 
has focused mainly on the parties to the conflict, only a few scholars, such as Waage 
(2005), have looked at the specific role of the intermediary in BCD processes. Ò 
Dorchtaraigh (2011, 768) noted this “paucity of work focusing on cooperation at the 
intersection between parties in back channels”. However, mediation theory contributes 
enlightening information on the role and importance of mediators in international 
conflict resolution (Bercovitch, 2011; Astor, 2007, Greig and Diehl, 2012, 5). Common 
to BCD theorists’ approach and mediation theory is the idea that the intermediary is a 
                                               
5 The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process derailed as a result of the hardened position of extreme right-wing 
parties in Israel and Palestine. Wanis-St. John (2006, 132) mentions the murder of Palestinians at the 
hands of an Israeli settler on 25 February 1994.  Hamas initiated a new wave of suicide bombings, while 
Israeli settlers denounced Prime Minister Rabin (Wanis-St. John, 2006, 133).  
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neutral entity, such as Norway was in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. Even 
though an ally of Israel, Norway also acknowledged the PLO, and both sides of the 
conflict accepted her as an intermediary. In theory there is nothing wrong with this 
general definition, but back-channel theory does not consider all possible alliances that 
exist in the international community. I argue that BCD research does not include biased 
(non-neutral) mediators, perhaps for the reason that a biased intermediary is usually 
not accepted by one party in the conflict. Other scholars, such as Astor (2007, 222) and 
Bercovitch and Houston (2011, 45),6 have questioned whether mediation can indeed 
be neutral. While Astor (2007) discusses the influence of the mediator’s own ethnic and 
cultural background on neutrality, this dissertation was confronted with the question of 
how the dynamics of BCD change if one party is officially at war/ in conflict with both 
the mediator and the other side of the conflict. These are dilemmas that have yet to be 
explored in the literature on back-channel theory and the closely associated mediation 
theory, yet it is also one which defined relations between Germany and Nationalist 
China during WWII.   
 Furthermore, I argue that much of the BCD research focuses too heavily on 
states that are in conflict, and leaves out other possibilities, such as states that are 
behind-the-scene not in conflict. If we go back to the simplest definition of BCD as a 
communication channel, then we need to raise the question regarding participants that 
officially are in conflict, but enjoy a not-conflicting, but un-official, relationship. In the 
course of this research I encountered this issue and had trouble classifying it as BCD, 
as too much weight in recent research is placed on the conflict-solving, rather than on 
the simple communication aspects. Simple back channels tend to be overshadowed by 
great cases such as the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, or the Northern Ireland one. I 
intend to bring the focus back on the simple communication aspect of back channels. 
 
 
                                               
6  Bercovitch and Houston (2011, 45) quote: Faure, 1989; Kressel and Pruitt, 1985; Smith, 1985; Touval, 
1985; Touval and Zartman, 1985. 
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Secret Diplomacy versus BCD 
 BCD and Secret Diplomacy are often conflated or treated as synonyms. Similar 
to BCD, Secret Diplomacy takes place unbeknownst to the audience (i.e. the 
population and other states). While BCD is often applied to explain behind-the-scenes 
diplomacy over the last 20 to 30 years, Secret Diplomacy has been widely associated 
with the 19th century, the years before WWI and imperialism. Loosely defined, Secret 
Diplomacy can refer to official, serious diplomatic negotiations, because the content of 
official diplomacy, even today, is secret in the first place. The public only sees the 
outcome of negotiations, but not the decision-making process. Post-WWI thinking 
attacked Secret Diplomacy, in particular as it was not known what kind of secret 
treaties were established between states (Berridge and James, 2003, 239-240), 
something which may have contributed to the outbreak of WWI.   
By definition, major parts of diplomacy take place in secrecy between official 
diplomats who negotiate treaties and arrangements, mostly in the receiving country 
itself (Magalhães, 1988, 72). After Secret Diplomacy takes place, a final treaty or 
agreement will then be made public. Magalhães (1988, 73) argues that in Secret 
Diplomacy, at some point, one of the negotiation partners tends to leak information to 
the public to gain benefits. Such a move is possible when public opinion is to be 
influenced through propaganda “to make the people war minded”, as was the case 
prior to WWI (Neilson, 1956, 35).  
Secret Diplomacy is often associated with the early 20th century and imperialism, 
in particular in the case of China. Elleman (1994), for example, provides a good 
example of Secret Diplomacy by looking at Sino-Soviet negotiations over the Eastern 
Chinese Railway in Manchuria in 1924/1925. Even though it promised not to use 
Secret Diplomacy and called upon other foreign powers to follow the Soviet example in 
China (Elleman, 1994, 459), the Soviet government continued to use Secret Diplomacy 
in negotiations. Elleman (1994, 460) points out that the Soviet Union’s image in China 
depended on the perception that she treated the Chinese differently from the other 
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powers. Officially, the Soviet Union therefore renounced the treaty rights she had 
inherited from Tsarist Russia, and this resulted in a boost in Chinese public opinion. 
Hardly known to anybody, however, was that the Soviet Union did not in reality 
relinquish her treaty rights, but “reneged on the promises [she made]” (Elleman, 1994, 
459).  
 At first glance Secret Diplomacy indeed seems like a fitting model to use when 
exploring clandestine Sino-German relations. On closer inspection, however, a careful 
comparison of the case and the two theories is mandatory to reveal that this is not the 
case. Let us remind ourselves of the important factors inherent in Secret Diplomacy: It 
is carried out by official diplomats on the orders of their respective heads of state. BCD 
in its initial stage, in contrast, can be carried out by agents who do not hold an official 
appointment, but who do nonetheless hold an official mandate.   
The clandestine Sino-German channels that I shall examine in this dissertation 
did not run through official diplomatic channels; rather, they were carried out by 
individuals outside the control of the German and Chinese Foreign Office. Secret 
Diplomacy has been defined as a normal, everyday part of the diplomatic decision 
making process (Magalhães, 1988, 72). In general, however, back channels are 
defined as a communication line which runs alongside the official diplomatic front 
channel (Berridge and James, 2003, 18). Back channels are chosen over normal, 
public diplomatic channels, due to the possibility that a back channel’s secrecy can 
hide new political developments from opponents (Berridge and James, 2003, 18).  
The desire to leave political opponents in the dark plays a strong role, and this 
surely influenced the decision for back channels in this case. Both governments in 
Chongqing and Berlin were plagued by political factions, and as I will point out later, the 
occupation of official posts in the foreign office by one faction may trigger the use of 
back channels by its rival to circumvent any obstacles that might arise. While this would 
hold true for German Chinese-friendly individuals, in the case of China, Chiang Kai-
shek’s tendency to influence foreign relations through his own, non-professional, 
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special representatives (see Chapter Four) also supports the use of back channels. 
While BCD comprises a steady development of trust between each side, coupled with 
the upgrading of talks on a higher, formal level, Secret Diplomacy can rely on pre-
existing official channels. The importance of trust in clandestine Sino-German channels 
will become clearer in Chapters Five and Six, where I introduce the agents and their 
conversation topics, respectively. This will set the scene and clear allegiances, before I 
present information on the clandestine communication between these individuals. 
Secret Diplomacy also relies heavily on existing foreign diplomacy 
organisations and structures, while BCD places much focus on the individuals and their 
actions. Since individuals were the base of clandestine Sino-German wartime relations, 
Secret Diplomacy would be insufficient to analyse them.  
While Secret Diplomacy is employed in either the sending country or the host 
country of a diplomatic mission, BCD relies on neutral locations or intermediaries. As 
we shall see, for example, post-1941 negotiations between Nazi German and Chinese 
groups took place in neutral Switzerland, which further makes the case for the 
application of BCD in this dissertation.  
 As Neilson (1956, 34) states, Secret Diplomacy always carries the option of war 
with it, and was used for example by pre-WWI countries to scheme amongst each 
other, such as Britain’s and France’s creation of the Entente Cordiale. In BCD, there is 
no threat to go to war with a country if the conditions are not met; rather, the idea of 
BCD is to avoid conflict. In much recent research, this idea also included the solving of 
conflict. Indeed, many BCD-practicing groups are already in conflict with each other 
when they commence negotiations. This would fit the case of the Third Reich and 
Chongqing China. Officially both sides entered into war in December 1941, but even 
before that relations had been severed in July 1941. From that time onwards there was 
no official diplomatic channel left, meaning that any kind of diplomatic communication 
could only run through clandestine back channels.  
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 It could be argued that Secret Diplomacy is also clandestine, just as its name 
suggests. However, as part of Secret Diplomacy, propaganda is essential, as it puts 
pressure on the counterpart, or prepares the own and allied population for the event of 
war, as was the case in the run up to WWI (Neilson, 1956, 34). This element of Secret 
Diplomacy is clearly impossible to incorporate into this project, because the clandestine 
communication channels I explore in this dissertation took place at a time when 
Chongqing had already declared war on Germany. This means that any kind of 
propaganda about these channels would undermine their existence, and that absolute 
secrecy was therefore necessary.  
As I hope to have shown above, there is a strong case supporting the use of 
BCD over Secret Diplomacy as the theoretical framework for this dissertation. This 
case might be further supported by other examples of BCD in the recent and more 
distant past.  
 
BCD in history  
Above, I introduced a number of well-known BCD cases, such as the Israel-
Palestine Conflict, or the Britain-IRA Conflict. These two conflicts, however, are not the 
only ones in which the idea of diplomacy through back channels has been applied.  
BCD theory cannot only shed light on modern day conflicts, but can also be 
used in retrospect. As the cases below show, BCD is not only applied in violent 
conflicts such as in the Middle East, but can also be used by ideologically conflicting 
parties (i.e. the US and the Soviet Union) to reach agreements in negotiations when 
the front channel is inefficient.  
A prominent user of BCD, whose foreign policy actions have been well 
researched, is former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy through back 
channels was part of the SALT talks between the Soviet Union and the US, which 
began in 1969 and aimed to control missile arsenals (Steinberg, 1985, 267). During the 
SALT talks, Kissinger, President Richard Nixon and their Soviet counterparts created a 
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back channel, which discussed all issues that could not be dealt with in the front 
channel. Since the back channel proved more successful, the front channel was kept 
busy with false proposals (Steinberg, 1985, 268).  
Diplomacy through back channels can go back much further than the 1970s, 
however, and there are even examples of this idea having been applied by historians to 
the ancient world (Marcos, 2012). Marcos (2012, 508) came to the conclusion that the 
use of an informal network by Roman representative Musonianus to initiate 
communication with Persia in 356 A.D. counts as back-channel communication, for 
example.  
These two examples show a surprising shift of focus from modern-day conflicts 
to around 1700 year-old ones, and clearly point to the great adaptability of BCD as an 
approach. It can be used in retrospect, and in combination with new research material, 
and can reveal the existence of clandestine diplomacy. I intend to conduct similar 
research on Republican China’s wartime diplomacy with Nazi Germany, combine 
intelligence and diplomatic history, and fill the gap in knowledge that previous literature 
has failed to recognise.  
 
In conclusion, BCD theory emerges as the most suitable theory to explore and 
explain clandestine Sino-German relations during WWII. The comparison between 
Secret Diplomacy and BCD clearly shows the characteristics of this particular back 
channel between China and Germany. At all times, it was secret, avoided the German 
and the Chinese Foreign Offices and the two parties involved, Germany and 
Chongqing China, were from July 1941 onwards officially in conflict with each other. As 
will be shown in Chapter Seven, this communication channel also contributes to the 
general debate on BCD.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Issues in Research 
 
A note on research methods 
Before I introduce the current state of research on wartime Republican Chinese 
foreign policy, it is necessary to highlight the research methods used and the issues I 
faced in the course of undertaking this project. Archival research represented the major 
part of my fieldwork and several archives were visited, mainly in Taiwan, the People’s 
Republic of China (hereafter PRC) and Europe. Most researchers in the field would 
agree that the most important Chinese archives for this period are in Taipei (Taiwan) 
and Nanjing (PRC). Following the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan, the administration’s 
documents were roughly split in two, and as a result, researchers have had to travel to 
archives on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (when these have been accessible) in order 
to form a fuller picture of available information. Academia Historica (Guoshiguan) in 
Taipei stores vast amounts of material related to Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the 
Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs files. These were examined in some 
detail for this project. While in Taiwan I also visited other archives, such as the 
Guomindang Party archive and the archives at Academia Sinica. Information on the 
Sino-German relationship in the post-1941 period proved to be sparse in these two 
institutions. As we shall see below, this in itself reflects the narrative of the relationship 
in wartime, and connections that were maintained through personal envoys rather than 
through the usual channels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Nationalist Party 
itself.  
 Following fieldwork in Taiwan, I aimed to continue my research at the Number 
Two Historical Archives in Nanjing, and hoped to find more supporting, or even 
contradictory information that would complement the picture I had built up in Taipei. 
However, as it turned out, this institution has been closed indefinitely for the purpose of 
digitalising all files. Obviously, the archive closure proved to be a challenge to my 
research plans, which had to be adjusted accordingly. Instead of complementing the 
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information found in Taiwan with further Chinese archival sources, I was forced to rely 
on Chinese secondary literature.  
This new research environment in the PRC has been subject to research by 
Carlson, Gallagher, Lieberthal and Manion (2010, 2), who take into account the 
increased availability of material, thanks to the new digital developments. Indeed, many 
researchers on Chinese history will agree, that while research in China has “become 
easier [it has also become] … harder at the same time” (Göbel, 2011, 177). On the one 
hand, more information has become available to the researcher; on the other hand, the 
Chinese government is able to control the access to such information to a greater 
degree (Göbel, 2011, 177). Indeed, as the Republican past has become increasingly 
important in the PRC, so too has the need for the PRC government to control sources 
related to it. Even though Carlson’s et al. edition (2010) focuses on contemporary 
Chinese politics, their conclusions make just as much sense for scholars of modern 
Chinese history.  
 
In order to take a transnational and objective approach to this research topic, I 
have also had to substantiate my East Asian findings with information from European 
and American archives. These have included the German Foreign Office Archive (the 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes), and the Bundesarchiv (the federal archive). 
The federal archive consists of several branches spread all over Germany, but the 
main branch is found in Berlin, and this stores material from the German Reich, 
including the Third Reich, as well as documents from the former DDR. As this project 
focuses relatively heavily on individual connections, including those between 
Chongqing and individual German military personnel, it was necessary to visit the 
military branch of the federal archive in Freiburg as well. I also visited the Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) in Munich, which stores several files on members of the German 
Resistance.  
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The last stop of my archival research took me to Berne in Switzerland, where 
the Swiss Bundesarchiv (federal archive) can be found. The Swiss archive cannot be 
ignored, as much of the back-channel negotiations took place in Berne and the 
surrounding area. As the Swiss authorities carefully monitored any intelligence 
operations and agents on their territory, they also maintained a number of records on 
both agents and diplomatic staff living in Switzerland. In consequence, I was able to 
search through files of the important mediators of the two back channels that Chiang 
Kai-shek maintained. However, contrary to my expectations, the Swiss files offer much 
information on US, British and German espionage during WWII, but little on specific 
Chinese intelligence—a fact that tells us much about the lack of importance Swiss 
authorities attached to East Asian affairs.  
As part of the research in archives, I encountered several different citation 
regulations that were laid out by the archives themselves. In some cases, page 
numbers are asked for and are provided wherever possible. In other cases, the only 
reference provided by the archive is a record number, which will lead directly to the file 
in question.  
As there existed connections between some of the individuals in question and 
the American wartime intelligence Office of Strategic Services (OSS), I also visited 
Princeton University, which holds the Allen Welsh Dulles Papers. This visit took place 
during my attendance at the 22nd Graduate Conference at Columbia University New 
York. 
Financial and time constraints did not enable me to access other important 
collections held in the US or Japan, but I acknowledge that future research undertaken 
in such collections may help strengthen, or indeed complicate, the findings that I 
present in this dissertation.  
 
As well as archival sources I have also accessed a number of personal diaries 
and evidence from oral history projects. A prominent (perhaps even fashionable) 
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source in Republican Chinese historiography at the moment is the Chiang Kai-shek 
diaries, held at the Hoover Institution in Stanford. I was unable to access the diaries, as 
I did not have the financial resources to travel to Stanford. However, I believe that the 
archival materials collected in both Europe and East Asia provide sufficient evidence 
for this project. Moreover, the Chiang diaries have been screened thoroughly by Yang 
Tianshi (2010b), who has included large amounts of diary content related to the 
German Resistance in his publications. The amount of evidence directly related to the 
Resistance which Yang cites from the diaries is rather limited in scope, which may 
suggest that the diaries themselves did not contain much information relevant to this 
topic.  
Oral history projects are also a fascinating source, but the individuals who come 
to the fore in this project have not left significant material in this form. Additionally, while 
scholars such as Hsi-huey Liang, working in the 1970s, were able to directly interview 
many of the individuals involved in the Sino-German relationship, I have not been able 
to apply a similar methodology due simply to the fact that none of the key figures in my 
project are still alive. 
 
 
Introduction to WWII Sino-foreign relations literature, 1937-1945 
The War of Resistance (1937-1945) has attracted a significant amount of 
attention in Western and Asian academia over recent years. While in the early decades 
following WWII many scholars focused more on the question of “Who lost China”, in 
more recent years, Western academic research has shifted to the social, cultural, and 
economic developments and consequences of these crucial years on China’s 
population. Chinese academia, on the other hand, is currently creating and questioning 
its own narrative of wartime Republican Chinese historiography, which also includes 
foreign relations. This literature review provides a short overview of the current state of 
Chinese and Western research on Sino-foreign relations. It then moves on to focus 
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more deeply on literature on Sino-German relations during the war years. It also 
highlights the gap in research that this project intends to fill.  
 
 
Chinese research on Sino-foreign relations 
The history of the Republic of China before 1949 and, in particular, during WWII, 
has gained increasing academic and popular interest in China in recent years, with a 
rich Chinese literature continuing to flourish (Mitter, 2005, 524). Domestic change, 
ideological adaptation and increasing nationalism in the PRC have all coincided with a 
re-evaluation of the past, described by one American historian as a “new remembering” 
(Coble, 2007, 402) of the war.7 This trend is evidenced in a wide range of journals and 
publications, such as Minguo Dang’an, or Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu (Coble, 2007, 402), 
and the construction of memorials that commemorate the war dead, such as on the site 
of the Nanjing Massacre of December 1937 (He Yinan, 2007, 8).8 
In contrast to Western academia, Chinese academic research focuses 
overwhelmingly on the crucial time of the Chinese War of Resistance, which started 
WWII in East Asia in July 1937. In connection with this period, a recent discourse on 
the role of Chiang Kai-shek, the Guomindang (GMD) and the presence of foreign 
powers in China has emerged. Kirby (1997, 436) argues that, since the 1990s, 
mainland Chinese scholarship has created good work in regard to the history of 
Republican Chinese diplomacy. Prior to this period well-researched literature on 
Chinese diplomacy had been published during the Republican period, but during the 
Cold War until 1990, successive Chinese governments limited archival access (Kirby, 
                                               
7 Coble (2007, 402) termed this development China’s “new remembering”; a re-evaluation of China’s own 
past, which coincided with domestic change; the opening to the outside world and ideological adaptation. 
Prior to the “Reform and Opening period”, memory of the Sino-Japanese war hardly found its way into 
public life. If this period was discussed, it would have had to follow the narrative authorised by the CCP, 
which “privileged the revolution and the leadership of the Communist Party” (Coble, 2007, 395). The 
GMD’s or foreign participant’s role in these events was neglected. Only with the “Reform and Opening 
Policy” in the 1980s did a gradual rehabilitation of other historical topics find its way into public memory 
(Coble, 2007, 397). 
8  Minguo Dang’an is a journal that publishes selected archival material and journal articles on the 
Republican Era. Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu publishes journal articles on the War of Resistance against 
Japan. Coble (2007, 402) noted that the journal published on topics that have been “previously off limits”.  
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1997, 436). In the last twenty years, Chongqing China’s foreign diplomacy, however, 
played an important part in PRC-Chinese historiography, as it is used to reshape 
Republican China’s image internally, re-evaluate her position in the pre-Cold War 
international community (Wang Zhen, 2003), and explain domestic WWII developments, 
as well as the structure of and competition bethween the Nationalist Chinese Foreign 
Office and additional organisations involved in China’s foreign relations (Chen Yan, 
2002b).  
Within this literature on Sino-foreign wartime relations, the role of Chiang Kai-
shek takes centre stage, and significant research redefines his character, motives and 
influence on events. Chen Renxia’s research (2003a, 92) indiciates that external 
developments (e.g. Hitler’s obsession with the Soviet Union, the secret foreign policy of 
German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop) complicated Chinese foreign policy, 
and hindered Chiang Kai-shek’s plans of good Sino-German relations.9 At the same 
time, Chen (2003a, 104) calls it “regrettable” that domestic Chinese academia hardly 
explored mid-1930s Republican Chinese foreign policy efforts directed at Germany and 
Japan. Amongst Chinese scholars working on Chiang Kai-shek, Yang Tianshi is 
arguably the most prolific, with much of his scholarship focusing specifically on the 
Chiang diaries at Stanford (Yang, 2007; 2011a and 2011b, in cooperation with Yang 
Yuping). The work of Yang and other scholars such as Chen Yan (2002b), indicates a 
research approach that, as Chen (2002b, 343-344) argues, was previously lacking in 
Chinese research. This approach calls for a focus on individuals involved in events, as 
this would help to explain domestic Chinese developments more thoroughly than 
before. Indeed, even more research has come out in the meantime that looks at 
individuals around Chiang Kai-shek and presents their role in the war, such as Deng 
and Wang (2012), who researched Chiang’s main generals, one of which was Chiang 
Kai-shek’s contact to the German side during WWII.  
                                               
9  Chen Renxia (2003a, 92) attempts to rehabilitate Chiang Kai-shek by suggesting that the alliance 
between the Third Reich and Japan was out of the Generalissimo’s control. Moreover, Chinese academia 
acknowledges the foreign relations difficulties the Nationalist government faced before 1937, which 
influenced events during the war (Chen, 2003a, 104).  
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Chinese academics’ work focuses on the re-evaluation of a century 
characterised by the “shameful treatment” by World Powers, which started with the 
“Unequal Treaties” in 1842. The PRC’s own increasingly influential role as a major 
political and economic power in the international community may also have contributed 
to the growing interest in the history of Republican Chinese foreign relations. As a 
result of the high level of foreign involvement in 19th and 20th century China, debate on 
the historical role of foreign powers in China is an important part of China's evaluation 
of her own role today. Current Chinese research tends to focus on Republican Chinese 
foreign policy in relation to China's role in the international community. In general, the 
tendency is to explore China’s relations with several countries in one publication 
simultaneously (Li, 2012). In many cases, scholars such as Yan and Li (2008) link the 
US and Britain closely together, with the focus on US aid. The Soviet Union and 
Germany are treated separately, and are discussed, for example, in regard to the 
Soviet-German Non Aggression Pact. Often the impact such international 
developments had on China are explored (see Yan and Li, 2008, 157-174).10 Foreign 
countries which had once been identified with Imperialism (especially during the Mao 
years), tend now to be perceived more positively.11 As an indication we can see the 
construction of museums that commemorate foreign individuals who fought in the WWII 
East Asian Theatre, 12  alongside memorials of the Chinese victims of WWII. This 
development, sanctioned by the CCP government, has been termed “history activism” 
by Reilly (2006, 190). Simultaneously, a number of recent publications do not shy away 
from casting former allies, such as the Soviet Union (and, for example, her negotiations 
with Japan in 1940), in a more negative light (see Yan and Li, 2008, 174).  
                                               
10 For example see Xu Lan (1990). Xu Lan discussed the connections between the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese war (July 1937) and the League of Nations Conference in Brussels from October 1937 until 
November 1937. Xu (1990, 102) criticises the behaviour of foreign powers (mainly Britain and the US) from 
abstaining from the conflict, and only looking after their own interests.  
11 The large amount of articles on the Nanjing massacre may have influenced the perception of foreign 
powers positively, while Japan’s image still is largely defined by atrocities carried out during the war, not 
only in China but also in other parts of Asia.  
12 In the city of Chongqing a museum that commemorates US General Joseph Stilwell has opened, and 
shows among other objects, a bust of Stilwell.  
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As most Chinese publications cover China’s relations with the most important 
countries in one single work, the reader can grasp the different intentions and 
motivations at work. On the other side, less time and space is devoted to single topics, 
and the information provided remains rather shallow. In Yan and Li (2008), for example, 
the period of the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact, the Munich Crisis, the content 
of the pact, as well as international and Chinese reactions, are covered in about 20 
pages. Through this process, however, Chinese academia is creating a new narrative 
and image of the Sino-Japanese war. 
While Western Powers tend to be dealt with in the same publication, there is a 
myriad of publications that deal only with Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, the Sino-
Japanese war is, and has been, used by the Chinese CCP government to promote 
nationalism and to legitimise its own position (Reilly, 2006, 193). As a result of the 
increased nationalism that has been promoted in China in place of Marxism-Leninism, 
China’s Japan policy has changed, and this has eventually led to an increase in 
references to atrocities committed by Japan during the war. At the same time China’s 
role as a victim, but also as a victorious power, has been emphasised. Chinese 
universities and the Chinese public more generally, have now great access to articles 
that are concerned with Japanese atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre (see for 
example Wang Weixing, 2005). 13  Unintentionally, but also interestingly, scholars 
interested in Sino-German relations can draw much information from these publications, 
because the Third Reich is usually mentioned on the periphery of Sino-Japanese 
relations. 
 
 
 
                                               
13 The involvement of foreigners as leaders of the so-called “Safety Zone” in Nanjing during the massacre 
increasingly features in Chinese research, and finds its expression for example in the 2005 movie Nanking. 
The movie was based on the diaries of German Siemens manager John Rabe, and US missionary Minnie 
Vaultrin. This movie is a perfect example of the “new remembering”. Wickert (1997) published the part of 
Rabe’s diaries that described the Nanjing Massacre in German first, and these were then published in 
English under the name of Rabe with the title The good German of Nanking: the diaries of John Rabe 
(1999). 
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Chinese research on Sino-German relations 
While there exists research on the Nanjing Massacre and also a translation of 
John Rabe’s diary accounts of that event into English, another aspect that Chinese 
scholars have focused on are 1930s diplomatic relations between the Third Reich and 
China.14 The German foreign relation shift, away from Nationalist China and towards 
Japan between 1936 and 1938, has been subject to a substantial amount of Chinese 
research, and Germany’s relations with these two East Asian nations have been seen 
as a “triangular” relationship (e.g. Chen Renxia, 2003b).  
Research covering Sino-German relations exclusively deals mostly with trade, 
military and official diplomatic relations (see He Lan, 1997; Zhou Jianming, 2006). 
Western research carried out by scholars such as William Kirby in earlier decades has 
had a particularly great influence on modern Chinese scholars, but has also led to a 
narrow perception of Sino-German relations in the Chinese accounts. The German 
military mission and its role in the Sino-Japanese war have often been explored (see 
Fu, 1998a, 1998b), as well as their contribution to the Chinese fight against Japan. 
Sino-German economic cooperation has been explored with a wide range of topics, 
ranging from “Industrial Diplomacy” (Sun (2004) to a comparison of the economic 
benefits that China offered to Germany (raw materials, agricultural products) with the 
ones she finally gained from her alliance with Japan. These publications questioned 
why Germany even considered siding with Japan in the first place, if China had the 
much better trade relations with her. Such a question silently underscores research on 
Sino-German trade, which focuses on the economic boom years of 1936 and 1937 
(see Cai and Wu, 2006a).  
 
                                               
14 Siemens representative John Rabe headed the “Safety Zone” set up in Nanjing by a number of foreign 
individuals, e.g. from the US, and Britain (Wang, 2005, 106). Rabe’s connections to the NSDAP and the 
German authorities contributed to the survival of the zone.  
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While the role of Sino-German trade and military relations, including the work on 
HAPRO,15 has been growing, there is little scholarship which looks beyond the end of 
official Sino-German relations in July 1941. In this specific aspect, Chinese historians 
do not differ much from their Western counterparts. Scholarship in English, German 
and Chinese tends to limit the story of Sino-German relations to the period of the 1920s, 
1930s and until shortly before July 1941. It is commonly acknowledged, for instance, 
that with the end of official Sino-German diplomatic relations, in the wake of German 
acknowledgment of the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist government with Japan, all 
contact between Berlin and Chongqing ended. Despite this common timeline, however, 
there are some subtle differences in the ways in which Germany and her role during 
WWII are perceived by Chinese and Western academics.  
Attitudes toward the Third Reich are, of course, diverse. Despite Germany’s role 
as an Axis partner of Japan, many references in Chinese scholarship to her role in the 
war are positive. The Third Reich and her atrocities are far more prevalent in Western 
historiography and minds than in China. The reason for this is perhaps the positive way 
that the technological aid (in the form of military advisors and weapons that were sent 
to China by Germany between 1927 and 1938) are viewed in China today. The terrible 
events of the Holocaust, and the heavy fighting in and bombing of large parts of Europe 
by the Third Reich, represent the primary war experience for European countries. In 
this respect, almost all Western work on the Third Reich is coloured by this knowledge. 
Without wanting to downplay or discount such narratives, however, it is important to 
keep in mind that the Third Reich is not necessarily remembered in this way in China 
itself. Such differences are not necessarily new, either: as we will see below, this 
difference in the public memory of the war also influenced Churchill’s and Chiang Kai-
shek’s perception of Nazi Germany and their approach to the German Resistance 
during WWII, respectively.  
                                               
15 Handelsgesellschaft für industrielle Produkte (Trading Company for Industrial Products). A consortium of 
German business, including for example Siemens. The founder of HAPRO, Hans Klein enjoyed good 
connections in China, and secured major trade contracts for his clients.  
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In the last three years, a noticeable shift has taken place in Chinese academia 
which has opened up the field for research on the connections between Chiang Kai-
shek and the German Resistance movement of 20 July 1944. Yang Tianshi (2010b) 
published his theory in the Taiwanese journal Zhuanji Wenxue and suggested that the 
German Resistance once asked Chiang Kai-shek to mediate with the Allies and to 
provide financial aid. With little evidence to substantiate his claims (beyond that which 
was found in Chiang Kai-shek's own diaries), Yang has been harshly criticised for such 
a notion in China.16   
This dissertation attempts, amongst its other aims, to establish that such a link 
that Yang Tianshi (2010b) has suggested was indeed there, and to explore aspects of 
the clandestine connection between the German Resistance and Chiang Kai-shek. 
Yang’s work in this regard is of help, but reaction to his work also highlights the 
shortcomings in the current field in China and Taiwan. One goal of my research is to 
encourage further research in this field by Chinese scholars.  
 While narratives of the German Resistance against Hitler are positive, 
references to Hitler and the Nazi government in Chinese publications are becoming 
more diverse. Bi Ye (1994, 52), for instance, argues that Hitler was tricked and 
pressurised by Japan into allowing relations with China to deteriorate. The argument is 
that Hitler and his government were not strong enough to resist Japanese pressure, 
and that if it had not been for Japanese meddling, Germany might otherwise have 
stood on China’s side. In cooperation with Wu Jiajia (2006a), and in a cooperation with 
Wang Anping (2006b), Cai Sheng on the other hand is far more critical and uses a 
combination of strategic and ideological arguments to show why Hitler chose Japan 
over China. The reference to Hitler’s ideological work Mein Kampf is used to highlight 
                                               
16 For more information on the reaction to Yang’s work see: Chapter Two and Chapter Six. The criticism 
Yang faced is referred to in more detail in Chapter 6, where I take up the case of his article again. For 
more information on the criticism Yang (2010b) faced, see: www.military.china.com (article from 03 March 
2011, read on 20 May 2012, link: http://military.china.com/history4/62/20110303/16409635.html); 
www.mil.huongqiu.com, 01 May 2012, read on 20 May 2012, link: http://mil.huanqiu.com/Forum/2012-
05/2676096_2.html); and www.chinataiwan.org (article from 02 July 2011, read on 20 May 2012, link: 
http://www.chinataiwan.org/wh/dswh/wtxx/201007/t20100702_1439032.htm, probably taken from 
Dongfang Zaobao). Also see: Wang Rongzu (2013). 
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the theory that the Nazi German government harboured discriminatory feelings towards 
Chinese individuals, and only saw the cooperation with China as temporary (Cai and 
Wu, 2006a, 52-53). In essence, this approach can shed light on the question why Hitler 
chose Japan over China, despite the latter having good relations with and economic 
importance to the Third Reich.  
I do not assume that this occasional positive depiction of the Third Reich is the 
pre-dominant perception in China, but in the course of research it became clear that 
very different perceptions of Nazi Germany exist in the realms of Chinese academia, 
and Europe.  
 
Chinese scholarship has contributed greatly to a new and emerging image of 
the Republican Era, and has positively revisited and re-evaluated many of that period's 
main events. There exist a number of criticisms, however, for example that Chinese 
historical research on Republican Chinese foreign policy lacks a proper conceptual 
framework (Chen Yan, 2002b, 343). Also, the choice of research topics has been 
rather limited over the years, and has only recently started to broaden to include 
controversial facts of Republican Chinese history, for example the foreign relations of 
the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist government in Nanjing (Chen Yan, 2002b). 17 
Notable work has been published in this field by Western scholars such as John Hunter 
Boyle (1972) and Timothy Brook (2005), and cooperation in the field of Chinese 
wartime collaboration with Western researchers might help bring the two strands of 
scholarship closer together.  
Further criticism can relate to the extensive use of oral histories and diaries, 
which are used while rarely questioning the writer’s intention. Oral records of former 
diplomats and military personnel, such as those used by Li (2012), provide a 
fascinating insight into events, but have not provided any additional information to our 
                                               
17 At this point I would like to mention that this thesis will not explore how the secret Sino-German 
connections were perceived by the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist government in Nanjing. Even though 
this aspect would clearly be of great interest, it would go beyond the scope of this paper. Future research 
can focus on such elements which have to be left out at this time.  
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understanding of Sino-foreign relations in this period. Without sufficient background 
information and evaluation, this information cannot be fully integrated into the wider 
context of Republican Chinese historiography.  
Additionally, Chinese scholars have yet to fully exploit the possibilities 
presented by European or US archives (apart, of course, from Chinese-language 
material held at the Hoover Institution in Stanford). As an example, Yang (2010b) has 
been unable to further support his theory of links between the German Resistance and 
Chiang Kai-shek by substantiating his findings with non-Chinese evidence. More 
thorough work in, for example, the German archives, would have uncovered much 
evidence in support of Yang's argument. That there is indeed much evidence to be 
found in Western archives is a fact I hope to underline in this very dissertation. In 
particular, in fields such as foreign relations, such collections can prove vital to finding 
information in the country in question, be it Sino-German-, Sino-US- or Sino-Soviet 
relations. In this project it was vital to back findings made in East Asia with European or 
US material, as material in the field of clandestine relations is much harder to find.18  
Additionally, research cooperation between Western and Asian academia is still 
limited, as the limited presence of Western research included in Chinese-language 
publications attests. This criticism is equally valid for Western scholars, who often have 
a tendency to overlook Chinese research, while incorporating East Asian archival 
material. Hu (1983, 431) argues many scholars in the West would either not know or 
deny Chinese academic tradition a similar credibility to Western traditions. Hu wrote 
these words 30 years ago, at a time when both academic sides had started to work 
with each other. In particular in the last 10 years, Chinese and Western academics 
have been working together, in order to explore Republican history and it is possible for 
both sides to learn from each other. Through research outcomes and archival access, 
scholarships in China and the West increasingly shape the other side’s point of view 
and tradition.   
                                               
18 Information are often stored in several files, under different subjects. Researchers in this field need to 
consider all kind of possible locations for their fieldwork.  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
33 
 
Recent Western research on Sino-foreign relations 
Following the war, much research on Sino-foreign relations was facilitated in the 
US. Like their Chinese counterparts, Western scholars were deeply influenced by past 
events and politics, most importantly WWII and the context of the Cold War. These 
events shaped the focus of discussions for decades to come.  
The cold war paradigm saw a highly polarised scholarship on Sino-US, or Sino-
foreign wartime relations. US Historians critical of the Nationalist government during 
WWII and on Taiwan faced difficulties during the 1950s, such as Owen Lattimore, who 
was accused of being the “shadowy Communist mastermind behind American policy in 
East Asia” that had resulted in the “loss of China” (Newman, 1992, x). This trend 
changed in the 1960s with the backlash of the Vietnam War. At this time critical 
discussion on Sino-US wartime relations and in particular of Chiang Kai-shek emerged 
(e.g. Gary May, 1979; Brian Crozier, 1977).19 I will not lay out academic research from 
the 1950s until the 1980s any further, as this would divert too much attention away 
from the focus on diplomatic history and the literature on Sino-German wartime 
relations.  
The 1980s saw a lifting of the restrictions on substantial archival material in 
China, Taiwan, the US and Europe that had characterised earlier research. Ever since 
then, the historiography of Sino-foreign diplomacy and relations has been reshaped 
and reinterpreted. The number of publications on Republican China’s diplomatic history 
has been rather limited, compared to other aspects of research that focus more on 
cultural and social elements of the Republican period. As Kirby (1997, 436) argues, 
diplomatic history has all but been “chased…from that small patch of the Chinese field 
that has continued to study foreign relations”. Influential historians in the 1980s that 
have focused on Republican Chinese diplomatic history are John Garver (1988) and 
                                               
19 The rapprochement between the US and the PRC in 1971 that culminated in President Nixon’s China 
visit on 21 February 1972 may also have played a role, as the Nationalist government on Taiwan came 
under increasing pressure to modernise.  
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John P. Fox (1982), amongst others.20 Christopher Thorne (1978) also needs to be 
mentioned at this point. Even though Thorne’s 1978 publication Allies of a Kind: The 
United States, Britain and the war against Japan, 1941-1945 explores primarily US-
British relations and their evolution before and after Pearl Harbor, at the same time, 
Thorne includes other countries in Asia such as China in his research.  
The 1970s saw a number of publications on wartime peace feelers between the 
US and Japan as well as Japan and China. John Hunter Boyle’s work (1972) stands 
out as one of the great publications on Sino-Japanese peace feelers, especially since it 
clearly showed the continued willingness of Japan to negotiate an agreement with 
Chongqing, before and after the acknowledgement of the Wang Jingwei 
Collaborationist government in Nanjing on 30 November 1940. Lack of Japanese 
confidence in Wang’s government, indeed, resulted in several peace feelers throughout 
1940 (Usui, 1983, 407). Chongqing China’s motives on the other hand are not too clear, 
as the negotiations may have been genuine, or used to disrupt the cooperation 
between Wang and Japan (Usui, 1983, 415-416). While peace feelers to Chongqing 
represented one way to solve the Sino-Japanese war, post-December 1941, Japan 
also attempted to bring about an exit from the war through negotiations with the US in 
neutral states (Koshiro, 2001, 435). As will become evident, the field of Allied-Axis 
peace feelers is not new, but has so far lacked any connections between Chiang Kai-
shek, Nazi Germany and Japan after the break of official Sino-German relations. The 
Third Reich is clearly omitted from the discussion on Sino-Japanese peace feelers, as 
academics may have concluded that Sino-German relations ceased to exist by July 
1941. This dissertation, however, will shed light on a clandestine back channel network 
that allowed Chiang Kai-shek to maintain connections to both Germany and Japan 
                                               
20 For more information on Republican Chinese-British relations see for example Li (1992). The publication 
focuses more on CCP-British relations, but due to the close connections between GMD and CCP, the 
relations between the GMD and Britain are also featured. Other research on Sino-British relations focuses 
on the rather ambivalent relationship between Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, see for example La 
Feber (1975) and Lowe (1974).  These publications represent only a fraction of the work on Sino-British 
relations. 
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after December 1941. Hence, adding further depth to our knowledge of clandestine 
behind-the-scene activities carried out by Chongqing China.  
In relation to Garver’s publication on Sino-Soviet relations, Slavinsky’s (2004) 
work on the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact may be of interest, as it covers Sino-
Soviet and Sino-Japanese diplomacy on the periphery. Garver (1988) explored the 
dynamics and motivations behind Sino-Soviet relations, Soviet East Asian foreign 
policy and explained well the relationship triangle between the Soviet Union, the CCP 
and the Nationalist Government. The work was well received and praised for the 
richness of its sources, but also criticised for the author’s attempt to “enhance Chiang’s 
reputation as a diplomat” (Goldstein, 1990, 1058). Goldstein (1990, 1058) instead 
argues that Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy approach saved China in the short term, 
but failed to establish long-lasting alliances. Foo (2011, 2-3), on the other hand, credits 
Garver with this re-evaluation and appears to agree with him. For this dissertation, 
Foo’s comment (Foo, 2011, 6) that the role of Chiang Kai-shek’s special 
representatives that were posted abroad by the Generalissimo himself is largely 
unknown, is of great interest. I intent to shed further light on this chapter of wartime 
Chinese diplomacy, and explore how Chiang’s special representatives operated as part 
of back channels and upheld communication between Chiang Kai-shek and Germany. 
Moreover, this dissertation will show the negative influence the Chinese pragmatic 
foreign policy approach had on Sino-Allied relations. This will contribute to the debate 
on Chiang’s foreign policy and diplomacy skills. 
 
Despite a lack of research on diplomatic history, the most current publications 
on Republican China come as part of a new trend in the research of Republican 
Chinese wartime history. This new trend provides much stimulus to the exploration of 
Republican Chinese wartime diplomatic history, and this long-overdue re-evaluation 
needs to be addressed. My work will complement the new interpretation of Republican 
Chinese historiography already created by the researchers introduced below.  
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One of the most recent and critically discussed publications to appear in the last 
ten years has been Jay Taylor’s The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle 
for Modern China (2009). While often criticised for relying too heavily on selective 
passages from Chiang Kai-shek’s diaries and not taking into account large numbers of 
archival material available on Taiwan (Tsang, 2010, 153), Taylor has succeeded in 
reshaping and questioning our perception of Chiang Kai-shek and his role in modern 
China, especially in regards to Chiang's actions during the war years. In Taylor's 
analysis, for example, the US is often presented as having been indecisive about her 
strategy in China during the war, as well as manipulative and even ready to 
assassinate Chiang Kai-shek if necessary. While many aspects of this publication are 
debated in academia, Taylor’s work has emerged from a body of research that links 
leading Chinese individuals with modernity in Republican China.  
Since the late 1990s and 2000 a good number of publications contributed to this 
new trend and the re-evaluation of China’s role in WWII.21 Interestingly, it appears that 
Western academia has become a little too focused on the question of modernity at the 
expense of other topics. This can be seen in publications which often explore Chinese 
foreign relations in the wider context of Chinese modernity, for example in Laura Tyson 
Li’s (2006) interesting work on Soong May-ling. Republican China’s First Lady is 
always linked with Chinese modernity and the struggle for Sino-US relations, alongside 
her brother T.V. Soong (Tyson Li, 2006; Kuo, 2009). Increasingly, personal insights 
from former GMD civil servants are published with a focus on the role of such 
individuals in Sino-foreign relations (e.g., Foo, 2011; Hoo, 1998). Such publications of 
personal accounts further shed light on Chiang Kai-shek’s own role in Chinese foreign 
relations. There is a debate in academia on Chiang’s direct involvement in the wartime 
administration, a debate that Chang Jui-te (2007, 66) continued in research on the 
Generalissimo’s use of “personal directives (shouling)”, which may or may not have 
been responsible for the failure of the Chongqing Chinese administration. In this 
                                               
21 Other research attempting to redefine Nationalist China is Wakeman Jr. and Edmonds, 2000. 
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research, Chang focused mainly on the impact Chiang Kai-shek’s personal directives 
had on the military hierarchy in wartime China. This dissertation, however, will look at 
another field where Chiang Kai-shek likely issued personal directives: foreign 
diplomacy, or more precisely, BCD. Chen Yan (2002b) has already highlighted the 
administrative structure of the Nationalist administration that allowed Chiang Kai-shek 
to influence Sino-foreign relations. 
Another example of a new type of scholarship and research focus is Rana 
Mitter’s (2013) recent publication on the Sino-Japanese war. Moving away from an 
older view of China as a weak nation, Mitter redirects his focus onto the efforts that 
China made to the overall war effort in terms of resistance. Sometimes highlighted in 
previous publications, Mitter stresses that China’s survival and fight were crucial for the 
outcome of WWII as we know it; a point that this dissertation supports and further 
elaborates on.  
This new scholarship provides us with more of an insight into decision making 
in wartime Chongqing, as well as a view of the dynamics behind China’s foreign 
relations and diplomacy, away from single foci on either the US or China. While 
research on the war years is largely dominated by Sino-US, Sino-Japanese or Sino-
Soviet relations, Sino-German relations have been excluded from research. However, 
recent research has shown that Republican Chinese wartime diplomacy may have 
been more multi-faceted than we think. Therefore, it is important to redirect our focus to 
pre-war and wartime diplomatic history, which have received so little attention over the 
last 20 years, compared to social and cultural aspects of China’s internationalism 
during the same period.  
Since wartime Chinese diplomatic history is little researched, a combination of 
diplomatic and intelligence history, as applied in this dissertation, is rare. Chinese 
intelligence has been researched in the past (Wakeman Jr., 2003; Yu, 2006; 
Schoenhals, 2013), but its application in Chinese foreign diplomacy represents a gap in 
research that needs to be addressed. This dissertation will enrich our limited 
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knowledge of Chinese diplomatic history by exploring the use of intelligence channels 
in wartime Sino-German relations, thus opening a new chapter of research in Sino-
foreign diplomacy.  
 
Anglophone and German literature on Sino-German relations 
In Western literature there exist two main strands of research on Republican 
Sino-German relations. One strand examines Sino-German relations primarily within 
the context of Republican Chinese economic performance, or as part of comparative 
work which explores the similarities between the Third Reich and Nationalist China. 
The main aspect of such work was to determine whether Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Guomindang were German-style fascists. Classic works in this vein were Lloyd 
Eastman’s “Fascism in Kuomintang China” (1972) and Maria Chang’s “Fascism and 
Modern China” (1979). While these publications remain an integral part of research and 
highlight important facets and questions, they have tended to push research on Sino-
German relations into what might be termed a “fascism corner”, in which questions 
beyond ideology are ignored. 
 Even though the question of whether Chiang Kai-shek was a fascist in the Hitler 
mode, and the extent to which he idolised or tried to emulate National Socialism, is still 
hotly debated (e.g., Taylor, 2009, 101-102), English and German-speaking researchers 
only started to detach research on Sino-German relations from this element of fascism 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Researchers to be credited with such work include William C. 
Kirby (1984), John P. Fox (1982), Hsi-Huey Liang (1978), Bernd Martin (1981, 2003), 
Mechthild Leutner (1998) and Stefan Berleb (2005). The focus of this scholarship tends 
to be on several aspects of 1930s Sino-German relations, including military, trade, and 
diplomatic relations. The picture that emerges from such scholarship is one of close 
cooperation between the German military and industry and the Nanjing government. 
The cooperation between the Germans and Chinese was initially confronted with a 
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reluctant German Foreign Office that rejected too close Sino-German cooperation, in 
particular in the military sector. 
Other prominent scholarship by Fox (1982) unravelled the myth of a single 
German East Asian foreign policy, and clearly pointed out the conflict between 
Chinese-friendly and Japanese-friendly political groups inside the German 
administration and industry. The existence of several competing groups in Germany 
and China, and subsequently their influence on foreign policy is important to this 
dissertation, as I intend to show the involvement of factions in BCD and Sino-German 
relations. These clandestine back channels were indeed fostered in an atmosphere of 
continuous competition over foreign policy. This will broaden our understanding of the 
Sino-German and Republican Chinese foreign policy.  
 One pattern that emerges in this research field is a focus mainly on individuals, 
and predominantly those at the periphery of state institutions, such as the German 
Foreign Office. This is indeed the case in research carried out by Liang (1978, 1999) 
and Kirby (1984). Such an approach clearly has its benefits, especially in the case of 
Sino-German relations. Individuals and their connections with Chiang Kai-shek played 
a crucial role in the facilitation of trade and military relations in the 1930s. This 
dissertation will take a similar approach, since clandestine Sino-German channels ran 
outside the German Foreign Office through individuals. Furthermore, diplomacy 
through back channels tends to be limited to individuals, and seldom includes a 
governmental organisation until the end.   
The complicated nature of Sino-German pre-WWII relations becomes clear in 
Liang’s The Sino-German Connection (1978). This work contributes to our 
understanding of Sino-German relations, as it helps to unravel the different factions in 
both Germany and China. At the same time Liang also shows us again the importance 
of individuals in Sino-German relations, as it becomes clear that much contact during 
the late 1930s had already started to run through private channels, alongside official 
diplomatic ones. This work remains one of the seminal texts on the presence of 
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German advisors in Chiang Kai-shek’s China, and it has been cited in further work on 
Republican Chinese military history (e.g. Sutton, 1982).  
Liang is also one of the first scholars to have pointed out the connections 
between Chiang Kai-shek, his envoys to Germany and the German state intelligence 
service Abwehr (Defence). This hitherto seldom mentioned aspect of Sino-German 
relations had been overshadowed by official events, but provides a first stepping stone 
into my project to further link Chinese foreign relations with the European war and 
Chiang Kai-shek to diplomacy through intelligence. This dissertation will further explore 
the possible involvement of the Chinese Secret Service 22  in Republican Chinese 
foreign policy, and will allow me to rectify the lack of “inquiries into the question of 
foreign participation in the German Resistance” (Liang, 1978, 143). Indeed, research 
on the German Resistance has not discussed the role of foreigners in its midst, with the 
vast amount of work focusing instead on the movement’s relations with foreign powers 
outside the Third Reich. This started with Hans Bernd Gisevius’ Bis zum bitteren Ende 
(Until the Bitter End, 1946), in which he came to term with first-hand experiences from 
his time in the Resistance movement. Over the last thirty years a number of 
researchers have explored the relations between the Resistance movement and the 
US and Britain, especially attempts made by the Resistance to seek Allied support for 
the toppling of the Nazi government (see Deutsch, 1981; Hoffmann, 1986; 1988; 
1991).23 China has not been included in this kind of research so far. The possibility of 
                                               
22 Due to rife factionalism inside the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, there existed at least two 
“secret services”, each run by a different body of people. Dubbed the “Chinese Himmler” (Yeh, 1989, 545), 
General Dai Li headed the Juntong, and worked directly for Chiang Kai-shek. In academia, the association 
of Dai Li with Chiang and the Blue Shirt Society (Lanyishe) tends to divert the focus more towards the 
already discussed issue of fascism in the Republican government. Despite this tendency, researchers 
have explored the links between Dai Li and foreign intelligence services; these were, however, limited to 
the US secret service (Wakeman, 1992, and Wakeman Jr., 2003). Any connections to the German secret 
service are not mentioned, even though Wakeman Jr. (2003, 55-84) establishes several links between Dai 
Li and crucial individuals involved in clandestine Sino-German relations. For more information on secret 
services in Chongqing China, foreign and Chinese, also see Elphick (1997) and Yu (2006). 
23 Members of the Resistance movement took up important positions in the German intelligence service 
Abwehr. German literature on the Abwehr is relatively numerous and very often focuses on the individual 
of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Resistance member and head of the service until February 1944. Already in 
the 1950’s research on his person started, see for example Abshagen’s (1954) Canaris, Patriot und 
Weltbürger (Canaris, Patriot and Citizen of the World). Focus on Canaris further increased in the 1970s 
with Höhne’s (1976) Canaris, Patriot im Zwielicht (Canaris, Patriot under Twilight). With time, the research 
focus shifted more and more to the intelligence service itself and its actions—in German literature, in 
particular Oscar Reile’s publication Der deutsche Geheimdienst im II. Weltkrieg. Ostfront. Die Abwehr im 
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Chinese contacts to the Resistance movement cannot be rejected, as Liang (1978; 
1999) already showed. Based on his work, I intent to further explore the communication 
links between Chiang Kai-shek and the two German groups, “Berlin” and the German 
Resistance that made up wartime clandestine Sino-German relations.  
 
Without wanting to downplay the importance of the above-mentioned research, 
I would like to note a number of problems that remain. As I mentioned, Western and 
Chinese language research on Sino-German relations shares two crucial 
characteristics. First, the deterioration of Sino-German relations in the process of 
German-Japanese rapprochement, the signing of the Anti Comintern Pact (November 
1936), the recall of the German ambassador and the military mission in summer 1938, 
are all seen as the end to Sino-German diplomatic relations. As a result, many 
researchers treat the time until the official end of relations in July 1941 as a period with 
much less activity and importance. All research then stops at the point of July 1941 
when Germany acknowledged the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist government in 
Nanjing, which prompted the breaking of relations with Chongqing. Very little prior 
research has gone beyond this point. The period during which these crucial events took 
place, 1938 until 1941, has been less thoroughly researched compared to pre-1938 
Sino-German relations. Hence, changes in the dynamics of Sino-German relations are 
known to a certain degree, but lack further exploration. This dissertation addresses the 
issue and highlights the continuation of Sino-German relations, and the increasing 
switch from diplomatic front channels to clandestine back channels.  
                                                                                                                                         
Kampf mit den Geheimdiensten im Osten (The German secret service during the Second World War. 
Eastern front. The Abwehr in the fight with secret services in the East) (1990). Besides the Abwehr there 
was also the SS-linked RSHA. The head of Department VI, “Foreign Espionage”, Walter Schellenberg, has 
been the subject of research in Germany by Reinhard Doerries (2003).  English language publications, in 
particular British ones, tend to focus on German intelligence services clashes with their British counterparts. 
The “Venlo-Incident” often attracts researchers, most likely because the British intelligence service was 
tricked by the RSHA and its agents caught in a trap. The British SIS actions and missions are often 
portrayed in contrast to that of their German counterpart, the Abwehr (e.g. Fedorovich, 2005; Aldrich, 
1998).  
 
 
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
42 
 
I fully agree with Liang (1978), who criticised the lack of research on the 
participation of foreign nationals in the German Resistance movement. Despite the 
good base that Liang’s initial research (1978) into connections between Chiang Kai-
shek and the German Resistance provided, this theory has not been picked up and 
further explored by other scholars. It is widely known that the Resistance movement 
tried to contact and engage with the Allies, however Chongqing China is always 
omitted from research on the foreign connections of the movement. The only 
exceptions, Liang (1978; 1999) and Yang (2010b) have failed to build on their findings, 
and to work for the inclusion of Chongqing China into the wider research on the 
German Resistance. Similarly, German and English-speaking scholars have failed to 
make the connections, even though Liang’s research is available in English. Here 
again, certain facts prohibited this development. Primarily, Chongqing China has hardly 
been perceived as a crucial element in WWII in Europe, thus scholars of European 
history did not regard research in Chinese archives as important, and likely as a waste 
of time.  
In this regard, the dissertation joins other recent research that attempts to re-
define Republican Chinese historiography, and not only demonstrate China’s 
importance during WWII to a wider audience, but also point out that Chongqing China 
did not stay aloof of events in Europe. That Chongqing China is primarily associated 
with the war in East Asia is evident in current research. Researchers, such as Taylor 
(2009), Mitter (2013), Boyle (1972), or even those who worked on Sino-Allied 
intelligence cooperation, such as Wakeman Jr (2003), or Yu Maochun (2006), focus on 
East Asia, leaving aside potential Chinese operations elsewhere.24  The number of 
research exploring wartime Chinese involvement in Europe or the US is largely 
confined to the diplomatic realm, researching the work of men such as T.V. Soong and 
Fu Bingchang, as well as Soong May-ling’s US journeys (Kuo, 2009; Foo, 2011, Tyson 
                                               
24 The great attention paid to Chiang Kai-shek’s involvement in the Burma Campaigns, his trip to India and 
the resistance against Japan clearly indicate that Chongqing is primarily researched in relation to the East 
Asian theatre of war.  
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Li, 2006). The combination of diplomatic and intelligence history brings Germany back 
into the research on Republican China, but, in contrast to previous research, introduces 
her as a part of WWII Chinese historiography. It moves beyond the known facts that 
the Third Reich maintained diplomatic relations with the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist 
government, as both Axis Powers continued to see the Chongqing government as the 
more crucial game-changer.25  
As a result of limited willingness to research Chongqing China’s involvement in 
the European war theatre and wartime Sino-German back channels, a number of 
interesting holdings in the Berne Bundesarchiv have been hardly consulted. Amongst 
the major academics who researched Sino-German relations in the late 1930s, Liang 
(1978) was the only one who visited the Berne archive. The exclusion of material by 
other scholars may also be related to the fact that important contemporary witnesses 
were still alive and could be interviewed. The information found in Berne 
complemented archival material from other sources and shed light on Chinese 
intelligence in war-torn Europe.   
This dissertation moves the boundaries of research from July 1941 until the end 
of WWII, hence expanding the focus of research. The argument that Chongqing China 
and the Third Reich cut all official ties, and that therefore no communication took place 
will be challenged by this dissertation. On the contrary, it will show that clandestine 
communication between Germany and individuals in Chongqing continued. 
 
 
Conclusion 
With wider access to primary archival sources in the PRC and Taiwan and the 
introduction of new approaches into the field in the last 20 years, research on Sino-
German relations, and the field of Sino-foreign relations more generally, was relegated 
to a far less prominent position. In its place, a new interest in Chinese urban history, 
                                               
25 The Japanese relations with Wang Jingwei and his Nanjing government are well researched by Boyle 
(1972).  
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consumer culture and socio-cultural change emerged (Mitter, 2005, 523). Economic 
historians such as Coble (2003; 2007) and Zanasi (2006), to name just a few, have 
also helped to promote new appraisals of the Nationalist Chinese economy and nation-
building efforts (also see Gerth, 2003; Dikötter, 2008).  As a result, over the last two 
decades, Chinese diplomatic history has largely been ignored.  
This trend has been noted by some scholars, with Kirby noting even in 1997 
(434) that “Diplomatic history has not been at the heart of Republican China studies”. It 
is my assertion in this dissertation, however, that there is scope to revisit this field. 
On the surface, research on Sino-German relations appears saturated, with 
major contributions having already been made by Kirby (1984), Ratenhof (1987), 
Berleb (2005), Liang (1978, 1999), and Martin (1981, 2003). Similarly, China’s relations 
with other major powers have already been explored in great depth. None of this 
should distract us from the fact, however, that many questions about China's relations 
with other great powers remain unanswered, and that there still exist a number of blind 
spots in the standard narrative of Republican Chinese foreign relations: the relationship 
between China and Germany after July 1941 is one such example. 
The notion that “all has been researched” in Sino-foreign relations has been 
countered in the last ten years, during which time we have witnessed a re-emergence 
of diplomacy and a re-evaluation of China’s role in WWII. Very often such scholarship 
has attempted to either take an objective approach or clearly focused on the Chinese 
side (Mitter, 2013). I intend to follow this new approach and redefine our understanding 
of WWII Sino-German relations, and Republican Chinese foreign policy more broadly.  
I will show that pragmatic, clandestine relations between Chiang Kai-shek and 
the two German groups, “Berlin” and the German Resistance, not only existed but 
formed part of a much larger pragmatic foreign policy approach. This project thus 
complements and builds on Boyle’s (1972) much earlier study of Sino-Japanese 
clandestine channels. Due to the fact that Sino-German wartime relations were 
clandestine after July 1941, I will apply an approach which remains novel in Chinese 
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historiography: a combination of diplomatic and intelligence history. Schoenhals (2013, 
10) argues that the inclusion of intelligence history can refine existing “narratives of 
relations” between groups, individuals and institutions which we study. While 
Schoenhals has argued this case for research on 1950s Communist Chinese 
intelligence, his point could quite easily be applied to research on the Republican era. 
Maochun Yu (2006) has also looked at how intelligence went hand-in-hand with Sino-
Allied relations. The nature of Sino-German relations examined in this dissertation 
leads to the conclusion that official diplomatic documents will be scarce, in particular 
after the break of official diplomatic relations. Hence, alternative sources had to be 
found. Given the strong intelligence affiliation of the agents that made up Sino-German 
back channels in Switzerland, additional archival material had to be stored in holdings 
on intelligence services and personnel. As a result, it can be concluded that a 
combination of diplomatic and intelligence documents is indeed the most suitable set of 
sources.  
My intention in this dissertation is not to challenge the importance of the US in 
the history of wartime China or to suggest that Chiang Kai-shek considered any other 
possible alliances than the one with the US. However, I would suggest that we need to 
bring other powers back into a story from which they have often been excluded. Hans 
van de Ven (2003, 3, 5-6) noted the US-centric approach to understanding Nationalist 
China’s wartime diplomacy, which has tended to shift the focus away from the 
pragmatic nature of Chinese diplomacy, with notable exceptions such as Boyle (1972) 
and Chen Yan (2002b). Instead, scholars, such as Zanasi (2006, 208), Jonathan Fenby 
(2004), Jay Taylor (2009) and Laura Tyson Li (2006), focused overwhelmingly on 
Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy to gain US support. It is the intention of this dissertation to 
divert from this US-centric approach that characterised a significant number of 
scholarly works, and will bring Germany back into the field of Republican Chinese 
wartime historiography. Within this dissertation, I wish to highlight that Chiang Kai-
shek’s foreign policy was driven by pragmatism. As this dissertation will reveal, such a 
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policy was influenced by interest groups surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the 
Generalissimo’s own involvement in foreign relations, which in turn were affected by 
the image and actions of foreign powers.  
This dissertation will contribute to the new interest in re-evaluating China’s 
WWII past. While Mitter and others focus parts of their re-evaluation on Sino-Allied 
relations, I intend to challenge our narrative of Sino-German relations and further 
extend previous research (such as Liang, 1978; 1999; Wakeman Jr., 2003; Yang, 
2010b) into the post-1941 era, hopefully resulting in a much more comprehensive 
picture of Sino-foreign relations in wartime.  
  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
47 
 
Chapter Three: Germany and China: An Overview 
 
As with many other European powers, Germany had maintained a presence in 
East Asia since the late 19th century. At that time, she was one of a range of imperialist 
powers that had sought to gain benefits from trade with China. A full discussion of 
Sino-German relations would be beyond the scope of this dissertation, and has in any 
case already been explored in works by Martin (1981), Kirby (1984) and Berleb (2005), 
to name just a few. Suffice to say at this stage, however, that while the trajectory of 
Germany’s relations with China up to the period of WWI was largely in keeping with 
those of other European powers, Sino-German relations, and subsequently German 
East Asian foreign policy, changed drastically in the aftermath of Versailles. The new 
dynamics of the Sino-German relationship would continue to hold sway until the 1930s, 
and nourish the hopes of Chinese and German factions for a lasting Sino-German 
alliance.  
Before the historical overview starts, a short note on the classification of 
different names for the Nationalist Chinese government is necessary to ensure that 
different periods are not confused with each other.  Much information in this 
dissertation originated from the time after September 1939, during which the Nationalist 
government had already shifted its capital to Chongqing, in Sichuan province. 
Therefore, the majority of time the Nationalist government will be referred to as the 
Chongqing government or Chongqing China. Any mention in the period before 
December 1937 (the fall of Nanjing) will refer to the Chinese government as the 
Nanjing government or Nanjing. From the fall of Nanjing in December 1937 until the 
end of October 1938, the capital of Nationalist China was Wuhan, which means that 
the Chinese government during this time is termed the “Nationalist wartime government 
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in Wuhan”.26 The government of Wang Jingwei, which was set up on 30 November 
1940 in Nanjing, is referred to as the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist government.  
 
The 1920s 
While political developments in China and Germany did not take place at the 
same time or at the same pace, developments within both countries had a profound 
impact on diplomatic relations between the two states throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
With the end of WWI, the newly established Weimar Republic inherited the political 
legacy of the war from the Kaiserreich (Empire). Accused by the German people of 
being saboteurs and backstabbers, who had worked toward the German defeat, the 
new republican government signed the Treaty of Versailles in November 1919. The 
post-war demands were perceived as a national shame, because amongst other things, 
Germany had lost all her overseas colonies, concessions and leased territories, 
including the ones in China (Ratenhof, 1987, 275). She was forbidden from dealing in 
weapons and lost the right of extraterritoriality in China. As a result, every German 
national in China was placed under Chinese jurisdiction from then onwards.  
The Weimar Republic was not the only country that felt mistreated by the terms 
of Versailles. The young Republic of China also suffered a perceived “national 
humiliation” (guochi), when the former German territories in Shandong were awarded 
to Japan, as a reward for her participation in WWI (Mitter, 2013, 32). This was even 
more of a shame, since the Chinese government in Beijing had declared war on 
Germany in 1917; hence she was one of the victorious Powers. In the course of the 
Versailles Peace conference, the Chinese delegation refused to sign the treaty. As a 
consequence, the Weimar Republic and the Beiyang government engaged with each 
                                               
26 In previous research, Wuhan is referred to as Hankou (Hankow). The name Wuhan is a generic term 
“referring to the three… cities of Wuchang, Hankou and Hanyang” (Spence, 1990, 250 n.).  
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other outside the Versailles framework and negotiated the Sino-German Friendship 
Treaty, which was signed on 21 May 1921.27  
Germany’s East Asian foreign policy therefore started on a new international 
relations basis, setting standards that other powers would come to copy in due time.28 
Indeed, Germany was the first of the imperialist nations to give up extraterritoriality, 
even though this change occurred only as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, and not 
voluntarily. This did not stop Chinese publications and work written by Chinese citizens 
to quote Weimar Germany as an example for other foreign nations, and some work 
from the 1930s reads like a promotion for the end of extraterritoriality (i.e. Feng, 1936).  
Even though Germany’s new standing in China would soon pay off in a 
rejuvenated China trade (Osterhammel, 2003, 209), the German Foreign Office and the 
Weimar administration remained ambivalent towards China. Diplomatic activities were 
limited to the exchange of diplomatic staff and the appointment of ambassadors 
(Muehlhahn, Leutner, Trampedach, 2003, 156). Sun Yat-sen’s Guomindang 
government in South China was never recognised by the Weimar Republic; instead, 
formal relations were sought with the Chinese government in Beijing (Berleb, 2005, 46).  
With an eye on a revision of the demands of Versailles, German foreign policy 
preferred to focus on relations with the European Entente powers (Berleb, 2005, 31). In 
certain sections of the political classes in China and Germany, however, the shared 
feeling of humiliation at the hands of the Entente led to the perception of each other as 
potential allies, and in the establishment of bonds between the two countries that had, 
ironically, been officially at war with one other during the later stages of WWI.29 These 
circles in Germany included German industry and the military, and these groups started 
                                               
27 The treaty regulated, amongst other agreements, the end of German extraterritoriality. In the words of 
Causey (1942, 366), Germany “had shown full respect for the sovereignty and independence of China”. 
The treaty had been confirmed again in 1928 (Martin, 2003, 39).  
28  Officially, Russia abolished her tsarist treaty rights on 25 July 1919 in the “Karakhan Manifesto” 
(Elleman, 1994, 460). At the same time as Germany had to relinquish her treaty rights, both Austria and 
Hungary renegotiated their relations with China. Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, several Latin-
American countries gave up their extraterritoriality (Wang, 1937, 748). The US and Britain would only 
abolish their treaty rights in 1942/43, when a signal of goodwill helped strengthen Chinese resistance 
against Japan.  
29 After WWI, Weimar Germany was not perceived as a threat any more by China (Berleb, 2005, 31). 
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to circumvent the cautious foreign policy of the German Foreign Office, and engaged in 
un-official diplomacy (Berleb, 2005, 12, 38). Early successes of Sino-German trade and 
relations would come about as a result of this un-official diplomacy, and of Germany’s 
new positive standing in China.  
Effectively, the new Sino-German relationship represented a huge symbolic 
achievement for a number of educated, patriotic Chinese who longed for recognition.30 
The Weimar government practiced and upheld strict neutrality in China, and avoided 
becoming “a pawn of the colonial powers in China or a tool of…Chinese factions” 
(Berleb, 2005, 37). This time also saw Sun Yat-sen proposing Sino-German 
cooperation, the proposals, however, were all rejected by the Weimar government, as 
long as they included military issues (Kirby, 1984, 34).31 Despite the German Foreign 
Office’s reluctance to engage with China, Germany’s new diplomatic, equal relationship 
with the Chinese Beiyang Government contributed to a positive post-WWI image that 
resulted in several calls for German mediation between China and other foreign powers 
in 1927 and 1929 (Berleb, 2005, 36). In cultural areas, Chinese admiration for 
Germany as a cultural and scientific centre remained high (Spence, 1990, 396). Culture 
was an accepted tool of foreign policy making in the German Foreign Office, and 
helped to influence and win the hearts and minds of the country that hosted a cultural 
or medical organisation (Martin, 2003, 46). Feng Djen Djang (1936, 217) even 
concluded that Germany “had made a favourable impression upon the Chinese mind”. 
At later stages in 1935, former Chinese students, who had returned from Germany, 
sponsored the establishment of the Sino-German Cultural Association in Nanjing, at a 
time when Sino-German relations had reached their peak (Feng, 1936, 217). 
In contrast, Chinese perceptions of Britain reached a low point with the May 30th 
Movement in 1925. The Shameen Incident of 23 June 1925 was the result of the killing 
of Chinese protesters by the Shanghai Municipal Police on 30 May in Shanghai. Close 
                                               
30 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Republican government, and later the Nanjing government (1927-
1937) engaged in revision of the “Unequal Treaties”, first at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922, 
and changed its approach to treaty revisions through diplomatic means in 1928 (Fung, 1987, 808).  
31 Throughout WWI, Sun had rejected the Beijing government’s declaration of war against Germany on 14 
August 1917 (for more information see Kirby, 1984, 29).  
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to the foreign concessions on Shameen Island in Guangzhou, British soldiers opened 
fire on Chinese protesters a month later, killing 52 Chinese (Spence, 1990, 340). The 
killings resulted in the boycott of British goods, and the blockade of Hong Kong by the 
Nationalist government of Sun Yat-sen in Guangzhou (then Canton).32 While the British 
government lost most of its prestige, the Weimar Republic was able to position itself as 
a trustworthy, neutral element. During the Shameen Affair, the Weimar consulate in 
Guangzhou acted as a mediator between Britain and the Chinese authorities (Feng, 
1936, 205).33  
The major event that shaped the political landscape in China was the 
Guomindang’s 1927/1928 Northern Expedition that saw the Nationalist army 
conquering major parts of Eastern China. In mid-1928, the Nanjing government was 
established, with Chiang Kai-shek firmly set as the Chairman of the State Council 
(Spence, 1990, 365).  
Modernisation in the GMD-ruled areas favoured the development of heavy 
industry, the improvement of infrastructure and military modernisation. China was an 
agricultural country which also had huge resources of raw material, like tungsten. In a 
time when Europe was preparing for a new war, tungsten was one of the crucial war-
related metals. China’s tungsten therefore could fetch a high price on the international 
market, but for that, the resources had to be exploited. German technology would help 
to build the necessary industrial base for the exploitation of raw material. Despite this 
rather long-term investment, China at the same time was looking for a trade partner 
that would provide immediate and practical help (Kirby, 1981, 213). 
China’s push for modernisation thus turned her towards German industry, which 
was well known for its technological knowhow. Military leader Chiang Kai-shek looked 
for foreign investment, but also for military and technological advisers (Martin, 2003, 
44). With the 1927 purge of the CCP and the Soviet advisers, Chiang was in dire need 
of new staff, and proposed the appointment of German officers and experts. Officially, 
                                               
32 For more information on this blockade see: Orchard (1930) and Roosevelt (1926). 
33 Feng (1936, 205) quoted: Gr. Brit. Parl., 1926, Vol. XXX, China No. 1 (1926), pp.7-8.  
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the German Foreign Office rejected the employment of German ex-military personnel in 
unstable regions, because German involvement and military trade in a region such as 
China could be interpreted as a possible breach of the Treaty of Versailles by the 
Entente, as the treaty forbade any engagement of former German military staff in 
military capacities outside of Germany (Kirby, 1984, 22). These powers had already 
accused Germany of breaking her obligations, and accused her of being one of the 
largest arms dealers to China during the 1920s. This accusation has since been 
challenged by Berleb (2005, 73), who has proved that many German WWI weapons 
were actually sold by the nations to whom they had been rendered at the end of WWI, 
and not by Weimar Germany, but at the time the allegations were widely believed.  
Due to the reluctant position of the German Foreign Office, Chiang Kai-shek 
focused his attention on German industry and the military, which were both eager to 
get a foothold in the China market. The loss of this market after WWI dealt a heavy 
blow to German business, which had initially flourished and taken a strong position 
amongst other major trading powers. After the war, German businesses were eager to 
regain their pre-war share of the China market, so they quickly returned only to find that 
their trading position had improved significantly (Kirby, 1984, 17). Chiang Kai-shek’s 
newly employed German military advisors further created a profitable link between 
German industry and the Chinese government between 1927 and 1938, because these 
men had worked as agents for German technology and weapons companies in the 
past (Geyer, 1981, 57). The first leader of the adviser mission was Colonel Max Bauer, 
who took up his post as adviser in late 1927.34  After Bauer’s sudden death on 6 May 
1929, the German military mission had four more leaders until its recall to Germany in 
summer 1938. 35  The period in which the military mission was most active was 
characterised by the consequences of the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and increasing 
                                               
34 A very interesting and useful work on Bauer has been written by Vogt (1974).  
35 These men were Hermann Kriebel (until summer 1930), Georg Wetzell (summer 1930 until spring 1934), 
Hans von Seeckt (spring 1934-spring 1935) and Alexander von Falkenhausen (spring 1935 until summer 
1938) (Vogt, 1974, 465-467). 
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Sino-Japanese tensions (for more information on the German military mission see 
Kirby, 1984; Berleb, 2005; Liang 1978; Vogt, 1974; Martin, 1981).  
Since the end of WWI, China and Japan had shared an ambivalent relationship, 
with the latter increasing her influence in coastal regions of China. Leading Japanese 
circles increasingly supported the idea of a “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” 
(Spence, 1990, 390), in which China and Japan would work together. China did not 
give in to this proposal, which would have placed her under Japanese leadership. 
Throughout the 1920s, the difference of Chinese and Japanese perception of China, 
her role in East Asia and the perceived increase in communist influence in China, 
determined relations between the two nations.36 At the end of the 1920s, and the 
beginning of the 1930s, Japan saw herself faced with great economic difficulties, and 
radical elements in the army took charge of events (Mitter, 2013, 54).37 The Kwangtung 
Army occupied resource-rich Manchuria and established a client state by the name of 
Manchukuo. These events came to be known as the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931. From 
this moment onwards, any foreign intervention to strengthen the Nanjing government of 
Chiang Kai-shek ran diametrically opposed to Japanese interests in China, and was 
therefore rejected; this also included the German military mission (Kirby, 1984, 223).   
The deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations complicated the international 
situation, as well as the domestic standing of the Nanjing government. The Nanjing 
government of Chiang Kai-shek saw itself faced with constant calls to counter the 
Japanese occupation of North East China throughout the 1930s. Chiang, in contrast to 
his fellow countrymen, believed a war with Japan to be disastrous at this point in time 
                                               
36 The 1920s Sino-Japanese relations were less tense as at the time of the Twenty-One Demands in 
January 1915, and in 1922 Japan returned the former German concessions in Shandong to China as part 
of the Nine Power Treaty. Increasingly, Japan engaged in International Conferences “that were supposed 
to strengthen China and help it gain greater economic autonomy” (Mitter, 2013, 46). The Nationalist-
Communist cooperation during the Northern Expedition raised fears in Tokyo over too much communist 
influence in China, and violent clashes between Japanese and Nationalist troops occurred (Spence, 1990, 
388).  
37 The 1929 Stock Market Crash had significant impact on the Japanese industry, and resulted in a 40% 
drop of Japanese exports to the US. Japan faced unemployment and agricultural decline (Spence, 1990, 
389). 
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(Taylor, 2009, 95).38  Internationally, the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931 highlighted the 
inability of the League of Nations to act (Sun, 1993, 33). The League was only able to 
send a commission to Manchuria, and the socalled “Lytton Report” was “not an outright 
condemnation” of Japanese actions (Burkman, 2008, 170). The image of the League 
as a peace guaranteeing body, with a role to prevent aggression, such as the 
Japanese occupation of Manchuria, has been tarnished ever since. As a member of 
the League, Germany was reluctant to take any major actions that might have harmed 
Germany’s relations with the Entente. Since the Entente Powers abstained from any 
involvement in the Far Eastern Crisis, so did Weimar Germany. Furthermore, Germany 
had to fight an increasingly difficult domestic situation that led to an increase in 
extremist views on both sides of the political spectrum. The outcome of this process 
would influence Sino-German relations and German foreign policy for years to come.  
 
The 1930s 
The early 1930s were of course marked by major territorial and political 
changes in both countries. After a positive start in China,39 1931 was greatly influenced 
by the Manchurian Crisis and internal fighting in the GMD (see for example Mitter, 2013, 
56; Fox, 1982; Spence, 1990, 388-396). In the following years, and up until July 1937, 
Chiang Kai-shek faced several smaller skirmishes with the Japanese army, which 
resulted in concrete economic and military measures taken by the Nanjing government 
to counter any future Japanese attacks (Mitter, 2013, 58). German technology and 
knowledge was part of this modernisation strategy, and Sino-German trade continued 
to flourish. Hitler’s rise to power in January 1933 resulted in no visible major change in 
                                               
38 Instead, Chiang argued that the CCP had to be fought first and only then could China resist any power 
from outside. His slogan was: “first internal pacification, then external resistance (xian annei, hou 
rangwai)“ (So, 2002, 213).  
39 The Nanjing government made progress in its modernisation efforts in China, and the process of treaty 
revision. In 1930 for example, the Nanjing government regained control over tariffs (Mitter, 2013, 51). Tariff 
autonomy not only meant increasing revenues but also had a highly symbolic meaning for the Chinese 
public. According to Gerth (2003, 40), tariff autonomy became synonymous for China’s undermined 
sovereignty. In the following decades it became evident that the public wished the autonomy issues to be 
addressed and for China to regain control of her customs more than “expanding economic activity and 
raising per capita incomes” (Gerth, 2003, 41). 
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East Asian foreign policy, as the German Foreign Office maintained its position of 
neutrality in East Asia. Sino-German trade, on the other hand, visibly increased. China 
had found a willing trading partner, which would trade on an equal level, something Fu 
(1981, 188) regards as one of the main reasons why the good Sino-German relations 
lasted until 1938. 
Another reason for the strong progress in Sino-German relations was the fact 
that China enjoyed support from influential Chinese-friendly Germans in the 
Wehrmacht and the Ministry of the Economy (Kirby, 1984, 126/127). These were, for 
example, the Minister of Economic Affairs Hjalmar Schacht, and the head of the 
Defence Economy and Armament Department General Georg Thomas. As this 
dissertation will reveal, Thomas and Schacht in particular played an important role in 
the maintenance of clandestine back channels between Chiang Kai-shek and the 
German Resistance during the 1940s.  
Even Adolf Hitler considered closer Sino-German relations, above all because 
of China’s huge natural resources (Berleb, 2005, 174). Old, un-official connections via 
the German military mission were increasingly channelled through state-sanctioned 
business conglomerates, such as HAPRO.40 The 1934 Treaty for the exchange of 
Chinese Raw Materials and Agricultural Products for German Industrial and Other 
Products (hereafter: the HAPRO Treaty) secured the exchange of German industrial 
products for Chinese raw materials, including tungsten of which China controlled major 
deposits  (Xue Yi, 2004, 715).41 HAPRO secured for the German industry (represented 
by companies such as Otto Wolff) orders for power stations and railway construction, to 
                                               
40 China was not the first attempt of Germany’s military to benefit from military business and relations with 
other states. The most prominent example is its involvement in Soviet Russia in the 1920s. It can be 
argued the business in Russia followed similar patterns as in the case of China. In both cases the German 
military established ties with the respective government, in this case the Soviet one. In order to channel its 
business with Russia, the Reichswehr established a shadow-company called Gesellschaft zur Förderung 
gewerblicher Unternehmungen G.m.b.H (Company for promoting business projects, with limited liability, 
GEFU) (Gatzke, 1958, 578). 
41 Tungsten is used for ferro alloys, which means that metallic elements are covered with iron, with 
tungsten or with other metals, and used as cutting tools (Stevens, 1999, 539). It is crucial for modern 
warfare and the construction of weapons, tanks and other war material. Tungsten would create “tough, 
heat resistant steel” (Stevens, 1999, 539). Germany purchased much of its tungsten before the war from 
China, and after 1939 Portugal emerged as an important source, which the USA and Britain tried to control 
(Stevens, 1999, 539).  
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name just a few (Kirby, 1984, 194-200). On the other hand, HAPRO “soon became the 
chief agent of the Sino-German arms trade” (Berleb, 2005, 228), and provided China 
with equipment such as howitzers, anti tank guns, Mauser rifles and armoured cars.42 
As Yu (Zhang Baijia, 6 in Yu, 2006, 4) shows, Republican China imported war related 
material worth 389 million German Reichsmark between 1934 and October 1937. In 
July 1937 alone, German shipments totalled 50 million Reichsmark.   
The mid-1930s were marked by excellent Sino-German relations, but events 
were about to change. From the Chinese point of view Sino-German relations 
appeared very promising. The German Foreign Office even started to recognise the 
value of Germany's China trade, and is today described by scholars as part of the 
China-friendly groups in the German administration (Berleb, 2005, 176). The China-
friendly lobby inside the German army also welcomed developments, and even toyed 
with the idea of a Sino-German military alliance (Ratenhof, 1987, 465).43 In 1936, the 
signing of an additional piece of the HAPRO Treaty during the visit of General Walter 
von Reichenau might have raised hopes of an official acknowledgement of the German 
military mission.44 As Spence (1990, 402) states, a “senior German general [Reichenau] 
who was visiting Nanjing suggested that Germany might even aid China in its ‘struggle 
against Japanese hegemony’… “. This would have resulted in Germany committing 
herself to China in the eyes of the world and Japan. However, Army chief von 
Reichenau travelled to China in 1936, not knowing that Hitler had already started 
clandestine negotiations with Japan (Berleb, 2005, 175). The Anti Comintern Pact thus 
dealt a heavy blow to any alliance plans between China and Germany in November 
1936.  
                                               
42 Berleb (2005, 230-231) quotes: Rostek, Horst (1989), “Zur Rolle der deutschen Militaerberater bei der 
chinesischen Nationalreguierung 1928 bis 1938“, in: [Anon.] (Ed.) (1989) Bulleting Faschismus/ Zweiter 
Weltkrieg; Sonderheft 1989, Berlin: Zentralinstitut fuer Geschichte, p.120; PA AA R 85705.  
43 Ratenhof (1987, 465) quotes: “Aufzeichnung Ribbentrop“, 16 August 1936, ADAP, CV, Nr. 509; Fox 
(1981, 235).  
44 Members of the German military mission had been privately employed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the 
mission was denounced by the German Foreign Office during the 1920s and early 1930s on a regular 
basis (for more information see: Kirby, 1984; Martin, 1981). 
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The reason for this sudden change of heart lay, amongst others, in the structure 
of the German administration and Hitler’s own ideology. The Chinese-friendly lobby in 
Germany was rivalled by a Japanese-friendly clique that found one of its strongest 
supporters in future Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. The lack of trust 
between Hitler and the German Foreign Office (Jacobsen, 1968, 24) created a vacuum 
that von Ribbentrop quickly filled, after he gained Hitler’s trust. From his “Ribbentrop 
Bureau” von Ribbentrop negotiated the Anti Comintern Pact, and meddled in German 
foreign relations.45 Without questioning any of Hitler’s orders, von Ribbentrop pursued 
a Japanese-friendly foreign policy line, which led to the destruction of the German 
Foreign Office’s neutral diplomatic position in East Asia. Ideologically, Hitler had also 
always preferred Japan over China, and his ideological opus Mein Kampf distinguishes 
between China, “a barbaric and uncivilised country” and Japan, a “culture carrying” 
society (Cai and Wu, 2006a, 52).  As a result of this internal conflict, German foreign 
policy split into two strands by 1936: a “German” and a “Nazi” foreign policy (Fox, 1982, 
335). The “German” foreign policy that focused on military and trade relations with 
China clashed increasingly with the Japanese-friendly “Nazi” one. Initially the goals of 
both strands complemented each other. However with increasing Sino-Japanese 
tensions, these goals drifted more and more apart (Fox, 1982, 335).  
The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese war in July 1937 and China’s 
improving relations with the Soviet Union form just one side of the overall picture that 
led to the deterioration of Sino-German relations. Japan’s increasingly stronger position 
in East Asia indicated to the Japanese-friendly political elite in Germany that Hitler’s 
Weltanschauung (ideology) on Japan and China was right, and that only Japan could 
support Germany in the upcoming war. In the following months until the summer of 
1938, Sino-German relations deteriorated, and Japan started to pressurize the Third 
Reich to cease aid to China and to recall the military mission (Bi Ye, 1994, 52). The 
                                               
45 The Ribbentrop Bureau took control of German-Japanese relations through secret channels, after the 
German Foreign Office rejected Hitler’s increasingly Japan-friendly foreign policy in 1933/1934 (Fox, 1982, 
337). 
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German Foreign Office was unable to claim back its rightful control of foreign relations 
and even the mediation of German Ambassador Oskar Trautmann between China and 
Japan in autumn 1937 did not help. Additionally, Chiang Kai-shek signed the Sino-
Soviet Non Aggression Pact on 21 August 1937 that, despite Chinese assurances to 
anti-communist Germany, led to an association of China with the Soviet Union (Kirby, 
1984, 234 and 238).46  
Hitler’s deteriorating perception of Nationalist China coincided with the 
consolidation of the Nazi administration and the elimination of all opposition 
(Gleichschaltung) in February 1938. The Nazi leadership “took complete control of 
Germany’s foreign policy” (Berleb, 2005, 257). Chinese-friendly individuals in the 
Ministries of the Economy, War and the Foreign Office were replaced by loyal Nazis. 
For example, von Ribbentrop took over as Foreign Minister in February 1938.47 His 
now official Japan-friendly foreign policy course included the recall of Germany's 
ambassador to China (Trautmann), and of the military mission, as well as German 
recognition of Manchukuo. Japan had requested these measures since the signing of 
the Anti Comintern Pact in November 1936. The shift from China to Japan aroused the 
anger of German industry though, which had invested heavily in the Nanjing 
government’s projects. German arms exports to China alone had risen to 83 million 
Reichsmarks by 1937 (Berleb, 2005, 238).48 Their arguments about the benefits of 
Sino-German trade were countered by the Nazi administration, which justified its move 
with reference to the vast resources Japan controlled in occupied China, as well as 
Japan’s promise to grant Germany favoured nation status (Berleb, 2005, 240-241).49  
                                               
46 Kirby (1984, 238) quotes: NA (National Archives, Washington), T-120, ser. 195, roll 164, 137456-463, 
Kung to Hitler, 3 September 1937; MA, RW 5/315, particularly “Bericht Hans Klein ueber Besprechung mit 
K’ung“, 10 December 1937.  
47 The Ministry of Economy was taken over by Hermann Göring, and the Minister of Defence Werner von  
Blomberg was forced to resign by Hitler. Contrary to post-war perception, it was not difficult for the Nazis to 
gain the foreign office’s support, because the majority of senior members sympathised with National 
Socialism, while younger members seemed to have joined the NSDP out of career considerations (Conze, 
Frei, Hayes, Zimmermann, 2010, 67). 
48 Berleb (2005, 238) quotes: Ruland, Bernd (1973), p.196. 
49 Early on in the 1930s Japan-friendly circles already had great interest in Manchuria and its economic 
capabilities. Ferdinand Heye, a businessman linked to Hermann Göring, travelled to Manchuria to intensify 
trade, and as a result would have accepted Japanese presence in North East China (Ratenhof, 1987, 447). 
Ignoring the warning of the German Foreign Office, Heye promised Japan the recognition of Manchukuo in 
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By the summer of 1938 Sino-German relations had reached a low point, but 
neither side was yet willing to fully give up on its years of cooperation, in particular not 
China. Hitler was not willing to give up neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict, which 
meant keeping open relations to China (Presseisen, 1958, 130). Trade with China did 
not cease but continued for a while through third channels (Berleb, 2005, 240-241).50 
The Third Reich also kept her embassy in Chongqing, which was run by a Charge` 
d’Affairs, as no new ambassador was appointed. The fact that this humiliation was 
accepted by Chiang Kai-shek suggests that he hoped for a return to a good diplomatic 
relations between both nations. 51  The appointments of Ambassador Chen Jie in 
summer 1938 and of General Gui Yongqing as military attaché in autumn 1940 prove 
this fact. This military attaché would then go on to become one of the agents of the 
clandestine Sino-German relations in 1941.  
In the end, Berlin’s recognition of the Wang Jingwei collaborationist government 
lead to the break in Chongqing China’s relations with Nazi Germany. Only six months 
later, and after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (8 December 1941), Chongqing 
sided with the USA and declared war on the Axis Powers. This state of war between 
Nationalist China and the Third Reich made any further official connections impossible 
to maintain.    
In hindsight, the impact of external and domestic events in China and Germany, 
and on German foreign policy becomes clear. As I have shown above, 1930s Sino-
German relations and official German foreign policy did not always correspond, but 
rather influenced each other. Due to the blending of official and un-official diplomatic 
forces in German foreign relations, Germany’s East Asian foreign policy appeared 
                                                                                                                                         
exchange for preferred trade agreements (Fox, 1982, 28). The promises of benefits from German trade 
with Japanese-occupied China did not pay off, as both economies (Japan and Germany) were too equal 
and demanded the same resources.   
50 Berleb (2005, 240-241) quotes: ADAP, Serie D, Band 1, Document 504. Memorandum of Counsellor 
von der Heyden-Rynsch, Berlin, 22 October 1937.  
51 German reluctance to replace Ambassador Trautmann, while China kept her ambassador in Berlin, was 
increasingly perceived as an affront by Chiang Kai-shek in October 1939. German Charge` Bidder 
reported on 19 October 1939 that Chinese sources recommended the Third Reich to rectify this issue by 
appointing a new ambassador. (PA AA Peking 1, 165, Chinesische Botschaft in Berlin 1939-1945(Chinese 
Embassy in Berlin). 
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contradictory at times. The mid-1930s internal fight over the direction of German East 
Asian foreign policy caused considerable damage to the German position in East Asia, 
but any attempt by China-friendly forces in Germany to rectify the course of foreign 
policy in favour of China failed with the Nazi consolidation of power in 1938.  
It appears that German East Asian foreign policy seemed only focused on 
Japan from 1938 onwards, and excluded China. This was not the case, however. The 
excellent Sino-German relations of the mid 1930s had clearly created a wish for closer 
Sino-German relations in sections of the German government. The efforts that 
Chinese-friendly Germans and German-friendly Chinese put into the maintenance of 
Sino-German relations during the late 1930s speaks for their continued interest. Many 
of the individuals who supported Sino-German relations, on both sides, could rely on 
personal connections established during the 1930s. 
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Chapter Four: Official Republican Chinese wartime foreign policy 
 
As I argue at the end of Chapter Three, the findings of this dissertation do not 
fully correspond with the official image and message of Sino-foreign relations shortly 
before and after the outbreak of WWII in Europe. Before I further elaborate on these 
findings in Chapter Six, however, I will present a summary of official Chinese WWII 
rhetoric and the official foreign policy message that Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Nationalist government presented to the international community. Though not entirely 
representative of the Nationalist foreign policy more broadly, these publications provide 
an insight into the official foreign policy guidelines pursued by Chiang Kai-shek. The 
content of these messages is further enriched with background information on the 
status and developments of international relations during the years 1938 to 1940. 
Furthermore, I will highlight that Chiang Kai-shek used special envoys to further 
support his messages with “people on the ground”, who lobbied through back channels 
in favour of Chongqing. The combination of foreign policy messages and special 
envoys contributed to Chongqing’s inclusion in the Big Four. However, as we will see in 
Chapters Five and Six, the presence of special envoys pursuing foreign relations 
outside of the framework of the Chinese Foreign Office is also noticeable in Sino-
German relations in 1940 and 1941.   
 
 
Chongqing China’s official wartime message 
Propaganda is, and has always been, an important tool in times of war, for the 
Allies as well as for the Axis Powers. Chiang Kai-shek’s China was no exception and 
spread her wartime message in several forms, for example through Soong May-ling’s 
radio addresses and the tour to the US in 1943 to rally for support (Tyson Li, 2006). 
Any radio address, newspaper article or speech carried a message that reflected 
Chinese official foreign policy, as well as transmitting overtures or warnings to the 
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world. Many of these messages were published on anniversaries or followed crucial 
events in either wartime China or in other countries. 
The speeches presented in this chapter reflect the official position adopted in 
Nationalist Chinese foreign policy, which was reached after intensive debate 
throughout the 1930s. The mid-1930s were characterised by a gradualist foreign policy 
which saw China appease Japan while preparing for a future military conflict (Sun, 
1993, 42). The two years between 1935 and 1937, on the contrary, saw a drive for 
national unity in China, which culminated in the establishment of an anti-Japanese 
United Front between the CCP and the GMD (Sun, 1993, 63).52  
Following the departure of Wang Jingwei from Chongqing in December 1938, 
the peace-faction the latter had represented lost much of its influence in Chongqing. As 
a result, the so-called resistance-faction directed the course of foreign policy.53 In the 
following section, I will briefly lay out some of the characteristics of the resistance-
faction’s foreign policy approach. I will then present the official line as it was articulated 
in foreign policy speeches by Chiang, as well as details on the international situation 
China faced between 1938 and 1941.    
 The resistance-faction, of which Chiang Kai-shek was a part, believed 
throughout the 1930s and early 1940s that Japan would inevitably clash with either the 
Soviet Union or the Anglo-Saxon nations, all of which had economic interests at stake 
in China (Sun, 1993, 157). From November 1937 onwards, after the failure of the 
Brussels conference, foreign aid and the hope for foreign intervention remained the 
only tool to maintain Chinese morale (Sun, 1993, 92). Chinese foreign policy, thus 
focused overwhelmingly on establishing ties with either the US and Britain, or with the 
Soviet Union, though by the end of 1939, this plan excluded the Soviet Union (Sun, 
1993, 126).  
                                               
52 For more information on the development of Nationalist China’s foreign policy see: Sun (1993).  
53 The terms “peace-faction” and “resistance-faction” are used by Sun (1993, 105), and adopted for this 
thesis.  
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Chiang Kai-shek’s wartime foreign policy objectives can thus be summarised as 
follows: the Generalissimo planned to fight the war on the side of the Western 
democracies and, after a decline in Sino-Soviet relations, the Anglo-Saxon powers 
emerged as the preferred partners of Nationalist China (Sun, 1993, 141).  
The Chongqing-based Central News Agency and Nationalist publishers did 
much to propagate this official foreign policy line in the early years of the war against 
the Japanese. A number of Chiang Kai-shek’s official speeches made in Wuhan and 
later in Chongqing were translated, re-published and distributed throughout sections of 
the world where the Nationalists sought support. The Vita Nova publisher printed such 
a collection of Chiang Kai-shek’s speeches in Lucerne in 1940. This publishing house 
was founded by German refugee Rudolf Roessler in Switzerland, who himself was 
involved in espionage against the Nazis, and published anti-Nazi material.54 Roessler’s 
anti-Nazi position would explain the publication of Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-Japanese 
and anti-Axis speeches that cover a period from 1937 to 1940.   
 The topic of pamphlets distributed in China and in foreign countries (friendly 
and neutral ones) likely differed and transmitted specific messages for certain 
audiences. The Vita Nova publication addressed European audiences, hence had a 
very specific reference to WWII Europe, and the international situation on the periphery. 
In contrast, The Anthology of Speeches of the Chairman in its 8th and 9th volume 
(published in 1942) addressed mainly Chinese audiences, ranging from military and 
civilian individuals to the National Political Consultative Council 
(Guomincanzhenghui).55 In this publication, the Chinese endurance and fighting spirit is 
far more emphasised. 
                                               
54 Roessler was part of the spyring “Lucy”, which provided intelligence on the Third Reich to the Soviet 
Union. “Lucy” itself was part of a much larger intelligence network that operated in Switzerland (Mulligan, 
1987, 236).  
55 On 6 July 1937, the National Political Consultative Council met for the first time in Wuhan (Shen, 2002, 
82). It included the CCP, the China Youth Party and others. This council was meant to act as the highest 
consulting organ in regard to National Defence. Furthermore, the council had the power to listen to 
administrative reports by the Nationalist Government, as well as make suggestions, inquiries and 
investigations. Any decisions, however, could not be enforced on the Nationalist Government.  
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 Most strikingly, but not surprisingly, Japan and the invasion of China featured 
dominantly in all of the speeches read for this dissertation, no matter whether these 
addressed a foreign or a Chinese audience. Apart from that, the single messages 
focused differently on the danger Japan represented for either the international 
community (Vita Nova publication) or China’s survival and modernisation (addressed to 
a Chinese audience). As well as foreign powers and the Chinese, Chiang Kai-shek also 
addressed the Japanese people, similar to Western Allied attempts to inform Germans 
through radio during the war years (Mann, 1943). Such a particular speech to the 
Japanese people was held on the second anniversary of the outbreak of the War of 
Resistance, on 7 July 1939.56 It conveyed a message of Chinese power and endurance, 
and meant to transmit to the Japanese audience that their country would never win the 
war. Such a message targeted as much the Japanese audience as the Chinese one, 
and can also be translated as a message of perseverance. 
Far different words, however, characterised a Vita Nova-published speech from 
24 July 1939, which came as a reaction to the British-Japanese Craigie Arita 
Agreement. In essence, this agreement stated that Britain would not counter any 
measures Japan deemed necessary to maintain order in China, meaning that Japan 
could do whatever she wanted in China. Many observers compared this agreement to 
the Munich Agreement, signed by Hitler and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
on 29 September 1938 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975, 7); hence it was 
also referred to as a “Far Eastern Munich” by critics (e.g., Clifford, 1963, 147).57 Chiang 
Kai-shek attacked this British appeasement policy in the East, as there indeed was a 
possibility that the Western powers might reach a Munich Agreement-style decision on 
China with Japan. With the Third Reich neither siding with Japan or Chiang Kai-shek’s 
                                               
56  Shanghai Municipal Archive (SMA) Y13-1-23, Zongcai yanlun xuanji (Anthology of remarks of the 
Chairman), Volume 8, 9: Waijiao, Jiaoyu, Yu Xunshu; Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Zhixing 
Weiyuanhui. Published in September 1942; p.1895: This speech was a letter by Chiang Kai-shek to the 
Japanese people on the second anniversary (on 7 July 1939) of the outbreak of the War of Resistance in 
1937. 
57 The Munich Agreement refers to the British-German Munich Agreement signed on 29 September 1938. 
It awarded the German-speaking regions in the western part of then Czechoslovakia to the Third Reich, in 
an attempt to appease Hitler.  
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China, and the US isolationist foreign policy, the British appeasement policy may have 
been regarded by the Chinese administration as a possible example to other foreign 
nations on how to avert any issues with Japan in East Asia. Indeed, the danger of 
either a British or Soviet appeasement of Japan posed a serious threat to Chongqing, 
and, as Sun (1993, 141) argues, resulted in the focus on Sino-US relations, in contrast 
to Sino-Soviet ones.  
As a result of fears over possible rapprochements between Japan and the 
Western powers, Japan’s foreign policy and actions were scrutinised by the Chinese 
government. In Chiang's speech that summarised the policies of the Abe Cabinet from 
1938 until January 1940, Japan was accused of harbouring “hidden agendas” that 
would be detrimental to the Western Powers. One of these hidden agendas was 
Japan’s rejection of involvement in the European war (Chiang, 1940, 53-54). Chiang 
(1940, 54), however, argues that by limiting the Western Powers’ rights and interests in 
East Asia, Japan involved herself in the European conflict. By arguing so, Chiang Kai-
shek linked the European and East Asian theatres of war. This comment clearly 
reflects the wide-spread thinking in Chongqing that Japan’s drive for hegemony in East 
Asia would damage British and US economic interests (Sun, 1993, 23). 
Indeed, the Japanese threat to Western economic interests was frequently cited 
in relation to the Nine Power Treaty. At the same time, Japan tried to foster relations 
with all sides of the conflict, including Germany, Britain, the US and the Soviet Union 
(Chiang, 1940, 55-56). Mention of the Nine Power Treaty in this speech suggests that 
Chiang was trying to influence Western-Japanese rapprochement. By linking Japanese 
aggression in China with the Nine Power Treaty, Chiang clearly targeted the US 
administration, which had been vocal over the “Open Door” policy included in the treaty. 
After accusing Japan of violating the Open Door policy, Chiang (1940, 60) positioned 
Chongqing China on the side of the US, describing it as a nation that was willing to 
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uphold the Nine Power Treaty58. Other promises to the Western democracies included 
continued resistance of the Japanese invasion, and a rejection of the Anti Comintern 
Pact (Chiang, 1940, 60). There were obvious reasons for such messages, as Chiang 
faced an international community in which “there were only interests and no sentiments” 
(Guo Chang-lu, 43 in Sun, 1993, 123). 
China’s position in the world and her alliances were not secure in 1939/1940, 
even though, as shown above, Chiang Kai-shek advocated relations with Britain and 
mainly the US. The early years of the European war were difficult for Chongqing China. 
According to Kirby (2011, 7-8), Chongqing was without an official partner until 
December 1941. Sun (1993, 1) also argues that China had great difficulties until 
December 1941 to receive “formal commitment…from any power”. I partially agree with 
these two statements, because the Nationalist government struggled to gain significant 
financial support and weapon shipments from the Western Powers, with the exception 
of the Soviet Union. In contrast to both Britain and the US, the Soviet Union stepped up 
as new supplier of arms and military advisors after Germany had vacated that role in 
summer 1938. Up until December 1941, Soviet support to China totalled approximately 
US $250 million; hence far exceeding that provided by other major powers at the time 
(Young, 1965, 345, quoted in Ratenhof, 1987, 492). Shipments of war-related materials 
included fighter planes and tanks. In addition, around 500 military advisors as well as 
2000 Soviet pilots were stationed in China (Ratenhof, 1987, 492).59 In total, the Soviet 
Union provided China between 1938 and 1941 with, amongst others, 900 aircrafts, 82 
tanks, 10,000 machine guns and 2,000 trucks (Yu, 2006, 13).60 The total amount of 
Soviet aid far exceeded that of German shipments between 1927 and 1937.  
                                               
58 “The 1922 Nine Power Treaty affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China” and made the 
US “Open Door” China Policy international law (Spence, 1990, 379). It was signed by major European 
Powers, the US, China and Japan. The “Open Door” Policy referred to the US proposal that would allow all 
nations to engage in trade in China and “not to deny others access to their spheres of influence…” 
(Spence, 1990, 231).  
59 Ratenhof (1987, 492) quotes: Johnson, Peking, to Secretary of State, 24. 2. 1938, FRUS 1938, III, 
pp.106 “Neue Zuericher Zeitung”, 4.7. 1938, HWWA, B 94/qNR. 2IIb. Bowden, pp.54.  
60 Yu (2006, 13) quotes: Li Jiagu, Cooperation and Confrontation, 85-99; and Liu Zhiqing, Seventy years of 
Sino-Soviet Relations, 242-243.  
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Soviet assistance was forthcoming because Chinese resistance focused much 
of Japan’s attention on the Sino-Japanese conflict, hence protecting the Soviet Union 
from a Japanese attack.61 Despite the substantial amount of aid, however, Chiang 
never fully trusted the Soviets (Garver, 1988, 90). Indeed, the Soviet-German Non 
Aggression Pact of 1939 had shattered Chinese hopes for Soviet military intervention 
on the side of China. Instead, Chinese foreign policy then “aimed at forestalling any 
Soviet-Japanese collusion” (Sun, 1993, 126).  
The Soviet Union was the only foreign Power that offered assistance to 
Nationalist China from 1938 until June 1941. The US and Britain both refrained from 
being drawn into the unfolding Sino-Japanese conflict. While US-public opinion and 
isolationist policies stopped President Franklin D. Roosevelt from engaging in an 
international conflict, the US sent supportive signals to China, such as the abrogation 
of the US-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (Taylor, 2009, 166), and a US’ 
$25 million loan in December 1938. Ratenhof (1987, 495) argues that the shift away 
from an isolationist US foreign policy coincided with great economic losses for the US 
in East Asia, due to Japan’s control of the major commercial centres along the Chinese 
coast.62   
The British reaction to the Sino-Japanese conflict is debated in academia. A 
number of scholars called Whitehall’s East Asian foreign policy an appeasement policy 
(Ratenhof, 1987, 493; Lowe, 1974). More interested in the maintenance of economic 
interests, London only supported the Nationalist government with a loan of US $2,3 
million in December 1938, a fraction compared to Soviet aid (Ratenhof, 1987, 494).  
Other scholars, such as Thorne (1978, 67) point out that while British East Asian 
foreign policy behaviour may not have always received the support of the Chinese, 
British officials believed that morale support of Chinese resistance was vital for British 
interests. Winston Churchill, who was known to deny China an equal position amongst 
                                               
61 This drew attention away from the Soviet Union, which had clashed with Japan in the past and feared 
that Japanese anti-communism might turn into an offensive in Siberia after China had been occupied 
(Ratenhof, 1987, 492). Ratenhof (1987, 492) quotes: Boyle, pp.116; Clubb, Century, pp.227. 
62 Ratenhof (1987, 495) states that the US fell from the first position amongst the nations trading with 
China to the third position in 1938/1939. Ratenhof (1987, 495) quotes: A. Young, Effort, Appendix 23.  
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the Big Four, informed Chiang Kai-shek in May 1940 that “we [Britain] shall do all we 
can to help China to maintain her independence” (Thorne, 1978, 67).63 In general, 
British reaction to events in East Asia can be described as morally supportive of China, 
and critical of Japanese actions, without being too harsh or vocal in either regard (Lowe, 
1974, 45). Instead, much of London’s attention rested on Europe and the looming war 
on that continent. Germany was perceived as a far greater danger to the British Empire 
than Japan.64  
 
From the above it is clear that the most powerful Western nations with which 
China maintained contacts in the late 1930s were concerned primarily with their own 
well-being, and aided China only to a certain degree, while not actually taking sides in 
the Sino-Japanese conflict. The continous flux in diplomatic developments provided 
Chongqing China with “tough choices” (Sun, 1993, 123), as signed agreements could 
easily be broken. One example might be the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact of 
summer 1939. The signing of this pact surprised Chinese policy makers, who began to 
entertain different scenarios as a result of German-Soviet rapprochement. First of all, 
the Soviet Union suddenly emerged on the opposite side to Britain and France, and 
secondly, the chance of either British or Soviet appeasement of Japan became a real 
possibility (Sun, 1993, 123). These sudden changes were considerable, especially if 
we consider that Chongqing had, at one stage, advocated an alliance with the Soviet 
Union and Britain against the fascist powers. According to scholars such as Mitter 
(2013, 213), the German-Soviet pact harmed Chinese plans to draw the Soviet Union 
into the Sino-Japanese conflict. Mitter’s position on this issue, however, is not shared 
by all scholars, as some (Yang, 2010a, 38; Ratenhof, 1987, 499) argue that Chongqing 
politicians, such as Sun Fo, actually welcomed the German-Soviet Pact, as it meant 
the Anti Comintern Pact of November 1936 was made void. In return, Sino-German 
                                               
63  Thorne (1978, 67) quotes: PREM 4, 42/8. 
64 For more information on Britain’s East Asian foreign policy in the 1930s and early 1940s see Lowe 
(1974); Hosoya (1981). 
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relations were expected by Soviet- and German-friendly Chinese politicians to 
improve.65  
As a result of continous changes and developments in international relations, 
the choice for a pragmatic foreign policy is clear. With Japan’s increasing affiliation with 
the Axis Powers, much of Chiang Kai-shek’s focus rested on the US, whose decision to 
enter the war would decide the outcome of it. Gaining US support proved rather difficult, 
however, as Chongqing decision makers had to take into account both the 
administration as well as American public opinion. While the US public sympathised 
with China, it preferred a “non-entangling” foreign policy (Rofe, 2007, 6). The Roosevelt 
administration thus faced a situation in which both the Left and Right in American 
politics favoured a policy of isolationism which would enable the US to stay out of any 
conflict, including the Chinese one (Doenecke, 1977, 221). Moreover, US reservations 
about assisting China stemmed from the perception that Chiang had evolved into a 
“Far Eastern Hitler” (Ratenhof, 1987, 494).  
A significant number of wartime speeches addressing the US were actually 
given by Soong May-ling prior and after her much publicised visit to the US in 1943, 
who appealed to the US public with her American upbringing and Christian faith. I will 
not go into more details on Soong May-ling’s wartime speeches, but focus once more 
on those made by Chiang Kai-shek. The reason for this decision is that Soong May-ling 
adopted a clearly US-friendly foreign policy, while Chiang Kai-shek, in addition to his 
US-friendly speeches, followed a much more pragmatic approach that attempted to 
keep all diplomatic doors open behind-the-scenes.  
Despite Chiang Kai-shek’s focus on drawing the US into the war, in the majority 
of his foreign relations speeches, Chiang addressed several democratic Western 
Powers, and sided clearly with Britain and France. Beliving that moral support for 
China’s resistance against Japan was important, Churchill informed Chiang Kai-shek in 
                                               
65 Sino-German relations had suffered greatly after the declaration of the Sino-Soviet Non Aggression 
Treaty of 1937. Individuals in Chongqing believed that the new German-Soviet alliance could mean that 
Germany was open to relations with China, instead of with Japan (Kirby, 1984, 245).  
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May 1940 that “we [Britain] shall do all we can to help China to maintain her 
independence” (Thorne, 1978, 67).66  
While singleling out the Western Democracies as Allies, Chiang Ka-shek had 
the international relations situation carefully wartches, as he declared in front of the 
National Political Council on 9 September, just a week after the outbreak of war in 
Europe, that China’s objective was to end the war with Japan as quickly as possible. 
Even though this should happen with support from the Western democracies, China 
would keenly observe the development of international relations and of her own 
wartime diplomacy (Leutner, 1998, 133-134).67 This statement, made in front of a non-
foreign audience, clearly highlights the pragmatic behaviour that influenced Chiang Kai-
shek’s foreign policy long after the events of Pearl Harbor, as this dissertation will show 
below. 
The clearer international split, which followed the outbreak of hostilities in 
September 1939, encouraged Chiang to link the Chinese and the European war. On 10 
October 1940, Nationalist China’s National Day 68  and the day Germany, Italy and 
Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, Chiang addressed a number of military and civilian 
individuals, and called Japan “the arch enemy of the Three Principles [the Three 
Principles of the People]” and of China’s modernisation.69 Delivered to an obviously 
domestic audience, this speech still addressed the international community when 
Chiang Kai-shek linked Germany and Italy with Japan, and described them as enemies 
of the “righteous states”.70 The image and message of this speech cannot be clearer, 
                                               
66 Thorne (1978, 67) quotes: PREM 4, 42/8. 
67 Leutner (1998, 133-134) printed the following record: Generalissimo Chiang Kai.shek’s War Speeches, 
(1944, 51-54).  
68 On 10 October 1911 the Wuchang Eight Engineer Battalion mutinied, and attacked the military forts at 
Wuchang, which marked the end of the Qing Dynasty (Spence, 1990, 263).    
69 SMA Y13-1-23, Zongcai yanlun xuanji (Anthology of remarks of the Chairman), Volume 8, 9: Waijiao, 
Jiaoyu, Yu Xunshu; Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Zhixing Weiyuanhui. Published in September 
1942, p.1950: On 10 October 1940, Chiang Kai-shek is addressing a group of military and civilian 
individuals. The Tripartite Pact situated Japan officially in the fascist camp, which had negative influence 
on US-Japanese relations (Cohen, 1990, 124).  
70 SMA Y13-1-23, Zongcai yanlun xuanji (Anthology of remarks of the Chairman), Volume 8, 9: Waijiao, 
Jiaoyu, Yu Xunshu; Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Zhixing Weiyuanhui. Published in September 
1942, p.1951.  
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as Chiang showed that Japan chose to be part of the Axis Powers, and thus became 
an enemy of the Western Powers and should be dealt with accordingly.  
This link to the European war was no coincidence, but calculated propaganda.71 
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the two conflicts in Europe and China were 
difficult to link, as China had not declared war on Germany and equally, Britain had not 
declared war on Japan. External developments, such as the Tripartite Pact, German 
recognition of the Collaborationist government in Nanjing and the attack on the Soviet 
Union, however, played into Chongqing’s hands, and raised hopes for Allied 
intervention in China, as Japan and Germany were increasingly perceived as members 
of the same camp. A preferred argument was the split of the world into “harassing, 
aggressive countries” and “democratic countries that defend justice”, 72  with China 
being one of the latter. This dichotomising of the world into “peace-loving” and “war 
mongering” nations had been evident in Chinese foreign policy discussions throughout 
the 1930s (Sun, 1993, 99), and correlated with Chinese attempts to discredit Japan in 
the eyes of the Western powers, while lobbying for support. 
In a speech on 23 January 1940, Chiang Kai-shek addressed the issue of the 
Wang Jingwei agreement with Japan, and appealed to all friendly nations to support 
Chongqing China. While the Generalissimo addressed “all friendly nations”, he singled 
out nations that were “immediately bound up with Pacific affairs” (Lowe, 1944, 58), or 
more precise the US and Britain. The speech would go further and criticise the 
continued trade between the US and Japan, which actually supported the Japanese 
war machine. By January 1940, this did not result in a call for the US to go to war, but 
to curb, or better to stop their trade with Japan. With an end to US trade with Japan, 
Japan would have to end her war in China and peace would return (Lowe, 1944, 59). 
This strategy would appeal to the powerful isolationists in the US, who could support 
                                               
71 The publication of these speeches in 1942 was also part of propaganda, likely meant to signal and 
support the close connections between Chongqing China and the Western Allies. 
72 SMA Y13-1-23, Zongcai yanlun xuanji (Anthology of remarks of the Chairman), Volume 8, 9: Waijiao, 
Jiaoyu, Yu Xunshu; Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Zhixing Weiyuanhui. Published in September 
1942, p.1969, this speech was titled: “Solving the Japanese incident” and it was held on 17 November 
1941, at the second (General Assembly) opening speech of the Second National Political Consultative 
Council. 
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Chongqing China, without jeopardizing their objectives. The final event needed to gain 
US support was the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. China’s constant Anglo-
Saxon-friendly propaganda and her strong resistance against Japan turned the US 
administration and public in favour of a Sino-US alliance (Sun, 1993, 133, 136-139).  
 
 With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, events unfolded 
and irrevocably linked the Sino-Japanese war with the European theatre, thus creating 
a truly global World War. The attack on the US American Naval base rallied the US 
public behind President Roosevelt’s declaration of war against Japan, which 
automatically made Chongqing China and Washington allies. In the mind of the US 
public, indeed, Japan was regarded as the main enenmy, a position that was not 
shared by its British counterpart (Thorne, 1978, 714). The War of Resistance and 
China’s strategic importance to the Allied war strategy raised China’s international 
profile. This development culminated in China gaining a seat amongst the Big Four, 
which some twenty years earlier would have been unthinkable. Even in 1942, British 
Prime Minister Churchill objected the inclusion of Chiang Kai-shek to the Big Four, but 
had to accept the plans of President Roosevelt (Yu, 2006, 97).  
Moreover, both Chongqing and Washington declared war on the rest of the Axis 
Powers, Germany and Italy. The Western Allies, USA and Britain committed 
themselves to fight Japan, while the Soviet Union abstained from any war declaration, 
which would have meant a break of the April 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact 
(Mitter, 2013, 308).73 Chinese celebration over her newly won allies suffered slight 
setbacks in the course of 1942, however, as it became clear that Roosevelt’s focus 
was on Europe and the defeat of Germany first (“Europe first strategy”). China only 
played a minor role, and was given enough aid to keep Japan’s forces occupied, 
“but…not necessarily…enough [aid] to win“(Cohen, 1990, 133). British wartime East 
                                               
73 As a result Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin never met at any wartime Allied conference, and the US and 
Britain had to arrange for separate forums. Meetings with Japan’s enemy China could have been 
interpreted as a violation of the Neutrality Pact (Mitter, 2013, 308).  
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Asian policy also led scholars to define the Allies as “unreliable” (Shai, 1984, 56; Mitter, 
2013, 14).74 Thorne (1978, 70), however, argues that British support for China has 
largely been overshadowed by US aid from 1941 onwards; hence creating the image 
that Britain “had never cared for the cause of China in the first place”. The ease with 
which Japan occupied British colonies in South East Asia baffled Western Powers 
(Dower, 1986, 6). As a result, the British fight in Asia was also undertaken to regain her 
lost colonies, an aspiration that clashed with Chinese and US plans in this area.75 The 
Churchill administration was eager to make up for the death of “the legend of the 
invincible European” in Asia (Shai, 1984, 11). Additionally there existed blatant racial 
prejudice in Downing Street. Shai (1984, 23) puts it in the following words: “…Churchill 
could not accept the idea that Britain and China were mentioned in the same breath. 
Equality between the two countries and their peoples were, as far as he was concerned, 
simply unthinkable”. Tyson Li (2006, 232) further argues that Churchill was “an 
unbashed racist”. Chiang Kai-shek on the other hand represented a staunch anti-
imperialist position, which brought him into conflict with Britain over issues such as 
independence for British India and the return of Hong Kong to China (Yan and Li, 2008, 
267).  
 The above selection of speeches does not reflect the full scope of Republican 
Chinese foreign policy, but does provide a window through which we can examine the 
official guidelines pursued by Chongqing. As a result of such analysis we can conclude 
that the official message Chiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government distributed in 
1939 and 1940 was one of Chinese resilience against foreign invasion and her fight for 
freedom and democracy. The lines were clearly drawn between the factions: in light 
and darkness, non-aggressive and aggressive. China was portrayed as willing to fight, 
but still in desperate need of foreign aid and support. These speeches were meant for 
                                               
74 Scholars differ in their opinion about Britain’s role in East Asia during WWII, with Thorne (1978, 70) 
taking a more positive stance by highlighting that Britain supported China as much as she could. Other 
scholars, such as Shai (1984) and Mitter (2013) take a more critical stance.  
75 For more information on US plans for South East Asia and how China was involved see: La Feber 
(1975).  
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an Allied, anti-Axis audience, which is further supported by the fact that an anti-Nazi 
magazine was chosen to publish Chiang Kai-shek’s speeches.  
 
 
Chiang Kai-shek’s special envoys 
Public speeches were one tool for gaining allies; another, very different, method, 
however, seems to have been preferred by Chiang Kai-shek to “reset the broad train of 
foreign policy” (Strauss, 1998, 154). As the final decision maker in Chinese politics, 
Chiang Kai-shek also had the possibility to influence Chinese foreign policy practices 
(Martin, 2003, 42). This influence resulted in the appointment of several special envoys 
and representatives to major countries during the 1930s and 1940s, the US and the 
Soviet Union. Academic research again has a US-centric view in this field, as much 
research focuses on the envoys sent to the US, and a much smaller number also 
covers envoys to the Soviet Union. Hardly anything has been done on envoys to Britain 
or to the Third Reich, respectively.  
This fact is important for this research, as I will point out the assignment of yet 
more special envoys in back channels during 1940-1944 to maintain contact with the 
Third Reich. Even though much of Chiang Kai-shek’s attention was on Sino-US 
relations, research on special representatives to Germany will further deepen our 
understanding of Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy approach. Foo (2011, 6) highlighted 
the lack of research in this area, and this dissertation will add more information to the 
already known cases that are presented in this chapter.  
The special envoy system is closely linked with Chiang Kai-shek’s own 
involvement in Republican Chinese foreign relations, which operated through channels 
removed from the Chinese Foreign Office. According to Chen Yan (2002b, 63) the 
Junshi Weiyuanhui, the Military Affairs Commission, operated as a “foreign relations 
headquarters”, and was headed by Chiang Kai-shek. Much in favour of non-
professional diplomatic foreign policy, Chiang relied heavily on trusted aides and family 
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members, whom he used to staff and operate multiple diplomatic channels at the same 
time (Chen Yan, 2002b, 259-261). This was due to the fact that the professional 
Chinese Foreign Office staff did not meet the Generalissimo’s expectations, and were 
perceived as timid (Chen Yan, 2002b, 261-262).76 
Republican Chinese history knows several well-researched cases of back 
channels through special envoys, and such research contributes to the understanding 
of the usage of un-official diplomacy measures. Arguably the most important of these 
envoys was Chiang Kai-shek’s brother-in-law T.V. Soong, who arranged several US 
loans to China prior to Pearl Harbor (Kuo, 2009, 222). 77  Initially, the American-
educated T.V. Soong was sent to the US in June 1940, when the American 
administration had not yet determined whether to enter the war. Despite a very 
influential Chinese-friendly lobby in the US, that also included many missionaries 
(Cohen, 1990, 120),78  Soong received the order to manage and improve Sino-US 
relations (Kuo, 2009, 219), as well as to lead the Military Procurement Office (Taylor, 
2009, 192), which he did successfully. Throughout his time as a special representative, 
Soong met with leading US and British politicians and diplomats, such as President 
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Gordon Hull, Minister of Finance Henry Morgenthau Jr. 
(Chen Yan, 2002b, 232) and British ambassador Lord Edward Halifax (Wu and Kuo, 
2008, 353). Presidential aide Lauchlin Currie served as Soong’s channel to President 
Roosevelt and further as channel for Chiang Kai-shek’s Personal Advisor Owen 
Lattimore (Thorne, 1978, 81, 113).79 
While Soong’s initial work in the US took place through back channels, and, 
hence, side-lined the Chinese Foreign Office, he was later appointed Foreign Minister 
                                               
76 Chen Yan (2002b, 262) quotes: Academia Historica,  Jiang Jieshi Dangan, Wenwu Tushu zhi “Jiang 
Jieshi Shilue”, 1938, October, 1.  
77 For more concrete information on the topics Soong and Chiang Kai-shek discussed see Wu and Kuo 
(2008).  
78 Encouraged by the presence of a Christian Chinese leader, American missionaries joined the ranks of 
the Republican Chinese Administration or lobbied for China’s case in Washington (Cohen, 1990, 120). 
Jespersen (1996, 77) has highlighted this combination of American missionaries, their perception of China 
(shared by the US administration) and the US media by focusing on the persona of Henry R Luce, the 
founder of Time Magazine.  
79 Thorne (1978, 113), quotes: Morgenthay, Presidential Diary, 10 July 1941. Thorne (1978, 81) quotes: 
Lattimore to Currie, 25 Jan. 1941; FDR to Hull, 21 Nov. 1941, Roosevelt Papers, PSF box 37. 
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in December 1941, and represented China in Washington until autumn 1943 (Kuo, 
2009, 219-220).  
Lesser known envoys include Jiang Tingfu, who was sent to the Soviet Union 
by Chiang Kai-shek at least twice, and General Yang Jie, who later served as 
ambassador to Moscow from 1938 until 1940 (Garver, 1988, 16). The appointment of 
these two individuals underscores the importance of the Soviet Union for Chiang’s 
foreign policy strategy in the early 1930s and the early years of the War of Resistance, 
as well as highlights the pragmatism in Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy approach, 
since Germany and Nanjing had a good relationship at that time. Jiang Tingfu received 
the order from Chiang Kai-shek personally to “sound out the Russians on the possibility 
of cooperation” in October 1934 (So, 2002, 239),80 and was told that the Soviet Union 
indeed wished to foster better relations with China. Two years later, Jiang Tingfu was 
appointed ambassador to Moscow in November 1936, where he worked for a year and 
made a name as an advocate for closer Sino-Soviet relations as a tool to counter 
Japanese pressure on China (Foo, 2011, 28). Jiang Tingfu was replaced in June 1938 
with the first “General ambassador” Yang Jie (Chen Yan, 2002b, 211). Yang Jie had 
also served under Chiang Kai-shek in the Northern Expedition (Foo, 2011, 28). The 
initial appointment to Russia took place under the cover of an industrial inspection 
commission, headed by Yang. The mission was a major success, and lead to the 
signing of a $50 million US Dollar Soviet loan to China (Chen Yan, 2002b, 211).81 Yang 
Jie would continue to work as Chiang’s private representative to Russia (Li, 2012, 187), 
and was sent on further missions to secure foreign aid, for example to France in 1939 
(Chen Yan, 2002b, 235). 
The direct involvement of Chiang Kai-shek in Chinese foreign policy and the 
appointment of special representatives are further visible in the case of the last 
Nationalist Chinese ambassador to Moscow, Fu Bingchang. The appointment of Fu to 
                                               
80 So (2002, 239) quotes: Wang Zhen, 1993, 37-39; Jiang Tingfu, 1984, 153; ZSWJ, 210-14. 
81 Chen Yan (2002b, 211) quotes: Hu Lizhong, Jin Guangyao, Chen Jishi (1994), Cong Nibuchu Tiaoyue 
dao Yeliqin fang Hua  (From the Treaty of Nerchinsk to Jelzin’s visit to China – 300 years of Chinese-
Russian and Chinese-Soviet relations), Fujian Renmi Chubanshe, pp.218-220.   
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Moscow in 1943 had been highly influenced by Chiang Kai-shek, who hand-picked Fu 
on the grounds that he had strong links to Sun Yat-sen’s son Sun Fo, and would be 
welcomed in the Soviet Union (Foo, 2011, 1). This assumption is also based on the fact 
that Fu had accompanied Sun Fo on the latter’s mission to Moscow in 1937/1938 (Li, 
2012, 174). A member of the “Prince Clique” that surrounded Sun Fo (Li, 2012 3), Fu 
had two missions in 1943: one was to increase China’s international standing; the other 
was to curb and restrain Soviet influence in China, particularly in resource-rich Xinjiang 
province (Foo, 2011, 123). Despite being officially appointed ambassador, Fu 
maintained a direct line of communication to Chiang Kai-shek, through which he could 
ask for financial support (Foo, 2011, 39). By doing so, Chiang diverted some 
communications away from the Chinese Foreign Office, which at the time of Fu’s 
appointment, was under the control of T.V. Soong. 
There exists more evidence for the frequent use of special envoys in relative 
close proximity to Chiang Kai-shek before and after the outbreak of WWII. As I will 
point out in more detail in Chapter Six, plans emerged and failed in March 1938 to send 
special commissioner Zhu Jiahua to the Third Reich, to foster Sino-German relations.82 
Moreover, Sun Fo and, again, Zhu Jiahua were chosen to travel to the Soviet Union 
and Germany, respectively to work as special envoys in July 1940.83 Even though this 
plan failed, it emerges that the same individuals had been closely linked to a certain 
foreign nation, such as Sun Fo to the Soviet Union and Zhu Jiahua to Germany, 
respectively, and were called upon repeatedly to serve as special representatives in 
each of these. Throughout this time, Chiang Kai-shek’s China maintained official 
                                               
82 Zhu Jiahua was, like Chiang Kai-shek, a native of Zhejiang Province, born in 1893 (Boorman, 1967a, 
437) and studied in Germany. He gained significant influence over the course of the 1930s (Walsh, 1974, 
503). After completing his PhD in Germany in 1922, Zhu initially worked in China’s rapidly emerging 
academia sector (Boorman, 1967a, 438). From 1932 onwards, Zhu Jiahua became a member of the GMD 
government and served in different posts, such as “minister of communication (1932-35) and vice 
president of the Examination Yuan” (Boorman, 1967a, 437).  In 1938, Zhu took over the post as secretary 
general of the GMD headquarters, a post he held until 1944, and even after his retirement on Taiwan, Zhu 
remained close to Chiang Kai-shek as a major advisor (Boorman, 1967a, 439).   
83 PA AA Peking 176, Peking 1, Bestand Peking, Akten der Deutschen Botschaft in China, Chinesische 
Gesandschaften und Konsulate; 1940-1941 (Records Peking, Files of the German embassy in China,  
Chinese legations and consulates; 1940-1941). The Shanghai Times, 31 July 1940, “Chungking Delegates 
to Berlin, Moscow”.  
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representations in the countries in question; hence these special envoys would have 
represented a simple back channel for Chiang Kai-shek.  
 
As we are seeing, all these cases, to a higher or lesser extent, avoided the 
Chinese Foreign Office and its embassies. If Sun and Zhu had been successfully 
appointed to the Soviet Union and the Third Reich respectively in 1940, these special 
envoys would have likely communicated with Chiang Kai-shek directly, and would have 
been recipients of the Generalissimo’s shouling (personal directives). The 
characteristics of this foreign policy approach reminds us of the theory of BCD. As laid 
out in Chapter One, BCD in its simplest form avoids official front channels, and is 
usually used “to maximise secrecy” (Berridge and James, 2003, 18). While the actions 
of T.V. Soong could hardly be called secret, the latter acted outside the control of the 
Chinese embassy and diplomatic front channels. Similarly, the actions of the other 
special envoys to the Soviet Union or Germany (1938) were also either fully or partially 
controlled by Chiang Kai-shek, and bypassed official channels, thus representing back 
channels.  
I would argue, and this dissertation will further discuss this argument in Chapter 
Seven, that the here presented special envoy or special representative strategy is an 
expression of BCD. As research in the historiography of Republican Chinese foreign 
relations shows, special envoys were a tool in Chinese foreign relations. The envoys 
usually had close links to Chiang Kai-shek, and as the main decision maker in 
Chongqing, Chiang had the means and the ability to run such clandestine missions. In 
the process, the Chinese Foreign Office and official diplomatic channels were 
bypassed, hence fitting the description of BCD.  
In the next part of this dissertation, Chapter Five, I introduce, amongst others, 
the special envoys Chiang Kai-shek appointed to the Third Reich, and show the 
continuance of Chiang’s involvement in Chinese foreign policy through special envoys. 
In Chapter Six I will then present the content of the clandestine communication 
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between these envoys, and analyse this special relationship in Chapter Seven, where 
the connections to BCD will emerge.  
  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
80 
 
Chapter Five: Agents 
 
At the end of Chapter Four, I presented information on the special envoy BCD 
carried out by Chiang Kai-shek and circles in Chongqing from 1937 until 1943. 
Moreover, I argued that a modified special envoy back channel existed as part of Sino-
German relations from 1940 until 1941, and that these special envoys then upheld 
communication between Chiang Kai-shek and the two German groups, way beyond 
July 1941 until the end of 1944. Before I lay out the detailed clandestine Sino-German 
communications, however, I will introduce in this chapter the Chinese and German 
individuals who acted as agents of Chiang Kai-shek, the German Resistance and the 
RSHA respectively.  
These individuals, their backgrounds and links, are too complex to be just 
mentioned in passing in this dissertation. The structure of this chapter is based on the 
communication channels, and clearly links the agents who worked together. It will start 
with a brief introduction of the main Chinese decision maker, Chiang Kai-shek, and the 
possible forces and motives behind the maintenance of the secret network. As the 
single individual that had contact with both German groups at the same time, Chiang 
needs to be discussed outside the communication channel framework. There will be no 
repetition of Chiang’s own background history, as this would go much beyond the 
range of this dissertation’s topic.  
After this, the rest of the network is introduced, each agent according to their 
communication channels. This means that the sections start with the Chinese agent, 
continue on to the German contact and finally end at the German decision-making 
body. According to this structure, the first agent of the “Berlin-Chiang Channel” to be 
introduced is Gui Yongqing. His introduction is then followed by that of German agent 
Kurt Jahnke, and finally Jahnke’s employer, the RSHA intelligence service.  
The “German Resistance-Chiang Channel” introduction will be structured in a 
similar way. It starts with Chinese agent Qi Jun. In this case, however, I encountered 
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difficulties in identifying a single Resistance agent, as Qi’s German contacts changed 
over the course of time. In Berlin, Qi was in contact with different individuals than in 
Switzerland. As a result, this section will cover the individuals Qi encountered in both 
Berlin and Berne. As the leading members of the German Resistance do not play an 
obvious role in this channel (there is no information about their active involvement), 
they will not be introduced.  
 
   
Chiang Kai-shek 
 The decision of Chiang Kai-shek to use special envoy back channels to uphold 
relations with the Third Reich was based on several reasons, and was influenced by 
domestic and international developments. At its heart lay Chiang Kai-shek’s pragmatic 
foreign policy approach that called for the maintenance of communications with all 
sides of the conflict, even with enemies. This was clearly visible in the existence of 
clandestine Sino-Japanese connections until late 1940 (Boyle, 1972; Sun, 1993, 
145).84 According to Sun (1993, 158), Chinese foreign policy tended to become more 
flexible whenever the Western Powers did not meet Chinese expectations of foreign 
support against Japan.  
Interestingly, scholars such as Boyle (1972) and Sun (1993) did not anticipate 
the existence of clandestine channels that linked Chiang Kai-shek with Berlin. These 
channels not only represented a communication pipe-line to Berlin, but also a possible 
connection to Japan via a third country.  
In addition to the pragmatic foreign policy approach, German-friendly cliques in 
the Nationalist administration and army lobbied for closer relations with the Third Reich; 
hence they prevented an early decision in Chongqing to side only with Britain and 
France. Their cause was supported by the Third Reich’s initial war successes in 1940 
                                               
84 Sun (1993, 145) quotes: Chiang’s diary, October 31; Keiji, The Secret Records, 12:61-62. 
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and 1941. German-friendly circles believed that in her powerful position, Germany had 
the potential to influence Japan’s China policy in favour of Chongqing.  
The Nationalist government’s foreign policy is regularly described as pragmatic 
by Western academics, and the fact that China fostered relations to three of the most 
powerful nations (US, Germany, Soviet Union) during the 1930s and early 1940s is an 
indicator of this pragmatism. As previous research conducted in this field shows, China 
did not foster relations with these three countries at the same time, but each foreign 
partner served different needs in different situations (Kirby, 2011, 33).85 As I mentioned 
in Chapter Two, the standard narrative of Sino-German, and Sino-foreign relations 
respectively, would argue that by late 1938 the Third Reich had lost much of her 
standing in Chongqing. Hence, Germany was slowly omitted from the equation.  
However, this dissertation will reveal that the pragmatic foreign policy approach 
kept all doors open, and allowed Chiang Kai-shek to gather intelligence as well as 
updates on all areas of the war, including the European theatre of war, and 
developments inside Germany. Hence, diplomatic relations with the Western 
democracies existed alongside relations with the Third Reich.  
This conscious approach complicated Chinese foreign policy making, as it 
increased the pressure that lobby groups could put on Chiang Kai-shek. These cliques, 
convinced that their supported foreign nation would be most suitable for China, would 
rally for better relations to the side in the conflict they supported, be it Germany or the 
US. The cliques were responsible for much of the political change (Tien, 1972, 47) 
during the war years.  
Political closeness to Chiang Kai-shek was one of the determining factors for 
the influence these groups actually exercised, war developments being another factor. I 
will not go into detail on Japanese-friendly or US-friendly cliques in Chongqing, as 
there has already been a substantial amount of research written surrounding these (e.g. 
                                               
85 From the early 1930s until mid-1938, Germany supported the modernisation process of the Chinese 
industry and army. In a time of crisis, when no other partner was available, the Soviet Union stepped in as 
a bridge until the US finally joined the war in December 1941. For more information see Kirby (2011, 33-
35). 
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
83 
 
as part of Tyson Li’s (2006) work on Soong May-ling, Tien (1972), Wakeman Jr. (2003) 
and Boyle (1972); rather, the sole focus here will be on the German-friendly elements 
in Chongqing.  
German-friendly influence has been repeatedly identified amongst the 
Nationalist civil administration and the army, in particular by contemporary observers in 
Chongqing, but has not featured overwhelmingly in research focusing on wartime 
Chongqing China.86 This has happened despite the fact that a substantial number of 
Chinese army officers had either been trained by the German military mission, or 
enjoyed military training in Germany. These officers made up a substantial part of the 
Nationalist Army’s command structure, and wielded significant power. As members of 
the Whampoa Clique (Tien, 1972, 45), named after their military academy, these men 
swore loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek and represented a backbone of support for the 
German-friendly course of the Generalissimo (Kirby, 1984, 158; Martin, 2003, 44). The 
Whampoa Clique did not include any members of the CCP, and carried out “quasi-
military and secret activities” (Tien, 1972, 53). Several high-ranking military officers 
would go on to become founding members of the “Society for Vigorous Practice” or 
Lixingshe.87 One of these men was Gui Yongqing, who served as military attaché and 
Chiang Kai-shek’s informant in Germany in 1940 and 1941.   
The Nationalist administration also recruited a substantial number of its 
personnel from returned students who had either studied in Europe or the US, and who 
harboured positive feelings for their former host countries. Students who had returned 
from studies in Germany occupied essential positions amongst the Nationalist 
administration, such as Minister of Education Zhu Jiahua or the head of the Ordnance 
                                               
86 On British observations of German-friendly sentiments in Chongqing see: TNA, (PRO) HS 1/165, Far 
East China: OSS/SOE Co-Operation; 11 May 1943, copy of long document summarising the background 
on OSS/SOE cooperation and Chongqing; British Library, India Office Records (IOR), L/ P&S/ 12/ 2293, 
China,Sino-British Relations  File 15, Sep 36-April 46. Government of India, Supply Dept. to Secretary of 
State for India. Calcutta 20 March 1942, Chungking to Foreign Office, from Sir H. Seymour, 2 April 1942. 
Much research on wartime Chinese relations focused on Sino-US or Sino-Soviet relations, mentioning 
German-friendly individuals on the periphery, without further exploring them.  
87 Gui Yongqing was also founding member of the Lixingshe (Wakeman Jr., 2003, 57-58). The translation 
for Lixingshe in this thesis is based on the translation used by Frederic Wakeman Jr. (2003, 46). 
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Department, Yu Dawei (Boorman, 1967b, 74).88 In particular, Zhu Jiahua has been 
identified by scholars as a German-friendly individual (Kirby, 1984, 43). The contact 
between Chiang Kai-shek and the Resistance movement, Qi Jun, had also studied in 
Germany. 
These German-friendly groups could rely on Chiang Kai-shek’s own positive 
view of Germany (Taylor, 2009, 101), but the impact of their lobbying on the 
Generalissimo’s foreign policy was closely linked to the initial German war successes 
in 1939 until 1941, which shaped Chinese perception, and turned many government 
officials in favour of closer Sino-German relations. This was a point in time when China 
had not officially joined any side in the conflict yet and still received Soviet aid, but also 
faced a neutral US, a Britain primarily occupied with events in Europe, and  Soviet-
Japanese rapprochement. Decision makers in 1940/1941 Chongqing failed to convince 
the Western democracies of China’s importance for besieged nations, such as Britain. 
This is despite the fact that Churchill’s May 1940 message clearly reflected the 
perception in London that Chinese resistance was important and that Britain feared 
Chiang Kai-shek might decide in favour of the Third Reich.89   
Despite Western nations’ wariness of Chongqing’s objectives and Chinese 
perception of a lack of official foreign commitment, the Chinese Foreign Office upheld 
an anti-Axis foreign policy for obvious reasons. A close association with Germany 
would have closed many doors for Chiang Kai-shek in Britain and the US, while it was 
not guaranteed that a Sino-German rapprochement would actually come to be. After all, 
the Third Reich was still allied with Japan in the Anti Comintern Pact and the Tripartite 
Pact, which received strong Chinese criticism. Despite this criticism of German-
Japanese alliances, the Chiang Kai-shek used special envoy back channels, hidden 
                                               
88 Like Zhu Jiahua and Chiang Kai-shek, Yu Dawei was born in Zhejiang Province, in the year 1899. Yu 
also pursued studies in Germany (ballistic and mathematic), where he stayed until 1926. A few years later 
he was back in Germany, where he served as liaison commissioner in Berlin’s “Commerce Department” 
during the early 1930s (Boorman, 1967b, 73). 
89 TNA, (PRO) WO 208/232, China, Chapter 1: Political; Chungking Government’s Relations with Germany. 
5 August 1941, Correspondence by Sir A. Clerk Kerr, from Chongqing to the British Foreign Office in 
London.  
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amongst the Chinese embassy staff in Berlin, as a possible solution to maintain Sino-
German relations, without jeopardizing Sino-US/British relations.   
 
 
The “Berlin-Chiang Channel” agents: 
Gui Yongqing 
Gui Yongqing was a career soldier in the Nationalist Army, who rose to the level 
of General before being appointed as military attaché to Berlin, where he arrived in 
autumn 1940. Born in China’s Jiangxi province (Cheng, 2001, 55), Gui graduated from 
Whampoa Academy’s first cohort of students (Wakeman Jr., 2003, 57) in 1925. These 
early graduates were described by scholars as Chiang Kai-shek’s “personal followers” 
(Ch’ien, 1948, 242). Five years of military service were followed by advanced military 
training in Germany in 1930 (Xu, 1991, 643), in which Gui familiarised himself with 
German war strategy and training procedures. Moreover, Gui made the acquaintance 
of German military officers, one of whom was Hermann Göring (Deng and Wang, 2012, 
233).90 The two men would meet again in the 1940s during Gui’s time as military 
attaché in Berlin. By that time, Göring had been made Reichsmarschall and the head of 
the German Luftwaffe (air force). As Hitler’s designated successor, Göring was one of 
leading Nazis that competed for Hitler’s favour and support.  
The acquisition of German military knowledge was then put into practise in 
China, where Gui helped to establish the Zhongyang Junxiao Xibei Junxiao (Central 
Military Academy Northwest Military School) in 1933 (Deng and Wang, 2012, 234). 
During the 1930s, Gui Yongqing rose to be commander of “the German-trained Model 
                                               
90 In Germany, Gui may have come into contact with fascism and National Socialism, because he placed a 
picture of Adolf Hitler right next to the photo of Chiang Kai-shek in his office (Deng and Wang, 2012, 235). 
Deng and Wang (2012, 233) also state that Gui met a General Gelin, who I assume was Hermann Göring.  
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Division, which successfully fought the Japanese in 1938” (Belden, 1944, 153-180, in 
Liang, 1978, 163).91  
Aside from his life as a military officer, Gui engaged in political activities. In late 
February 1932, Gui and other officers of the armed forces founded the “Society for 
Vigorous Practice”, or the Lixingshe (Wakeman Jr., 2003, 57, 411n), and elected 
Chiang Kai-shek as their leader (lingxiu). The society was closely related with the rise 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s personality cult in the early 1930s, and is often linked with groups 
such as the “Blue Shirts”, which have been associated with fascism (e.g. Eastman, 
1972). Members of the Lixingshe and in particular of the Whampoa Academy were 
known for their nationalism and anti-imperialism, which they shared with Chiang Kai-
shek. Gui Yongqing helped to organise the Fuxingshe (the Renaissance-Society), a 
satellite organisation of the Lixingshe (Deng, and Wang, 2012, 234). 92  It can be 
established that Gui took a German-friendly stance, even arguing that Germany had 
Hitler to revive her, and China had Chiang Kai-shek and was in need of reviving [by 
Chiang] (Deng and Wang, 2012, 234). In 1937, Gui became involved for the first time in 
Chinese foreign policy when he joined H.H. Kung’s “Chinese Study Commission” to 
Germany. During the trip, Kung met with several German industrialists and politicians, 
including Hitler, and it is very likely that Gui accompanied him on a number of these 
visits (Liang, 1978, 121). 
This early experience with Germany and her politicians may have predestined 
Gui for the job as military attaché to Germany. Surely, Gui’s loyalty and political support 
for Chiang Kai-shek, as well as his work as a military officer played a role as well. 
Besides, Germans interested in better Sino-German relations vouched for Gui’s 
diplomatic skills, and declared him to be “the ablest diplomat the Chinese ever sent to 
Germany” (Liang, 1978, 163). Gui’s appointment as military attaché to Germany 
occurred in April 1940, and Gui arrived in Berlin in autumn of the same year. The duties 
                                               
91 Belden (1944, 159) refers to the battle against “Doihara along the southern banks of the Yellow River in 
1938”. He accompanied Gui Yongqing on the battlefield and later wrote his work Still Time to Die in 1944. 
Gui was the commander of the 27th Corps.  
92 The translation of the Fuxingshe is based on Frederic Wakeman Jr. (2003, 69).   
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of Gui (and Qi) included, amongst other matters, the order to observe, investigate and 
to make “powerful” friends in the German authority (Yang, 2010b, 4).93 During his time 
in Berlin, Gui established contact with German intelligence agent Kurt Jahnke, and the 
two men met on a weekly basis and exchanged “views on matters of foreign policy” 
(Liang, 1978, 164).  
The appointment of a follower of Chiang Kai-shek to the post of a military 
attaché in Berlin aroused suspicion in European capitals. This suspicion was not 
unreasonable, as military attachés can be involved in espionage and are linked to their 
country’s secret service (Berridge and James, 2003, 243). The Third Reich also 
mistrusted foreign military attachés, and had found evidence in May 1941 that showed 
the intelligence activities of attachés from neutral countries in Berlin.94 In addition to 
espionage, a military attaché may find himself “having to serve different – and 
sometimes competing – masters” (Berridge and James, 2003, 243). In Gui’s case, one 
of these masters was Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, foreign observers in the British 
embassy in Chongqing suspected that Gui was the leader of a Chinese military mission 
to Germany. Suspicion further increased due to the fact that Gui did not take the 
initially agreed route via India and Burma (now Myanmar), but travelled via Hong Kong 
under an assumed name. British observers explained Gui’s mission as being an 
attempt by Chongqing China to get a foot into the German camp, and “to provide a sop 
for Pro-German elements [German-friendly] in [the Chinese] Government”.95  
As a result, the British Foreign Office requested the US embassy in Berlin to 
keep an eye on Gui’s actions.96 As I will lay out in Chapter Six, Gui’s actions in Berlin 
do indicate a wider range of orders than those normally expected of a military attaché.  
                                               
93 Yang put a footnote close to this information, but does not state where his sources are coming from. He 
refers to Chiang Kai-shek’s reception book information, several different archives and the Human 
Resources Office of the Presidential House. No exact names or locations are given for these references; 
see Yang (2010b, 16).  
94 PA AA R101997, Akten betr. Abwehr + Allgemein (Files regarding Abwehr and General). 21 May 1941, 
“Rundschreiben an sämtliche Abteilungsleiter, gezeichnet Kramarz“ (Writing to all heads of departments).  
95  TNA, (PRO) WO 208/232, China, Chapter One: Political; Chungking Government’s Relations with 
Germany, 19 August 1940, Telegram: Special Distribution and War Cabinet. 
96  TNA, (PRO) WO 208/232, China, Chapter One: Political; Chungking Government’s Relations with 
Germany, 5 September 1940, telegram to the Marquess of Lothian (Washington) from Chongqing sent via 
Shanghai.   
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The break of Sino-German relations in July 1941 dealt a blow to Gui’s 
diplomatic mission, but the General’s work was adapted to the situation, and he 
continued to serve as a communication channel between “Berlin” and Chiang Kai-shek. 
After Chongqing announced the closure of its embassy in Berlin, almost all of the staff 
returned to China, with the exception of Gui, who instead stayed in Berne in 
Switzerland, where he was to spend most of the war years.  
During this time, Gui’s official position as well as his work becomes 
questionable, and information is at times conflicting. Some scholars (Chen Yan, 2002b, 
182) set Gui’s active time as military attaché in Germany and Switzerland from August 
1940 until September 1942, after which Gui was appointed military attaché to Britain.97 
Chen’s information is further supported by Swiss archival material. As will be further 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, the Swiss authorities did not welcome the 
arrival of what they had been told was a new military attaché for Chongqing China.98 
Contemporary witness Hu Shizhe (Hoo, 1998, 64-65), however, stated that Gui was 
appointed to the position of Counsellor of the Legation and Charge d’affairs,99 which Hu 
had held himself in late 1941. From this information it can be deduced that Gui’s 
position in Switzerland was relatively high and influential.  
German records, in contrast, stated that Gui’s work was unknown, indeed it was 
speculated that he was “ohne amtlichen Character” (without official appointment) and 
served as a private observer for the government in Chongqing.100 A very vague term, 
“private observer” may refer to the possibility that Gui worked as an intelligence agent, 
which would be further backed by the attaché’s potential intelligence links, such as the 
                                               
97 Chen Yan (2002b, 182) does not specifically state that Gui lived in Germany, but says that he was 
temporarily stationed in Switzerland. In his letter to General Alexander von Falkenhausen on 7 August 
1941, Gui Yongqing mentioned that the Chinese embassy corps had left Germany on 10 July and arrived 
in Switzerland on 11 July. Except Gui Yongqing, almost all embassy members continued their journey to 
China (BArch N/246(Nachlass Falkenhausen, Korrespondenz mit Chinesen und Japanern, sowie wegen 
ostasiatischer Angelegenheiten/12 (Falkenhausen Documents, Correspondence with Chinese and 
Japanese). Fiche 89 and 90.  
98 CH-BAR#E2001D#1000/1553#1271*; contains the dossier on Kwei Yun-Chin, Legationsrat. 
99 According to Berridge and James (2003, 59 and 174), the title of a “counsellor” is synonymous with that 
of a “minister”, who in the diplomatic service ranks below an ambassador. The term Charge d’Affairs can 
refer to an interim head of the mission, who takes over in the absence of the ambassador. Similarly, this 
term can also refer to the “head of a mission which is neither an embassy nor a legation” (Berridge and 
James, 2003, 36-37). 
100 PA AA, Bern 3604. “An das AA in Berlin, Brief von Köcher aus Gesandschaft Bern“, 24 November 1944.  
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link to Jahnke and the RSHA. The superior officer of German agent Jahnke, Walter 
Schellenberg, recalled in his memoirs that the main centres of the Nationalist Chinese 
intelligence service in Europe were located, amongst other places, in Berne, which was 
also one of the reported locations of one of Jahnke’s main contacts, Vichy in France 
being the other.101 Other sources, such as the German military attaché in Berne, Iwan 
von Ilsemann, reported on 27 January 1944 “that all Chinese embassies and 
consulates were under the control of Gui” (lit. translation).102  
Towards the end of 1944, Gui was appointed as military attaché to Britain, 
which met with certain reservation from the British side, which presumed that Gui’s 
political position had been influenced by fascist ideology while he worked in Berlin. 
Chongqing China denied such developments, and London had no chance to reject the 
choice of Gui, as a rejection might be perceived negatively by the Chongqing 
government.103  
 
In conclusion, an image emerges of a German-friendly Chinese general, who 
was completely loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and who gained experience with Germany 
and the leading elite of the Third Reich during the early 1930s. In his role as a military 
attaché Gui was able to move relatively independently from interference by the 
Chinese embassy, and answered very likely directly to Chiang Kai-shek. Gui had at his 
disposal connections to the German party intelligence service RSHA and the agent 
Jahnke, while he was in contact with the Chinese intelligence service.104 The back-
channel intelligence role of Gui, and the use of a public office as cover, took on a wider 
dimension in Switzerland, due to the fact that Sino-German communication officially 
                                               
101 IfZ, ED90, Schellenberg, Walter, SS-Gruf. Memoiren 1939-1944, Volume 4, p.629.  
102  BArch, RW/4(Fernost: Japan, China, Indien)/693, (Far East: Japan, China, India). Fiche 0247166.  
Partial copy of report of German military attaché in Berne, 27 January 1944.  
103 TNA (PRO) WO 208/ 216, Chinese missions; Coronation delegates and visits to Allied forces in Europe 
and Asia; 12 July 1944 from M.A. Chungking to the War Office, to D.M.I.  
104  German records mentioning Gui Yongqing tend to randomly romanise his Chinese name. During 
interrogation by the British secret service, Schellenberg stated that the Chinese general Jahnke was in 
contact with was named Coue. Coue is a romanised approximation of the surname Gui. For reference see: 
TNA, (PRO) KV2/755, Jahnke Kurt; Copy of translation of report by Walter Schellenberg, Head of Amt VI 
of the RSHA, on Herrn Jahnke and his authorities, 23 August 1945. 
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ceased to exist in July 1941. Gui merged his very likely role as an intelligence agent 
with clandestine diplomacy, something that Scott (2004, 330-331) identified as a sign of 
governments (here more likely Chiang Kai-shek) using secret services to conduct 
foreign policy. The discussion of Gui’s actual role in Switzerland proves to be 
challenging, but will be continued in Chapter Six of this dissertation. 
 
Kurt Jahnke 
 Jahnke is a rather elusive individual, and information on his movements and 
career is scarce and scattered throughout different archives. There is no written 
memoir or set of papers left by Jahnke himself, with all information about him narrated 
by others who knew or worked with him. Archival material on Jahnke’s missions is also 
rare, as research in the Swiss and German archives highlights. The nature of Jahnke’s 
profession and the secrecy associated with it might be one of the reasons for such 
scarcity, but also the destruction of major parts of Berlin and surroundings towards the 
end of WWII contributed to this issue. As a result, researchers are faced with problems 
whenever they try to create a picture of this man. Several interviews with Jahnke’s 
secretary Carl Marcus, carried out by Liang, have been included in The Sino-German 
Connection (1978). The addition of Jahnke to his 1978 publication earned Liang some 
criticism, as Presseisen (1980, 170) argued that “such shadowy figures as Kurt Jahnke” 
should have been excluded from the book. This opinion cannot be shared, as new 
research carried out for this dissertation suggests that Jahnke played a much more 
crucial role in Sino-German relations than many scholars had previously anticipated.  
In addition to Marcus’ interview with Liang, the British National Archive stores 
the Allied interrogation reports of Marcus and Schellenberg. The latter also published 
his memoirs in 1956 and these have been translated into English as well (Schellenberg, 
1956a, 1956b). The original manuscript of this document is located at the Institute for 
Contemporary History (IfZ) in Munich. The lack of sources makes Schellenberg’s 
memoirs one of the best sources available on Jahnke. Naturally, these memoirs have 
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to be read with caution, due to the fact that after the war many former Nazi Party 
members published their accounts of events, in an aim to whitewash their own 
participation in the Third Reich machinery, and Schellenberg is no exception to this.105  
 
There is little known about Jahnke’s earlier life, except that he was born in 1889, 
and worked as a German agent during WWI in the US, where he carried out acts of 
sabotage. Rumours also pointed to his work as a British-German double agent 
(Spence, 1996, 92). While in the US, Jahnke made a fortune by shipping tin-covered 
caskets of dead Chinese citizens to China (Schlie, 2001, 91).106  After the war he 
reportedly spent some time in China, where he may have worked as an intelligence 
instructor (Blancke, 2011, 68). In addition to his work in China, Jahnke made the 
acquaintance of the Soong Family and Sun Yat-sen (Spence, 1996, 92). Rumours that 
have been picked up by scholars107 through the decades even suggest that Jahnke 
was made an honorary member of Sun’s family in some capacity, in order to honour his 
service to the Chinese (Schellenberg, 1956a, 43). In contrast to the published memoirs, 
Schellenberg’s manuscript stated that Jahnke “was invited by the family of Sun Yat-sen, 
of which Mrs. Tschiang Kaischek is a part”.108 Whether Jahnke was made a member of 
the Soong or Sun family is outside our current knowledge, as no record in Chinese 
supports these claims, and we do not know whether Jahnke was actually given any 
kind of honorary status. Nonetheless, Jahnke’s work in East Asia provided him with an 
excellent network of contacts, which may have included influential Chinese such as 
members of the Soong family, in China and in Japan.  
In Nazi Germany, Jahnke increasingly became involved in state intelligence, 
while maintaining a semi-independent position amongst the competing factions of the 
                                               
105 On several occasions the Schellenberg memoirs (1956b, 436) point out how many lives Schellenberg 
apparently saved and how peace loving he was. This however, does not fit with the image given by 
Gisevius (2009, 36), in which Schellenberg is described as being abusive and sadistic.  
106 Jahnke made a fortune by helping the relatives of deceased Chinese to ship the corpses from the US 
back to China for the funeral. US authorities did not allow the shipment of corpses for hygienic reasons. 
Jahnke therefore had the coffins covered with tin, to seal them air-tight. For each body he charged $1000 
(Schellenberg, 1956b, 40). 
107 See for example much recent research by Schlie (2001, 91).  
108 IfZ, ED90, Schellenberg, Walter, SS-Gruf. Memoiren, 1939-1945, Volume 4, p.471.  
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Nazi government. By mid-1930, Jahnke worked for Hitler’s Deputy Rudolf Hess in the 
so-called Büro Jahnke (Jahnke Bureau) (Schellenberg, 1956a, 44). From this bureau, 
Jahnke distributed information on foreign intelligence to different groups, including the 
intelligence service, and the German Foreign Office. The bureau successfully stayed 
above the notorious competition of other government bodies and agencies in this 
period, and maintained contacts to the Abwehr, and the secret service of the SS 
(RSHA), and of the Wehrmacht (Schlie, 2001, 92), but was unable to shoulder Hitler’s 
wrath after Hess’ flight to Britain in October 1941. On the order of the NSDAP, 
Jahnke’s bureau was closed and he was transferred to Department VI (foreign 
intelligence) of the RSHA, which made excellent use of Jahnke’s East Asian 
connections to keep open a channel to Chiang Kai-shek.109  
Jahnke’s connections to China ran, as far as we know, through several German 
individuals that had excellent connections to, and had earned the trust of Chiang Kai-
shek. There were, for example, General Alexander von Falkenhausen and Walter 
Stennes.110 Falkenhausen, as well as Stennes, first met Jahnke during the Ruhrkampf, 
a resistance movement against the French occupation of the Ruhr area in the 1920s 
(Drage, 1982, 89),111 and stayed in contact from then on. With the death of Chiang Kai-
shek’s fourth chief military advisor Hans von Seeckt (1936) and the recall of von 
Falkenhausen (1938), Stennes turned out to be the closest of Jahnke’s agents to 
Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Secret Service chief Dai Li (Westad, 2012, 196). 
According to Kirby (1984, 247), Stennes headed an organisation under the name of 
                                               
109 The National Archive in Kew stores the interrogation reports of Schellenberg. Schellenberg stated that 
this Chinese General “Coue”, with whom Jahnke was in touch, had been posted in England at the end of 
the war, which was exactly the case of Gui (Chen, 2002, 182). For reference see: TNA, (PRO) KV2/755, 
Jahnke Kurt. Copy of translation of report by Walter Schellenberg, Head of Amt VI of the RSHA, on Herrn 
Jahnke and his authorities, 23 August 1945. 
110 TNA, (PRO) KV2/755, Jahnke Kurt, 22 May 1945, Letter by M.N. Forrest to Captain Walmsley. Schlie 
(2001, 104) mentions investigations of the Jahnke Bureau, following Hess’ flight to Scotland. Schellenberg 
also recalls that Himmler and Heydrich mentioned such a possibility to Hitler (Schellenberg, 1956a, 202). 
See also Schellenberg (1956b, 270). Hans von Seeckt and Alexander von Falkenhausen both led the 
German military mission in China, while Walter Stennes headed Chiang Kai-shek’s bodyguards.  
111 The reference to Jahnke’s cooperation with Falkenhausen during the Ruhrkampf is in: BArch N/246 
(Falkenhausen Nachlass, Ueberarbeitete Fassung der Memoiren, Kap. I-XIV)/48 (Falkenhausen memoirs, 
Revised Version, Ch. I-XIV), p.129. Drage (1982, 90) states that Stennes and Jahnke went to Bavaria 
when they realised that the Ruhrkampf had no success. In Bavaria the two men met with national forces, 
which also included Adolf Hitler.  
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“The Generalissimo’s Air Transport Squadron” and engaged in intelligence that relied 
only on foreigners.112 For an intelligence man such as Jahnke, this kind of connection 
would be valuable. Stennes’ importance may have decreased due to the increasingly 
difficult situation in Chongqing (Tyson Li, 2006, 160) and, foremost, the arrival of Gui in 
Berlin—a connection that has hitherto hardly been noted or evaluated by any scholar 
working on Jahnke.113  
 
The importance Jahnke attached to his Chinese connections was strong, and 
was rooted in his post-WWI goals for Weimar Germany to improve the country’s 
international standing. Detailed information about Jahnke’s political proclivities do not 
exist, but contemporary witnesses explained that he “pursued a two-fold [agenda]: to 
break up Germany’s encirclement by the Western Powers and Russia, and to fight the 
Communist world revolution” (Liang, 1978, 117).114 The Nationalist China of Chiang 
Kai-shek, with her anti-communist position (after 1927) and increasing economic 
importance emerged as a solution to improve Germany’s international standing (Liang, 
1978, 117). Jahnke, who had engineered the 1920s cooperation between the German 
and the Red Army, also planned a “Eurasian partnership with China” (Liang, 1999, 343), 
meaning he may have been involved in the successful 1930s Sino-German trade 
relations.115  
From previous publications it is difficult to define whether Jahnke was a loyal 
Nazi or worked for the German Resistance. Liang’s work (1978, 1999) appears to 
                                               
112 Kirby (1984, 247) quotes: Drage (1958); Utley (1940, 9) & Liang (1978, 117).  
113 Apart from Liang (1978; 1999).  
114 German public perception of the 1920s saw the Treaty of Versailles and in particular French behaviour 
as encircling, and threatening to the country (Layne, 1994, 37).  
115 According to sources, Jahnke was also involved in events prior to WWII. Schellenberg states that 
Jahnke attempted to prevent war with England during what he called the “Polish Crisis”, and planned for a 
British emissary to be seen by Hitler. The only obstacle to reconciliation between England and Germany 
was Ribbentrop, who changed Hitler’s mind. This is also reported by Hsi-Huey Liang (1999, 358), who 
interviewed Jahnke’s secretary Carl Marcus. While Schellenberg is stating the year 1938/1930, Liang 
points towards 1937. Nonetheless, from both sources (in particular Schellenberg) it becomes clear that 
Jahnke thought little of Ribbentrop and did not work together with him. Schellenberg reports that Jahnke 
called Ribbentrop an idiot. (For reference see: TNA, (PRO) KV2/755, Jahnke Kurt, 23 August 1945, Copy 
of report of translation of Walter Schellenberg.  “Polish Crisis” probably refers to the 1938/1938 Danzig 
Crisis between Germany and Poland. Hsi-Huey Liang (1999, 357) is referring to the year 1937 in a 
situation very similar to what Schellenberg described. 
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support the latter theory and portrays Jahnke as a man who wanted the best for his 
country. On the other hand, other scholars (Doerries, 2003; Schlie, 2001) highlight 
Jahnke’s work for the RSHA, the party intelligence service. I do not attempt in this 
dissertation to question or answer any of these issues, but will present the actions of 
Jahnke in his capacity as part of the “Berlin-Chiang Channel”, without trying to find out 
whether he was a Nazi or not. My findings in this dissertation hopefully will therefore 
contribute to the discussion on Jahnke, and complement the fragmented picture we 
currently have of this man. 
 
The information provided above shapes our understanding of Jahnke and his 
intelligence work. We can see that Jahnke pursued a Chinese-friendly agenda from the 
shadows of his Jahnke Bureau, and linked Germany’s future with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
China. As we will see below, the Nazi government’s drive towards a Japanese-friendly 
foreign policy threatened the plans Jahnke harboured for Nationalist China and 
Germany. During the 1930s and mainly 1940-1941, Jahnke was able to expand his 
intelligence network to General Gui, and emerged as the main German communication 
channel to Chiang Kai-shek once the official diplomatic channels ceased to exist. The 
Nazi leadership was aware of Jahnke’s contacts with Chongqing, and used these to 
uphold Sino-German connections, despite China’s allegiance to the Allies. 
 
Berlin: the RSHA and its motives 
In the network of wartime Sino-German relations, Jahnke takes a central stage 
on the German side. His actions were largely controlled by the RSHA, which emerges 
as an un-official player in German foreign relations. Controlled by SS and Gestapo 
chief Heinrich Himmler, and SD-Chief Reinhard Heydrich,116 the RSHA was one of 
several Nazi institutions that competed with each other for Hitler’s favour. As is the 
case in authoritarian regimes, information meant political survival, and the RSHA 
                                               
116 Heydrich only played a role in clandestine Sino-German relations until his death in Prague on 4 June 
1942. 
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foreign intelligence allowed Himmler and Heydrich to rival von Ribbentrop’s information 
that the German embassies and consulates sent. Hitler himself had created this system 
of internal competition, but as Shore (2005, 6) states:  
By rarely confiding in his [Hitler’s] advisers and by pitting each against the 
other, he [Hitler] produced a constant sense of uncertainty within the 
regime. Uncertainty grew to a climate of fear as state-sponsored violence 
and intimidation affected even the leading decision makers. Yet instead of 
making his advisors more cautious, the frenzied environment fostered 
greater risk. They tightened their grip on information and advocated more 
dangerous policies. 
 
 In the hierarchy of the RSHA, Jahnke’s first person of contact was Walter 
Schellenberg, the head of Department VI, responsible for foreign intelligence. The two 
men discussed extensively Sino-German clandestine connections, with the results then 
being reported by Schellenberg to his superiors Himmler and Heydrich. These two men 
would decide which information to forward to Adolf Hitler, and which to withhold. After 
finally reaching Hitler, new orders were likely issued in the same way, though in the 
opposite direction via Himmler/Heydrich and Schellenberg. Jahnke would then inform 
Gui, who himself was in contact with Chiang Kai-shek. As I will show in Chapter Six, 
hardly any German Foreign Office staff (apart from von Ribbentrop) played a role in the 
“Berlin-Chiang Channel”, suggesting that the Third Reich’s foreign policy making was 
as equally dominated by factions as was the case in Chongqing.  
Current narratives of and research on intelligence channels controlled by 
Schellenberg mainly focus on the latter’s contact with the chief of the Swiss military 
secret service, Roger Masson. While Jahnke maintained the channel to Chongqing 
China open, Schellenberg directly conversed with Masson over Swiss-German 
relations and Swiss neutrality. Given the much more serious repercussions such a 
communication line between the RSHA and the Chief of the Swiss military intelligence 
service would have had, information on these events are more frequently available in 
the Swiss federal archive, and have been subject to research in the past (e.g. 
Braunschweig, 1989; 2004). While Swiss authorities observed many espionage 
attempts on their territory, the Sino-German “Berlin-Chiang Channel” has not found 
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entry into the records stored at Berne. As I will show below, even the information on 
members of the “German Resistance-Chiang Channel” are scarce. This can imply a 
number of developments. On the one hand, the scarcity of material may imply that 
these channels were not taken seriously by the Swiss authorities. Alternatively, and 
perhaps more likely, Swiss authorities were largely focused on intelligence operations 
by the powers involved in Europe, and the China theatre seemed distant from events in 
Europe. Given that Swiss authorities feared primarily for their country’s neutrality, any 
actions related to the war in Europe, such as requests by the Axis Powers for transit 
rights for soldiers through Swiss territory, had a much higher importance.117  
 
Nazi German interest in Chongqing stemmed from German dissatisfaction over 
the execution of German-Japanese wartime cooperation, a development that surely 
undermined the position of Japanese-friendly Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. 
Increasingly, and despite the public image of a strong bilateral relationship, new 
scholarship suggests that German-Japanese relations were never as close as the early 
post-war research suggested (Dobson, 1999, 179). Foreign policy actions and re-
actions on the German and Japanese side had damaged relations in the run up to the 
war. From November 1936 until August 1939, the alliance between the Third Reich and 
Japan seemed stable, but the German-Soviet Non Aggression Pact in August 1939 
surprised the Japanese government. Nonetheless, faced with an increasingly hostile 
US and in anticipation of German-Soviet cooperation, a new Soviet-Japanese 
rapprochement was initiated.118 Previous Japanese complaints over the Soviet Union’s 
aid to China in form of weapons and military advisors subsided. For a while, it seemed 
that both anti-communist Germany and Japan considered the option of the Soviet 
Union to join the Tripartite Pact. Stalin indeed showed interest, but was stopped by 
Hitler, who believed that Soviet amendments to the pact would “curb German appetites” 
                                               
117 TNA, HW 1/1620, From Chinese Legation Berne to Foreign Office Chungking, 17 April 1943, British 
administration sent out note on 20 April 1943. 
118 Japan indeed looked for ways to “keep the Soviet Union out of the war “(Hasegawa, 2005, 3). 
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(Slavinsky, 2004, 9). The new German shift towards war with the Soviet Union then ran 
against Japanese plans, as the new Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in April 1941 
forbade Japan to enter into war against the Soviet Union with Germany. Moreover, the 
Japanese leadership did not want to engage in a two-front war in the Pacific and in 
North Eastern China. German demands for Japanese support therefore remained 
unanswered.119  This resulted in sections of the Nazi hierarchy turning to China again, 
in a bid to influence the war. These individuals contacted Chiang Kai-shek without 
going through the German Foreign Office, and the RSHA faction made sure that the 
wartime ”Berlin-Chiang Channel” remained open.  
 
 
The “Resistance-Chiang Channel” agents:  
Qi Jun 
 If Gui Yongqing’s time in Germany qualified him to serve as military attaché in 
Berlin, Qi Jun was equally skilled to work there. Along with his two cousins, Qi spent 
his teenage years with a German family in the province of Brandenburg. He attended 
school there and spoke German fluently.120 In later years he studied in Potsdam and 
Munich (Kirby, 1984, 309-310, notes to the pages 178-181). Qi’s fluency in German 
enabled him to serve as translator for the same study mission to Germany that Gui had 
joined in 1937. Throughout the 1930s, Qi then worked in China as a translator for the 
military mission leader Hans von Seeckt (until 1934) and later as secretary for the 
National Resource Commission and for Chiang Kai-shek (Kirby, 1984, 309-310).121 
Informed German observers described Qi as a member of a German-friendly group, 
                                               
119 The very interesting topic of German-Soviet-Japanese relations during the years 1939-1941 cannot be 
further discussed in this thesis, as it would divert from the intended topic of Sino-German relations. 
Interested readers are recommended to read Slavinsky (2004).  
120 Andreas Chi, Interview by Hsi-Huey Liang, Taipei 9 August 1972; and Robert Chi, Interview by Hsi-
Huey Liang, Lucerne, 26 July 1973. For more information see Liang, 1978, 5; BArch N383, Nachlass 
Foerster (Foerster Papers).  
121 At the time of the Kung study mission, Qi had already assumed his position as secretary to Chiang Kai-
shek (Kirby, 1984, 238). 
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without defining this particular group any further.122 Apart from this information there is 
not much else known about Qi. In contrast, information about Gui is widely available in 
bibliographical dictionaries on Republican Chinese individuals (Xu, 1991, 643). 
 The break of Sino-German relations in July 1941 saw Qi return to China, from 
where he was quickly reposted to Berne in Switzerland in January 1942 as Economic 
Attaché at the Chinese legation (Yang, 2010b, 11).123 The reason for this change will 
be further explored in Chapter Six. Suffice it to say at this stage that British observers 
in Chongqing informed the British Foreign Office in London of these events, which in 
turn identified Qi as a possible “pipe-line” between Chongqing and Berlin.124 Despite 
the fact that British observers correctly anticipated the existence of such a 
communication pipeline, they erred in regard of the actual agent, which was General 
Gui Yongqing, who had been overlooked by the Allies. In reality Qi was the main 
contact for members of the Resistance movement against Hitler, and these members 
had requested Qi’s presence in Europe to serve as a contact to Chiang Kai-shek. As a 
result, Chiang indeed sent Qi to Switzerland in order to work together with the German 
movement (Yang, 2010b, 11).  
 
The Resistance Agents: 
 While it was certainly the case that Gui, Qi and Jahnke represented the main 
agents in the complex network of clandestine relations between Nationalist China and 
Germany, the picture was also complemented (or rather complicated) by the inclusion 
of a number of Resistance members and sympathisers. There were a number of 
individuals, such as former Minister of Economic Affairs Hjalmar Schacht and General 
Georg Thomas, who very likely had backing by the highest movement leaders, to seek 
                                               
122 PA AA Peking 1, 165, Chinesische Botschaft in Berlin 1939-1945 (Chinese embassy in Berlin 1939-
1945). 10 November 1940, telegram from German consulate Chongqing to the German Foreign Office in 
Berlin, in which the personality and background of a new embassy staff member (Guan Doe Mou) is 
discussed. Qi and Guan belonged to the same German-friendly group.  
123 Reference on the appointment as Economic Attaché to Berne see: British Library, IOR, L/ P&S/ 12/ 
2293, China, Sino-British Relations File 15, Sep 36-April 46. Government of India, Supply Dept. to 
Secretary of State for India. Calcutta 20 March 1942.  
124 British Library, IOR, L/P&S/ 12/ 2293, China, Sino-British Relations File 15, Sep 36-Apr 46. Chongqing 
to Foreign Office from Sir H. Seymour, 2 April 1942.  
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contact with Chiang Kai-shek in summer 1941 (Klemperer, 1981, 351/352).125 With the 
break of relations, however, the epicentre of clandestine Sino-Resistance connections 
shifted to Switzerland, similar to the “Berlin-Chiang Channel”. Here, other individuals 
took over the role as middlemen and informants, leaving Schacht and Thomas in Berlin. 
These men were Hans Bernd Gisevius, a Resistance member, and Hans Klein, a 
former merchant and a long-term sympathiser of China.   
 
Resistance members with China contact 
 Research on Sino-German relations had already uncovered many of the links 
between Nationalist China and the Chinese-friendly groups in the German Ministry of 
Economy and the German army during the 1930s. I will not outline the previous 
research again, but it is suffice to say that two prominent, Chinese-friendly individuals 
were the Minister of Economic Affairs Schacht and General Thomas, who maintained 
Sino-German trade as long as possible. By the time Sino-German relations ended in 
July 1941, Schacht had long been out of office, and the German administration and 
army had been following a Japanese-friendly policy. However, this did not stop both 
men from approaching and talking to Qi over their involvement in the German 
Resistance. It was certainly true that Schacht and Thomas asked Chiang Kai-shek to 
appoint Qi as middleman between the Resistance and Chongqing in Switzerland (Yang, 
2010b, 8). There Qi was informed of the presence of another German Resistance 
member by the name of Hans Bernd Gisevius.126  
 One of the few survivors of Hitler’s revenge on the German Resistance 
movement, Gisevius provided testimony at the Nuremberg Trials which gives us an 
insight into the Resistance’s involvement with Chongqing China. Chinese archival 
sources further underscore these links. Initially employed by the Abwehr as an 
intelligence agent, Gisevius was posted to Switzerland to take up the post as vice 
                                               
125 Klemperer (1981, 351-352) argues that the movement’s leaders Beck and Goerdeler were aware and 
backed overtures to foreign governments.   
126 AH, “Dui Deguo waijiao (Foreign Relations with Germany (6)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, 
Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080106-00060-008, Entry Number: 002000001283A, p.48 of Qi 
Jun’s report.  
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consul in 1940. During his time at the German consulate-general (in Zurich), Gisevius 
established contact with foreigners, such as the head of US intelligence in Europe, 
Allen Welsh Dulles (Hoffmann, 1998, 4, in Gisevius, 2009), and with Gui.127 Evidence 
for these encounters can be found in Taiwan, as Gisevius himself never mentioned 
meetings with Chinese individuals in his memoirs. The reason for this could be the 
general post-war focus on the relationship between the German Resistance and the 
Western Allies, and the perception of Chongqing China having stayed aloof from 
events in the European theatre.   
 Apart from Gisevius, there was also another Chinese-friendly individual who 
lived in Switzerland, and who turned out to be a supporter of Qi’s work. Hans Klein is 
usually known in academia as the HAPRO founder and weapons merchant of 1930s 
Sino-German relations (see Kirby, 1984; Fox, 1982; Fu, 1981b). The story of his 
relationship with China, however, usually ends in 1938/1939 when Sino-German 
relations and trade suffered a heavy decline. In this project, new information on Klein 
and his role in Sino-German relations emerges, and challenges the hitherto dominant 
perception of Klein’s role as being solely limited to trade and commerce. Instead, an 
Abwehr report details Klein’s meeting with an agent, during which it is revealed that 
Klein served as host for Qi and as China’s honorary consul in Switzerland.128 Swiss 
archival information further elaborates on the role of Klein, his background and 
connections to staff at the Chinese embassy in Berne.  
 
The Resistance-Chiang network:  
 What was summarised above was the inner core of the Sino-German network. 
Next, however, we need to understand how the individuals on the peripheries of the 
                                               
127 AH, “Geguo qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.62. 
128 BArch R/58(Aussenpolitische Ziele der USA und GB. Insb. Verhaeltnis zur Sowjetunion. Meldungen 
von V-Leuten ueber Aeusserungen von Staatsangehoerigen dieser Laender und neutraler Staaten und 
Pressemeldungen)/1123. (Foreign relations objectives of the US and Britain, especially relations to Soviet 
Union. Information collected by informants on statements of citizens of those states, neutral countries and 
press). 
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network also helped to establish and even maintain clandestine Sino-German relations 
in the late 1930s. Even though these individuals do not play a major role in this 
dissertation, their existence and actions helped to establish the post-1941 clandestine 
back channels. Moreover, highligting the 1930s connections between German and 
Chinese individuals as well as potential intelligence exchanges, show that the 
clandestine channels explored in this dissertation did not appear overnight, but were 
based on substantial foundations laid in the 1930s.  
The most important of these peripheral figures was General Alexander von 
Falkenhausen, a Resistance member who contacted and met Gui during the latter’s 
active time as military attaché in Berlin.129  Through Gui, Falkenhausen maintained 
contact to Chiang Kai-shek, and supported the Generalissimo with military advice, and 
probably with inside knowledge of war developments in Europe.130 Known mainly for 
his role as the last head of the German military mission, Falkenhausen was called back 
into active service after the beginning of WWII in Europe, and was appointed Military 
Governor of Northern France and Belgium. Falkenhausen’s active service did not 
prevent the exchange of communication with leading Chinese, such as Yu Dawei,131 to 
whom he wrote as late as 20 September 1941. 132  Chiang Kai-shek still accepted 
Falkenhausen’s services and military memoranda (Liang, 1978, 140), and had Gui 
                                               
129 Gui and Falkenhausen likely knew each other from the latter’s time in China. As commander of the 
German trained model troops, Gui may have been in contact with the German military mission and 
Falkenhausen.  
130  TNA, (PRO) WO 208/232, China, Chapter 1: Polticial; Chungking Government’s Relations with 
Germany. 4 August 1942, From Chungking to Foreign Office, Sir. H. Seymour. The British Foreign Office 
on 4 August 1942: “VERY CONFIDENTAIL: Reliable Chinese Source [h]as admitted to member of my staff 
that General von Falkenhausen is still trying to give the Chinese government ‘good advice’ through 
contacts in Berne.” 
131 Yu also pursued studies in Germany (ballistics and mathematics), where he stayed until 1926. A few 
years later he was back in Germany, where he served as liaison commissioner in Berlin during the early 
1930s (Boorman, 1967b, 73). When General Hans von Seeckt took up his post as head of the German 
military mission, Yu Dawei was chosen as appointed director of the ordnance department (until 1944) 
(Boorman, 1967b, 74). 
132  BArch, N/246(Nachlass Falkenhausen Korrespondenz mit Chinesen und Japanern sowie wegen 
ostasiatischer Angelegenheiten)/13, (Falkenhausen documents, correspondence with Chinese and 
Japanese on East Asian matters), Fiche 40-41. Falkenhausen writes to Yu Dawei on 4 July 1941. 
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deliver letters to Belgium upon his arrival in Germany.133 In return, Falkenhausen also 
informed Chiang Kai-shek of his own impressions of the European war.134  
That Chiang Kai-shek knew of the Resistance and its plans is further 
underpinned by the fact that he stood up for these men after the end of the war. 
Together with Schacht, Thomas and other members of the Resistance movement, 
Falkenhausen was imprisoned after the failed coup of 20 July 1944. At the end of the 
war, the group was freed by American soldiers, but quickly re-arrested over their 
involvement in the Third Reich. On receiving news of the arrest of these men, Chiang 
Kai-shek ordered T.V. Soong (then ambassador to the US) to speak in favour of them 
in Washington on 15 May 1945.135 Moreover, Falkenhausen named Chiang Kai-shek 
as the first and most important witness to vouch for his membership in the German 
Resistance.136  
 
 Prior to the arrival of Gui and Qi in Germany, much of the intelligence exchange 
passed through two different channels. The first channel was a member of the Chinese 
Commerce Department in Berlin by the name of Tan Baiyu (also known as Tan Beue), 
who worked as First Secretary of the Chinese embassy in Berlin in 1937 (Liang, 1978, 
119). Information sent to Chiang Kai-shek covered different topics, amongst others the 
work of Falkenhausen. Other information was of a much more important nature for 
Chongqing, for example the news of the French surrender to Japanese demands 
regarding the French colonies in Indochina in summer 1940.137 Prior to this, Chongqing 
                                               
133 Ibid., Fiche 79, Gui Yongqing wrote letters to Falkenhausen, on 28 September 1940. The authors were 
General Chang Chen, Minister of War Cheng Chen and presumably Chiang Kai-shek.  
134 AH, “Dui Ying Fa De Yi guanxi (Material on relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy) (6)”, 
“Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-090103-00016-187, 
Entry Number: 002000002105A. 
135 AH, “Dui Ying Fa De Yi guanxi (Material on relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy) (1)”, 
“Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu “, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-090103-00011-227, 
Entry Number: 002000002100A. 
136 Military Government of Germany, “Fragebogen” in FP-“De-Nazification” Box, quoted in Liang (1978, 
172). 
137 In the summer of 1940 the Japanese government repeatedly pressured the French Vichy Government 
to stop shipments for China from passing through the Indochinese colonies. With the German occupation 
of France, the Vichy government had gained control over the colonies. Shipments to China were still 
allowed because the government was supposedly neutral (Mitter, 2013, 221).  
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had tried to use the German government to stop Japanese advances in Vietnam, which 
were threatening some of the life-lines of the Nationalist government.138  
 Tan Baiyu’s information was further complemented with intelligence material 
from a private, non-governmental, source: Lin Qiusheng. Lin was also the first Chinese 
to establish ties with the German Resistance, on which Qi could build upon in 
1940/1941.139 A professor and member of the Chinese Supreme National Defence 
Council, Lin reported directly from Berlin to Chiang Kai-shek from 1936 to 1940 (Liang, 
1999, 356). 140  While lecturing at Berlin University, Lin also published the weekly 
propaganda bulletin China Post (Liang, 1999, 356), supported by Falkenhausen, 
Jahnke, his secretary Marcus and Chiang Kai-shek’s son Jiang Weiguo (Liang, 1978, 
137). 141  This early connection between Jahnke and China was no coincidence, if 
considering his plans for a Sino-German alliance. Through Falkenhausen and other 
military officers, Lin gained access to the German Resistance, and informed Chiang 
Kai-shek about plans and developments.142 This included, for example, the planned 
attack of Germany on the Low Countries, four days before the attack took place on 10 
May 1940. 143  While this kind of information would come through the intelligence 
channel of Gui Yongqing on later occasions, Lin’s connections to the German 
Resistance likely laid the groundwork for cooperation with Qi Jun. The major difference 
between Qi and Lin was that the first had been officially appointed to Berlin and it was 
                                               
138AH, “Geming wenxian - dui De waijiao (Politics Document on Foreign Relations with Germany)”, “Jiang 
Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang”, Document Number: 002-020300-00044-060, Entry 
Number: 002000000398A. 
139 Apart from archival material in Taiwan, the only other source on Lin Qiusheng is Liang (1978) who 
researched Lin’s pre-war activities substantially. 
140 See for example: AH, “Yiban ziliao yi chengbiao huiji (General Information) (100)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng 
Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080200-00527-066, Entry Number: 
002000001916A. 6 May 1940, Lin reported on the planned attack on the Netherlands and Belgium through 
the German army, four days before the actual event occurred. Liang (1999) quoted: Interview Lin Tsiu-sen 
Taipei 1972. China Yearbook (1975, 558). In interviews with Lin Qiusheng, Liang (1999, 368) was shown 
diaries by Lin that contained coded messages he had send to Sun Fo and Chiang Kai-shek.  
141 Liang interviewed Prof. Lin in his home in Taipei in 1972. China Post was a news bulletin, which passed 
on news from China to the German press, which Lin saw as being too anti-Chinese (Liang, 1978, 137). 
Jiang Weiguo lived in Germany during the later 1930s and received a military education.  
142 Lin’s connection to the German Resistance was Captain Heinz (Liang, 1978, 140). In order to prevent 
the war happening in the first place, intelligence officers from the German secret service Abwehr used to 
inform the Allies and western European countries of the planned tactics as early as 1938 (Deutsch, 1981, 
327), and, for example, urged Neville Chamberlain not to give in to Hitler’s plan regarding Czechoslovakia 
during the Munich Crisis (Hoffmann, 1991, 437). 
143 See for example: AH, “Yiban ziliao yi chengbiao huiji (General Information) (100)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng 
Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080200-00527-066, Entry Number: 
002000001916A. 6 May 1940.  
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likely known that he had worked with Chiang Kai-shek directly in the past. Hence, Qi 
may have constituted a much more official connection for the Resistance movement to 
Chiang Kai-shek than Lin.  
Lin stayed in Berlin until July 1941 “still seeking political contacts to the friends 
of China among the German opposition” (Liang, 1978, 144), before relocating to Berne, 
Switzerland. Interestingly, Lin claimed that there existed no contact between the 
Resistance and members of the Chinese embassy and that he was the only contact for 
Jahnke and Falkenhausen to “transmit political initiatives to Chungking” (Liang, 1978, 
141). This statement will be challenged in this dissertation, as I can show that 
communication did not run through Lin alone. 
 
 From the above information we can obtain concise impressions of the early 
back channel and intelligence contacts between Chiang Kai-shek and the German 
groups, as well as of the clandestine communications network that Chiang Kai-shek 
supported. International, as well as domestic Chinese and German, developments did 
not hinder the continuation of communication through back channels.  Nominally at war, 
the two German sides and Chiang Kai-shek circumvented any communication issues 
by arranging for back-channel meetings in Switzerland. The Chinese agents were 
stationed there, with their German counterparts travelling between the Third Reich and 
Berne. Communications passed along these clandestine lines, and side-lined both the 
German and the Chinese Foreign Offices, as well as maintained the secrecy that was 
so crucial for the Resistance and Chiang Kai-shek.  
While there is no recorded link between the Resistance movement and the 
RSHA personnel, archival material show that Gui was aware of the Resistance 
movement and had been visited by Gisevius several times in 1942.144 Apart from this 
                                               
144 AH, “Geguo qingbao (Intelligence reports from various countries) (3)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu“, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.62, p.72, p.79. 
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intersection, the two communication channels seem to have been left apart, very likely 
for security reasons. 
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Chapter Six: Sino-German back channels, 1938-1944 
 
The previous chapter outlined the backgrounds and allegiances of the two 
German communication back channels with Chiang Kai-shek and the main decision-
making bodies. Chapter Six will present the archival information that was gathered in 
East Asia and Europe in the course of my research. This chapter represents the core of 
this dissertation and provides the main evidence which supports my argument that 
Sino-German relations continued beyond July 1941, served as a channel to keep doors 
open and as a tool to gather intelligence on developments inside Nazi Germany. I have 
divided the chapter into three sections for the reader and the following paragraphs will 
provide a brief introduction. 
 In Chapter Two, I criticised existing research which has sometimes underrated 
the period after the summer of 1938 and through to the break of relations in summer 
1941. I intend to give some additional information that will highlight some of the 
dynamics that characterised Sino-German foreign relations and policy during that time. 
I do not intend to repeat already known facts which have been put forward by Fox 
(1982) or Kirby (1984), but I will present findings made in archives with secondary 
literature which adds more information to our current knowledge of this period. In 
particular, I will show that several lines of diplomatic communication ran alongside each 
other, and that official and clandestine back-channel diplomatic efforts characterised 
German Foreign Policy in this period. I am hence extending Fox’s thesis (1982, 254) on 
Chinese-friendly and Japanese-friendly forces, and Germany’s use of official and un-
official channels to Japan, by adding the possibility of the evolution of clandestine 
Chinese-friendly Sino-German back channels and continued efforts by a German-
friendly Chinese lobby to direct German foreign policy away from Japan. Particular 
focus will be on clandestine efforts, due to the fact that these evolved into post-1941 
back channels. This includes the use of clandestine measures on the Chinese and the 
Chinese-friendly German side. Interestingly, this period is also characterised by 
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developments from simple back channels to more complicated, conflict-solution back 
channels, in which German individuals served as mediators between Japanese circles 
and Chongqing. 
The second section of this chapter deals with the internal competition in 
Chongqing over Sino-foreign policy in the years 1940 and 1941, and how this shaped 
the appointment of Gui and Qi to Berlin. I will lay out the relationship between internal 
and external events on the standing of a German-friendly lobby in Chongqing, for 
example the consequences of events such as the three-month Burma Road closure in 
1940, the US non-intervention policy, and a new Soviet-Japanese rapprochement. With 
this background, I will then show that the appointment of Gui and Qi occured at a time 
when Chiang Kai-shek had gained greater control over Chinese foreign relations, used 
special representatives in other nations and also upheld clandestine connections to 
Japan through agents in East Asia.  
Despite his official anti-Axis rhetoric, Chiang Kai-shek did not consider 
Chongqing China to be at war with Germany (Tyson Li, 2006, 160). The pragmatic 
foreign policy practiced by circles in Chongqing called for all doors to be kept open, and 
also ordered the maintenance of connections to Germany. In order to do this and 
considering the public US/British-friendly stance, Chiang Kai-shek fell back on a 
modified version of his successful special envoy tactic. In contrast to T.V. Soong, the 
special informants Gui and Qi were placed among the Chinese embassy staff in Berlin, 
probably to mask their actual orders. Gui’s appointment as military attaché was no 
coincidence either, as an attaché does not necessarily fall under the ambassador’s 
management, can act more freely, and does not answer to the Foreign Office. My 
arguments are substantiated with contemporary witness statements, and secondary 
literature.  
In the third section, the largest part of this chapter, I will lay out the post-1941 
clandestine meetings between the German and Chinese agents of the two channels, 
describing the content of communication, as well as providing the most plausible 
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reasons and objectives that drove Chiang Kai-shek and the two German groups. While 
the objectives of the German groups are easy to understand, the same cannot be said 
of the Chinese side. I agree with Boyle (1972, 289) who, in regard to the Sino-
Japanese Operation Kiri, and Operation Qian (Ch’ien), stated that it is impossible to 
determine whether some peace efforts pursued by Chongqing were actually a hoax or 
genuine. Even forty years after this comment was made, it still holds true for this 
research. It will be impossible to determine at this stage of research whether the Sino-
German clandestine back channel mediation efforts and communication were seriously 
considered by Chiang. However, it is the intention of this chapter to present to the 
reader the different stages of diplomacy that Sino-German relations went through, 
ranging from clandestine channels between the two nations, to the role of the Third 
Reich as a mediator between Japan and China. As we will discuss in Chapter Seven, 
some of these back channels do follow the guidelines that have been prominent in 
current research on BCD, while others tend to raise new questions on diplomacy 
through back channels.  
Moreover, we will be able to clearly see that the years 1941 and 1942 were of 
great importance to a Chongqing government that was close to collapse in 1940, to her 
choice of allies and her position in the international conflict. 1940 and 1941 have been 
described as the “hardest years” for Chongqing China, during which she fought Japan 
with increasingly less aid coming from the Soviet Union (van de Ven, 2003, 16).145 
Indeed, there was a window of opportunity in spring and summer 1942 for a victory of 
the Axis Powers (Nowotny, 2012, xiii, in Menzell Meskill, 2012). Despite Nationalist 
China joining the Allies and gaining support and aid, it would be wrong to dismiss the 
influence that internal Allied difficulties and the early losses against the Axis Powers 
had on the pragmatic foreign policy operated by Chiang Kai-shek and his circles. 
                                               
145  In hindsight, it can be seen that while 1940/1941 were indeed hard years, the Japanese Ichigo 
offensive could be described as much more challenging for the Nationlist government. The offensive 
brought Japanese forces close to the wartime capital Chongqing and China “was in the depths of despair” 
(Mitter, 2013, 338). Despite the severity of Ichigo in 1944, the serious situation Chongqing China faced 
between 1940 and 1942 is not to be underestimated. 
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Internal problems even led Chiang to dismiss the alliance with the Allies as “just [being] 
empty words” in May 1942 (Mitter, 2013, 260).146   
It will become evident in the subsequent paragraphs that “Berlin” hoped to form 
a Sino-German alliance that would put pressure on the Soviet Union, and on the other 
side free hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers from the China battlefield. In the 
eyes and imagination of “Berlin” these objectives would have had the potential to 
change the course of war. Faced with a rather “unreliable partnership”147 with Japan 
herself, in which both sides tent to use each other rather than cooperated, the Third 
Reich adjusted her East Asian strategy and approached Chongqing China once again 
(Thorne, 1978, 51). Whether these Nazi German objectives were actually plausible and 
possible to put into action is not going to be further discussed at this stage of research.  
The German Resistance also acted out of self-centred motivation. It planned to 
oust the Nazi government in order to establish a new government and to initiate peace 
talks with the Allies. Hopes were high that Chiang Kai-shek’s mediation would help to 
ease Allied war demands, such as the unconditional surrender, and allow for an 
“honourable” exit for Germany from the war.148  
 
 
Section 1: pre-1941 Sino-German diplomatic objectives and dynamics 
The three years between the downgrading of the German embassy in 
Chongqing to that of a consulate, and the break in official diplomatic relations in July 
1941 represents the beginning of a far more ambivalent Sino-German relationship than 
anticipated by our current level of knowledge. The available material shows the 
                                               
146 Mitter (2013, 260) quotes: CKDS, May 1942, cited in Wang, “Xinren de liushi”, 52.  
147 As it is known (Schellenberg, 1956a, 201), Hitler hoped for Japanese support during his attack on the 
Soviet Union. However, Japan could not afford for this to happen, as a fight with the Soviet Union would 
have diverted her forces away from South-East Asia. Additionally, Japan and the Soviet Union had signed 
the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Article Two of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact did ask for the 
signatories to remain neutral if their respective partner was attacked by a third country. The full text of the 
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact from 13 April 1941: available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s1.asp, 
[accessed on 10 April 2013]. The pact did not allow Japan to join the German attack.  
148 An honourable exit meant, unlike the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany would remain intact and that a 
total defeat would be avoided. Foreign support could have put the Resistance in a position to stop the war 
earlier than May 1945.  
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development and evolution of diplomatic communication channels during pre-1941 
years. These years were characterised by official German attempts to unify German 
East Asian trade, without losing the important China trade, while Chinese-friendly 
forces first public and then “intergovernmental and subdued” voiced their discontent 
(Kirby, 1984, 235). These individuals then relied on clandestine measures to rectify 
Sino-German East Asian foreign policy. This further complicated German foreign policy, 
but also represented a chance for Chinese-friendly Germans to influence the course of 
German foreign policy in cooperation with Chongqing China. As a consequence, 
several diplomatic channels ran parallel to each other; some were official diplomatic 
channels, while others were characterised by clandestine communication that directly 
targeted Adolf Hitler. 
These clandestine back channels also forwarded Japanese proposals for 
conflict-solution back channel mediation to Chongqing, and actually tried to engage 
with the two East Asian sides. The Nationalist government, and foremost Chiang Kai-
shek, reacted differently to the overtures by the Nazi government and the Chinese-
friendly groups, the reaction being deeply influenced by domestic demands and the 
Chinese need for international support and recognition. The different positions, 
objectives of the sides in concflict, as well as the mediation environment are also 
looked at here.  
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937 marked the beginning 
of the end of Germany’s neutral foreign policy in East Asia. Increasing pressure 
exerted by Japan and China for support, as well as inner conflicts over foreign policies, 
raised the question for how long neutrality could be upheld (Fox, 1982, 248).149 This 
question was answered by the Nazi consolidation of power and its control of German 
foreign policy in February 1938. The appointment of Japanese-friendly von Ribbentrop 
as Foreign Minister likely caused little joy in Chinese-friendly German circles. The 
information on pre-1941 relations presented below is an addition to that already 
                                               
149 For more information on the struggle for and against German neutrality in East Asia see: Fox (1982, 
248-252).  
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elaborated by previous researchers, which shed significant light on the German side 
and its internal struggle. 150  I aim to add more specific information on clandestine 
approaches as well as the Chinese side’s measures.   
 
Autumn 1937- Spring 1938 
In correspondence with Chiang Kai-shek and German-friendly Chinese circles, 
attempts were made to use back channels to rectify the new Japanese-friendly route 
that German East Asian foreign policy was taking. Foremost, Kurt Jahnke likely saw his 
work to improve Germany’s international standing through Sino-German cooperation 
ruined by German-Japanese rapprochement and the Nazi drive for war.151 As I showed 
in Chapter Five, Jahnke regarded Nationalist China as the most suitable ally outside 
Europe and as a tool to circumvent the perceived encirclement of Germany by other 
European powers and the Soviet Union after WWI. In Jahnke’s thinking, China also 
increasingly took on the role as a pawn to stabilize and pacify German-British 
relations.152  
Cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek’s China would have meant keeping channels 
open between the Germans and British (Liang, 1978, 124). Chinese attempts to “solicit 
German support in the Far Eastern conflict” in autumn 1937 (Liang, 1978, 124) were 
welcomed by Jahnke, in particular since Hitler’s position on East Asian foreign policy 
up until late October 1937 was “to remain friendly to Japan but not be against China” 
(Fox, 1982, 258).153 Chances for Chinese special envoy Jiang Baili (Chiang Pai-li) to 
argue for Sino-German relations with the leading Nazi Göring, who could then influence 
Hitler, were good. Jiang Baili, however, failed to forward a proposal for Sino-German 
cooperation, which had been planned by Jahnke and others, to win Göring’s support, 
                                               
150 This struggle was further complicated as the Japanese side used Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and 
his access to Hitler to circumvent to German Foreign Office’s strong stance on neutrality in East Asia (Fox, 
1982, 253).  
151 It is very likely that Jahnke was more than aware of Hitler’s plans for a European war, something that 
would have further undermined Jahnke’s own project for Germany’s recovery.  
152 TNA (PRO) KV2/755, 23 August 1945; Copy of translation of report by Walter Schellenberg, Head of 
Amt VI of the RSHA, on Herrn Jahnke and his authorities; In this report Schellenberg is mentioned that 
Jahnke tried to “ [at the outbreak of the war]…bring an English Intelligence man to Hitler”. 
153 Fox (1982, 258) quotes: FRUS, 1937, III, 625-26, Gilbert/Washington, Berlin 20 October 1937. 
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or to gain German assurance of neutrality in the East Asian conflict (Liang, 1978, 125; 
Kirby, 1984, 239).  
In spring 1938, another special envoy mission was being prepared, to be led by 
Zhu Jiahua. It was planned that Zhu would take up the post of special commissioner, 
but the rapidly cooling relations between China and Germany prevented this mission 
(Kirby, 1984, 239). While Berridge and James (2003) do not mention the term special 
commissioner in their diplomatic dictionary, other references in connection with US 
diplomacy may give a clue to the rank and powers such a special commissioner might 
have had.154  US diplomacy has several examples in which the President appointed 
special commissioners or personal envoys to a mission, with powers similar to that of 
the regularly appointed ambassador or minister (Waters, 1956, 126). These 
commissioners are also termed “executive agents”, and as such they answered to one 
branch of the government, namely the executive, and had been in use by the US 
President as late as the 1940s and 1950s (Waters, 1956, 128). An example for such a 
US personal envoy was Sumner Welles, sent by President Roosevelt to Europe in 
1940 to meet with the leaders of France, Britain, Italy and Nazi Germany (Rofe, 2007, 
2). Given this frequent use of special commissioners in Western nations such as the 
US, and the direct control the head of state/ highest decision maker had on diplomatic 
developments, this approach may have been Chiang Kai-shek’s preferred choice of 
diplomacy as long as official Sino-German relations still existed and their fostering did 
not jeopardise China’s foreign policy strategy. The fact that Chiang used to bypass 
elements of the government and army on a regular basis during the war (see Chang, 
2007; Chen Yan, 2002b) supports this theory. As we see in this case, however, the still 
official special representatives’ missions to Germany were going to turn increasingly 
clandestine the more the world became polarised.  
These episodes of special envoy Chinese foreign policy in this dissertation, and 
the involvement of Chinese-friendly German groups, indicate a preference for direct 
                                               
154 Berridge and James (2003, 126-127) only mention the title “High-Commissioner”, which is a rank given 
to ambassadors that are appointed by Britain to another Commonwealth Country.  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
113 
 
contacts to the main Nazi decision makers that characterised Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign 
policy approach. More indicators for such an approach will be further detailed below.  
Moreover, the back channels that would later be resumed in July 1941 are 
indicated by these events, as we see Jahnke being involved.155 Jiang Baili’s and H.H. 
Kung’s mission to Europe occurred during autum and summer 1937 respectivley, and 
indicate Chiang’s willingness to cooperate with the Third Reich.156 Germany seemed to 
have still enjoyed a reputation and role in China, despite the Anti Comintern Pact with 
Japan. Chiang Kai-shek and German-friendly circles found support in Chinese-friendly 
German individuals, such as Jahnke, Schacht, Thomas and others, 157  and, given 
Jahnke’s own involvement in presenting a Chinese proposal to Göring, it is very likely 
that Jahnke and Jiang Baili actually met, and that Jahnke corresponded with the 
Nationlist government over the purpose and content of Jiang Baili’s mission.  
Interestingly, in this section we can see Jahnke as a member of a Chinese-
friendly group, while he would then go on and work for the party intelligence service 
RSHA. Officially, high-ranking Nazis such as Himmler and Heydrich would be counted 
as part of the Japanese-friendly clique around Hitler, but behind the scenes political 
factions in the Nazi German government pursued different foreign policy lines. Other 
Chinese-friendly individuals became active in the Resistance by 1938. In 1937 however, 
these individuals still worked within the framework of the Nazi administration and as 
representatives of the Third Reich.  
Efforts by German groups to rectify the Japanese-friendly course of German 
foreign policy failed, the fault for this failure lay on both sides.158 Sino-German relations 
in summer 1938 seemed to be at a low point, especially after Hitler recalled 
                                               
155 Other sources (Klein) reported of “old and new friends of China who are maintaining the friendship 
between both countries with all their power” (“ci jian yuan you Zhongguo laoyou shenduo xin you yi zhu 
zhengjia junjin quanli yi weihui liang guo youyi”), AH, “Yiban ziliao yi chengbiao huiji (General material 
collection) (72)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-
080200-00499-134, Entry Number: 002000001888A. 
156For more information on the Kung mission see Kirby (1984, 237-238). 
157  Kirby (1984, 247) named several companies that were involved in Sino-German trade and active 
China-friendly lobbyists, amongst others the company Otto Wolff.  
158 The Third Reich increasingly obeyed Japanese demands, while the Sino-Soviet Non Aggression Pact 
of August 1937, resulted in more ammunition for the Japan-friendly circles to ruin the Chinese image in 
Germany.  
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Ambassador Trautmann and the German military mission. Despite this fulfilment of 
Japanese demands, 159  the German government was reluctant to fully reject any 
cooperation with Chongqing China, since the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek still 
held substantial amounts of war-critical resources, such as tungsten. Japanese 
“rewards” for German fulfilment of the above listed demands, such as a favoured nation 
status and economic benefits in occupied China, did not make up for the actual 
economic losses the German industry suffered (Kirby, 1984, 240-241).  
 
Summer 1938 
In an attempt to unify Germany’s East Asian trade, Hitler authorised the Minister 
of Economic Affairs Walter Funk to appoint an official mission (that was still kept secret 
and with a low profile) to the Nationalist government in Wuhan to negotiate a new 
barter agreement in May 1938. 160  Chinese sources (Huang and Ma, 1997, 127) 
acknowledge this mission’s secrecy (calling it mimi), and Qi Jun161 further stated that 
the Woidt mission (named after its leader Hellmut Woidt) actually also came to 
Chongqing in late summer 1938 (Ratenhof, 1987, 510) to explain Germany’s trade 
position towards China, and to erase any doubts the Chinese leadership might have 
(“…wei shuoming Dezhengfu duiyu Zhong De jingji guanxi zhili chang xiwang xiao 
Zhongguozhengfu dui De zhi huaiyi”).162 “Doubts” may refer to mistrust on the Chinese 
side toward the German intentions. Woidt succeeded in the negotiation of a new treaty 
with China on 10 October 1938, and on 29 March 1939 an additional treaty was signed 
in Chongqing (Leutner, 1998, 257).163  
 
                                               
159 Since the signing of the Anti Comintern Pact Japan had urged the Third Reich to stop any trade with 
Chongqing China, and to recall the German military mission, despite the private employment of these 
officers by Chiang Kai-shek (for more information see: Kirby, 1984, 235).  
160 The leader of the mission, Hellmut Woidt, did not try to revive the HAPRO Treaty of 1934, but had 
orders to direct German trade in China towards Tokyo and to secure business in Manchukuo (Leutner, 
1998, 257; for more information also see: Leutner, 1998, 281 (Document 86) and 286 (Document 88).  
161 At this time, Qi worked either as a secretary to the National Resource Commission (NRC) or as Chiang 
Kai-shek’s secretary. In either case, he was responsible to report messages, on the stage of negotiations 
between H.H. Kung and Woidt, to Chiang Kai-shek.  
162 AH, “Yiban ziliao yi chengbiao huiji (General information collection) (74)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080200-00501-029, Entry Number: 002000001890A. 
163 Leutner (1998, 257) quotes the data from Eckert (1981, Appendix “Hapro Daten”). 
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This trade mission may have transmitted to the Nationalist government the 
message that the Third Reich still considered China a partner, and may have given rise 
to hopes for a turn towards better Sino-German relations. The signing of the new barter 
agreement initiated the flow of German arms and machinery to Chongqing China (Kirby, 
1984, 246).164 Indeed, the agreement stated the monthly trade volume between China 
and Germany to be 7,5 million Reichsmark (Huang and Ma, 1997, 132). In addition, 
material ordered under the previous barter agreement (HAPRO Treaty) would be 
shipped to China (Kirby, 1984, 246). Any new purchases and outstanding bills were to 
be paid in raw materials only (Ratenhof, 1987, 510).  
Such hopes, as well as internal Chinese demands to resist the Japanese 
invasion, may have been the reasons for the failure of a back-channel mediation  
carried out by Chinese-friendly elements of the German government at roughly the 
same time as the Woidt mission. 
According to Taiwanese records, this back-channel mediation attempt was 
initiated by members of the Japanese financial and economic elite, who understood 
that Japan’s economy was in crisis and who wished to negotiate peace with China in 
the summer of 1938 (Academia Historica, 2010, 158).165 They approached the former 
German Minister of Economic Affairs Hjalmar Schacht to serve as a neutral mediator 
between the Japanese and Chinese side. The cover for the mediation attempt would 
be the invitation of Schacht by the director of Japan’s Imperial Bank. Schacht agreed 
and received the German government’s approval for the trip, and together with HAPRO 
merchant Hans Klein engaged in an exchange of letters and telegrams with Chiang 
Kai-shek (Academia Historica, 2010, 201).166 The plan envisaged that Schacht would 
travel to Japan, meet there with the circles that advocated German mediation, and then 
continue his journey to China, where he would then meet with government officials to 
                                               
164 Kirby (1984, 246) quoted: NA, T – 120, ser. 7072, roll 3185, E526385, Wiehl to Hankow, 4 June 1938; 
interview, Ludwig Werner, 8 August 1977.  
165  The initiators in Japan were likely financial and moderate circles that in the past had repeatedly 
clashed with the extreme militarists (Mitter, 2013, 68-69). 
166  Following the failure of this mediation attempt at the end of August, Schacht visited Klein at the latter’s 
villa in Meggen, Switzerland. (see: CH-BAR#E4320B#1984/29#652*).  
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discuss the mediation. Given the difficult political situation in China for any mediation 
attempt between her and Japan, the plan suggested that Schacht would be officially 
jointly appointed by the two sides simultaneously, but carry out his work in secrecy 
(Academia Historica, 2010, 159). Despite several attempts by Klein and Schacht to 
convince Chiang Kai-shek, the latter rejected the proposal on 31 August 1938, and 
stated on 22 August 1938 that China “would not welcome anybody who appears to be 
a friend of Japan”.167  
This mediation attempt originated on the Japanese side, which was split among 
political lines, with some groups advocating the end of negotiations with Chiang Kai-
shek. This last move, however, would close any possibilities to accommodate Chiang 
Kai-shek (Boyle, 1972, 5). More liberal groups gained influence following the defeat of 
the Japanese army at Taierzhuang in April 1938. Amongst a number of non-military 
solutions, cooperation with Wang Jingwei was one, and the Japanese mediation 
approach of summer 1938 was another one (Boyle, 1972, 141).168 In particular, a shift 
in policy of former hard-line Japanese Premier Konoe resulted in increasing support for 
a non-military solution among members of the financial elite, who were instrumental to 
approach Germany as a mediator in the first place in 1938 (Boyle, 1972, 139).  
Schacht’s second trip to China may have been linked to a second mediation 
attempt that first surfaced in March 1939 in discussions between Chinese Minister of 
Economic Affairs Weng Wenhao and his German counterpart Walter Funk. In March 
1939 Weng approached Funk, and this coincided with Schacht’s second attempt to 
travel to China in the first half of 1939. Officially, Schacht travelled to India as a tourist, 
                                               
167 The reference for the last letter rejecting any German mediation from 31 August 1938: Academia 
Historica (2010, 160). The reference for the 22 August 1938 quote: AH, “Gezhong jiangyi (Various kind of 
Proposals) (4)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-
080109-00026-003, Entry Number: 002000001346A. Instead Schacht was asked to postpone his trip by a 
year and to choose a travel route through a third and neutral country. It would be interesting to know at this 
point if records exist that shed light on the Japanese discussion. However, this lead would extend the 
frame of my dissertation and cannot be followed here, but could be subject to research in the future.  
168 Boyle (1972, 148-166) offers more information on the shift of Japan’s China policy in summer 1938, 
and amongst others details Ishii Itaro’s “Ikensho” report, and Sino-Japanese negotiations in summer 1938.  
No further information on the involvement of the Third Reich is mentioned at this time, though.  
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but also journeyed on to Burma (now Myanmar), and hoped to reach China.169 Un-
officially, Schacht, the predecessor of Funk, might have been informed about these 
proposals and agreed to serve as a mediator between Chiang Kai-shek’s China and 
Japan. This time though, Schacht followed the recommendation he had received a year 
earlier and travelled via India and Burma (now Myanmar).  In Rangoon (now Yangon) 
in Burma, he met with a Chinese friend “who had visited me [Schacht] before in 
Berlin… who had been commissioned by his government to talk to me about the 
situation in China”.170 As a result of this meeting, Schacht wrote a memorandum for 
Chiang Kai-shek, in which he advised to continue the resistance against Japan, and 
that China should rely on her vast resources and the US.171 The second time as well, 
Schacht did not reach China, but was called back by Hitler, who did not allow him to 
“touch Chinese soil”.172 Apparently, Nazi party members in the German Foreign Office 
had become suspicious of Schacht, due to the good reception he received in British 
India. 173  These events occurred shortly before the German attack on Poland in 
September 1939. One month later, in October 1939, the initially un-official mediation 
proposal to the Germany Ministry of the Economy was officially forwarded by the 
Chinese side to the German Foreign Office, with the information that “Chiang Kai-shek 
had remained very German-friendly”, (Kirby, 1984, 248).174 This shift to the Japanese-
friendly German Foreign Office may have been the result of Schacht’s recall to 
Germany, meaning that the back channel had failed, and only front channels were left 
available. 
 
These events, the Woidt and the two Schacht missions, indicate the dynamics 
behind Sino-German relations, and the perceptions that drove and influenced Sino-
                                               
169 Nuremberg Process, Day 114, Morning Session. For reference see: Trial of the Major War Criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal (1947, 223). 
170 Ibid., Day 119, Morning Session, p.544. 
171 Ibid., p.545. 
172 Ibid., Day 114, Morning Session, p.223.  
173  AH, “Gezhong jiangyi (Various kind of proposals) (4)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, 
Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080109-00026-004, Entry Number: 002000001346A. This 
telegram was sent to Chiang Kai-shek by Hans Klein.  
174 Kirby (1984, 248) quotes: DGFP, D, 8, no. 201, memorandum by Knoll, 5 October 1939.  
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German foreign policy. An important factor for any mediation attempt between Japan 
and China was the domestic political and public opinion. I also would argue that the 
official Woidt trade mission may have given hope to a Sino-German rapprochement, 
hence undermining the possibilities of the Schacht mission of 1938. The reason for this 
statement is the fact that the successful early and mid 1930s Sino-German relations 
had been established by a number of German officials in the Wehrmacht, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. Even HAPRO, the company Woidt 
represented, was by 1936 property of the Ministry of Defence. Hence, the visit of a 
HAPRO official, sent by the German Minister of Economic Affairs, would directly 
connect to earlier forms of Sino-German negotiations.  
If Chiang Kai-shek believed that he could build a new Sino-German 
rapprochement upon trade, 175  German-friendly circles may have calculated that a 
China-friendly Third Reich would speak up against Japanese actions in China. The 
mediation attempt therefore would have been useless, or even counterproductive.  
The importance of a Sino-Japanese peace for the Chinese-friendly German 
group becomes clear. It needed at least two rejections by Chiang Kai-shek (on 22 and 
31 August 1938) to stop this BCD attempt. Klein in return did all he could to convince 
Chiang Kai-shek, and praised Schacht as the best possible mediator, as he was known 
to and trusted by both sides, as well as the fact that he was a friend of China 
(Academia Historica, 2010, 160). Chiang Kai-shek was also told that Schacht wished to 
participate in the development of China, something which was welcomed by Chiang. In 
general we can see that Schacht himself was not rejected; only his appointment (if 
leaked out) could have caused immense political trouble for Chiang Kai-shek. 
When Chongqing Chinese observers realised that Sino-German rapprochement 
could not be achieved through trade, as the new trade agreement with Woidt failed to 
meet expectations, Chongqing decision makers likely approached the Ministry of the 
Economy in March 1939, which may have resulted in the second attempt by Schacht to 
                                               
175 Initial Sino-German relations had also profited from and fostered through trade, see 1920s and early 
1930s trade.  
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travel to China. Ratenhof (1987, 514) also noted for this time a shift in Chongqing, 
away from the idea of a mediation attempt through Western powers, to one only 
conducted by the Third Reich, as this signalled a willingness to cooperate with 
Germany.176  
 
In terms of exploring aspects of this mediation attempt, we can see that the 
simplest of all back-channel requirements had been fulfilled: the bypass of official 
diplomatic channels. In a wider context, it is also clear that many aspects highlighted by 
the current focus in BCD research on conflict solution also appear in this case, such as 
secrecy and the use of a mediator. There are differences and possible issues, however 
that may have hampered mediation efforts: The approach for mediation was one-sided, 
and did not have the backing of the two leaders on both sides. According to 
Bercovitch’s (1984, in Bercovitch, 2011, 30) and Hiltrop’s argumentation (1989 in 
Bercovitch, 2011, 30) mediation efforts are far more successful when proposed by both 
sides. In these two mediation cases, however, Japan and Chongqing China proposed 
one-sided mediation respectively in 1938 and then in 1939. While it seems that the 
1938 mediation attempt failed due to reluctance on Chiang Kai-shek’s side, which was 
likely due to domestic politics, the 1939 attempt failed due to changing objectives on 
the side of the mediator. The influence of factions within the Chongqing government on 
these mediation attempts is impossible to assess at this stage. However, the 1939 
Schacht mission was recalled due to infighting in the German government, suggesting 
that factionalism played a role in ending this mediation attempt. With the limited 
information available and the fact that both mediation attempts did not progress beyong 
the initial stage, it is difficult to say what the demands of both sides would have been, 
and how these would have influenced any mediation efforts. It can, however, be 
assumed that demands would have been similar to those during the late 1937 German 
mediation attempt through Ambassador Trautmann. However, the effect Taierzhuang 
                                               
176 Ratenhof (1987, 514) quotes: “Aufzeichnung Weiszaecker“, 26 August and 18 September 1939, PA, 
Bureau StS [Secretary of State]/ Ohne Bezeichnung (China)/1.  Liang (1978, 159).  
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would have had on the demands is not to be dismissed.177 There was no direct contact 
between envoys from both sides (to build trust) in a neutral location, something that 
had been crucial to the Oslo negotiations in 1992/1993.  Instead, Schacht was 
supposed to travel to Japan, speak to the moderate Japanese circles and then travel 
onward to China, to transmit the proposal. This approach in itself appears flawed, as 
Schacht seemed to have been given the role of a courier, a description that fitted the 
role of the German mediator Trautmann in late 1937 (Kirby, 1984, 234).178  
 
The three cases of Sino-German foreign relations and policy that I presented 
above (Jiang Baili 1937, Woidt August 1938 and Schacht August 1938) provide an 
insight into the motivations and hopes that drove all three sides. In an attempt to 
secure support and condemnation of Japanese attacks after July 1937, a number of 
countries were approached, including the Third Reich. The initial Chinese approach 
saw Jiang Baili travel to Germany in autumn 1937, but he failed to secure any help. 
Here, a China-friendly German group became involved and likely secretly cooperated 
with Nanjing to turn around German East Asian foreign policy in favour of China. One 
aim was to stabilize German-British relations, and to prevent the outbreak of war in 
Europe. At the same time as Jiang Baili’s mission, Ambassador Trautmann in Nanjing 
served as a courier in an effort to mediate between Nanjing and Tokyo. Within a year, it 
became clear that the Nazi administration’s interest in China was focused on the rich 
resources, and the intention to purchase those for as long as possible. The 
consolidation of German trade with East Asia in the direction of Tokyo speaks for the 
possibility that Berlin considered Japan to be the final victor in the Sino-Japanese 
conflict. The Woidt mission of the years 1938 and early 1939, though, may have raised 
                                               
177 For more information on the Trautmann mediation see: Fox (1982).  
178 This approach has been criticised by academics before. In summer 1937, the German ambassador to 
China, Oskar Trautmann, acted as a mediator in the Sino-Japanese conflict, but was reduced to only 
delivering the messages between Nanjing and Tokyo. In the course of the mediation attempt Trautmann 
“became the unwilling tool of the Japanese, who timed their approaches to correspond to battlefield 
victories” (Kirby, 1984, 234). Further detailed information on the Trautmann mediation can be found in Fox 
(1982) and Cai and Cheng (1987).   
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Chinese hopes for better Sino-German relations and contributed to the failure of the 
Schacht mediation proposal of August 1938.  
I argue that this period was as crucial to the establishment of post-1941 
clandestine communication channels, as were the links established by the German 
military mission in early 1390s. Numerous efforts on the Chinese and the German side 
kept the diplomacy machine running. Evidently, Sino-German diplomatic relations were 
maintained after September 1939, but increasingly managed and pursued through 
back channels.  
 
The Aftermath 
Over the course of 1939, Sino-German relations experienced a slight 
improvement, which saw the German Foreign Office open a consulate in Kunming, 
while the idea of German mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict re-emerged in March, 
and was formulated in October 1939. None of these plans ever matured, as they were 
blocked by von Ribbentrop (Kirby, 1984, 247-248). Von Ribbentrop’s rejection of 
changes to Germany’s East Asian policy had an impact on wartime relations, as from 
then onwards one of the main objectives of the Chinese side and “Berlin” seemed to 
have been the exclusion of the German Foreign Office from foreign policy, as I will 
show below.    
On the Chinese side, the continuation of relations with the Third Reich was 
strongly influenced by competing factions. A German-friendly faction (as described 
earlier in Chapter Five) faced a US-friendly one. Leutner (1998, 45) argues that the 
decisive struggle over Chinese foreign policy was fought out over the course of the 
summer and autumn of 1940. Academic circles regard this competition as having been 
decided in favour of the US/British group, and that relations between Germany and 
China ended in July 1941.179 This narrative can partially be agreed with, however, while 
                                               
179 This is shown in the end of most research on Sino-German relations at the time of summer 1941.  
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the US indeed became the focus of Chiang Kai-shek plans, it would be wrong to 
assume that German-friendly staff and opinions suddenly vanished.  
As I hope to show with this research, connections to Nazi Germany were not 
fully suspended, but continued to exist through clandestine channels, indicating that the 
state of war did not stop Chinese circles from communicating with Germany.  
 
 
Section 2: Gui and Qi in Berlin and Chongqing’s internal split  
 The official appointment of Gui Yongqing and Qi Jun to Berlin clearly reflected 
Chiang Kai-shek’s involvement in Nationalist Chinese foreign relations and foreign 
policy. As outlined by Chen Yan (2002b), the Chinese Military Commission, headed by 
Chiang Kai-shek, operated its own foreign relations and policy section. While the staff 
of that organisation may not have been professional diplomats, Chiang Kai-shek 
preferred them over the Chinese Foreign Office ones. As showed in Chapter Four, 
Chiang appointed trusted aides or family members to diplomatic missions abroad; one 
of those was Yang Jie, a military man and non-professional diplomat. Similary, Gui 
Yongqing’s and Qi Jun’s appointment cannot only be seen as part of this non-
professional approach to foreign relations, but also as a reflection of both the 
pragmatism that existed in Chongqing as well as the internal competition over the 
direction of Chinese foreign policy.   
There are several traits that reflect this pragmatic foreign policy approach during 
the late 1930s and early 1940s. The main trait is the fact that Chongqing China 
maintained relations with both Nazi Germany and Italy, even after these two had 
become increasingly close to Japan. As I will demonstrate below, this strategy was 
proposed by the Chinese Ressource Commission, an organisation with close links to 
the Military Commission headed by Chiang Kai-shek. Interestingly, connections to Italy 
and Germany were to be maintained through clandestine activities. Such a pragmatic 
approach to the Western democracies and the Axis states would allow Chongqing 
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China to adapt quickly to changes in international relations, without committing to one 
side (Leutner, 1998, 139-144).180 
Another aspect of pragmatism that emerges is the fact that in the two years 
before and after the outbreak of war in Europe, the individuals appointed by Chiang 
Kai-shek as special representatives or on special missions were all non-professional 
diplomats. However, they all were familiar with the country and government of their 
host countries. This is indeed the case with men such as T.V. Soong and Gui Yongqing, 
who had studied in the US and Germany, respectively.  
Moreover, both men knew how to work with leading members of the US and the 
German administration respectively. Gui, for example, used his own background as a 
military officer to operate in a highly militarised German society and administration. T.V. 
Soong, on the other hand knew how to move in political circles in Washington and how 
to project an image of Chongqing China as a strong nation (Kuo, 2009, 220). Amongst 
others, Soong’s lobbying efforts reflected an “aggressive, friendship-building lobbying 
style” (Kuo, 2009, 228). This approach diverted from the more traditional role of a 
diplomat, who, according to Hu Shi, should work through cultural engagement (Kuo, 
2009, 228).  
Interestingly, special representatives such as T.V. Soong, Gui Yongqing, Zhu 
Jiahua, Sun Fo and others were also closely linked with interest groups surrounding 
Chiang Kai-shek. These groups not only competed for Chiang Kai-shek’s support but 
also over the direction of Chinese foreign policy. In the following section, I will highlight 
the existence of a German-friendly Chinese interest group, and show how external and 
internal developments influenced its standing, the content of its discussion as well as 
its cooperation with other interest groups. 
After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese war and the outbreak of 
fighting in Europe two years later, Chongqing China’s foreign policy was increasingly 
                                               
180 Leutner (1998, 139-144) quotes: “Außenpolitisches Strategiedokument aus der Rohstoffbehörde der 
chinesischen Regierung“(Foreign Policy Strategy Document from the Resource Commision of the Chinese 
Government) [Chongqing, October 1940], 2 HACh, 28 Rohstoffbehörde der Nationalregierung, No. 246.  
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influenced by Chiang Kai-shek, who continued to centralise power in his own hands 
(Chen Yan, 2002b, 251-252). This trend meant that the Chinese Foreign Office had to 
compete with an alternative organisation over the course of foreign policy. Political 
factions outside of the Chinese Foreign Office used their access to Chiang Kai-shek to 
influence foreign policy making. These groups had a strong nationalism in common and 
the wish to save China. However, they differed in their political ideology as well as on 
how China would be saved. I do not intend to further look in depth at groups other than 
the German-friendly one, as this would divert too much attention from the topic. 
However, wherever necessary I will provide additional information.  
 There exists no exact description of a clearly defined German-friendly group 
within the Chongqing administration during WWII, as is the case with US-friendly or 
Britain-friendly groups (Tien, 1972; Tyson Li, 2006; Taylor, 2009). Instead, it appears 
that these groups vanished “off the radar” after summer 1940, which is the point at 
which a number of scholars have declared the competition over foreign policy to have 
ended (e.g. Leutner, 1998, 45). While the attack on Pearl Harbor and the US entry into 
the war resulted in Nationalist China’s affiliation with the Allies, this does not imply that 
a German-friendly group did not play a role prior to December 1941 or lost all 
significance between 1942 and 1945, however. On the contrary, as part of a pragmatic 
foreign policy approach this group was over and over again used to maintain 
communication to Germany; through both front and back channels.  
 Scholars agree in the fact that returned Chinese students within the Nationalist 
administration tend to support their former host countries relations in and with China. 
This is the case for students returning from the US or the Soviet Union.181 
 Similarly, Chinese students that had returned from Germany maintained 
positive feelings for their host country, and made up parts of a German-friendly group 
in Chongqing. According to British observations, Zhu Jiahua was the leader of a 
German-friendly group, which also included Qi Jun, who became one of the agents 
                                               
181 Members of the Nationalist Chinese elite that had studied abroad and maintained positive relations to 
their host country were, amongst others, T.V. Soong, (US), Sun Fo (Soviet Union) and Guo Taiqi (US).  
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maintaining the clandestine wartime Sino-German communication network.182 Zhu has 
been identified by scholars as a core member of the powerful C.C.Clique, one of the 
main organisations competing over power in China, and associated with Chiang Kai-
shek (Tien, 1972, 49).183  
Zhu’s association with the C.C. Clique and Gui’s role within the Lixingshe are of 
interest, as both groups were “notorious” rivals during the 1930s (Wakeman Jr., 2003, 
93). The C.C. Clique was lead by Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, two brothers whose 
connections to Chiang Kai-shek started in the 1920s (Wakeman Jr., 2003, 90). The 
Clique itself consisted of several right-wing, anti-communist groups such as the 
Western Hills group or the Sun Yat-sen Study Society, which merged in June 1927 
(Wakeman Jr., 2003, 91). By mid-1930s, the C.C. Clique controlled large parts of the 
Nationalist administration from the GMD’s Organisation Department (Wakeman Jr., 
2003, 91), and turned out to be a powerful part of Chiang Kai-shek’s political machinery 
(Tien, 1972, 52).  
 The Whampoa-Clique was a second source for German-friendly individuals. 
Recruited from the first five years of graduates of the Whampoa Academy, these 
military officers were strongly nationalist. A number of these, including Gui Yongqing, 
worked together with the German military advisors for around ten years from 1927 until 
1938.  
 These two groups had competed for power within the Nationalist administration 
during the 1930s. It is impossible to say at this stage of research whether the German-
friendly members of the Wahmpoa and the C.C. Clique cooperated with each other in 
the 1940s. Given the lack of evidence, this research will treat the two groups as 
separate, with each other competing entities and assume that Chiang Kai-shek chose 
German-friendly individuals for missions in Germany due to their personal skills, and 
not because of their affiliation to certain interest groups in Chongqing.  
                                               
182 British Library, India Office Record (IOR), L/ P&S/ 12/ 2293, China, Sino-British Relations File 15, Sep 
36-April 46. Telegram sent from Chongqing to the Government of India, Supply Dept. to Secretary of State 
for India. Calcutta 20 March 1942. 
183 Tien (1972, 49) quotes: Hatano Ken’ichi, Chugoku Kokuminto, p.461. 
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 British appeasement policies towards Japan prior to September 1939 led to a 
slight deterioration in Sino-British relations, resulting in internal dicusssions on the 
course of foreign policy in Chongqing (Leutner, 1998, 107). While the US started to 
move away from it isolationist position and acted more supportively towards Nationlist 
China, early German war successes influenced the foreign policy discussions inside 
Chongqing. Members of the German-friendly group believed that German war success 
in Europe had put her in a far more powerful and favourable position to mediate 
between Chiang Kai-shek’s China and Japan. Zhu Jiahua even congratulated the 
German army on their successes and called for German intervention on China’s behalf 
(Kirby, 1984, 249-250). The Chinese ambassador to Berlin, Chen Jie, in fact 
approached the German Foreign Office with the hope for improved Sino-German 
relations (Kirby, 1984, 245).184 Chen Jie’s remarks were greeted with support from 
German state secretary von Weizsaecker, who agreed that the obstacle of Sino-Soviet 
relations and German-Soviet rivalry had been removed with the Non Aggression Pact 
(Leutner, 1998, 132).185 Interestingly, the official mediation approach to the German 
Foreign Office of October 1939 fell in the same period.  
 Apart from such direct communication towards Germany, internally the events 
of mid-1940 led to some surprising cooperation between Soviet-and German-friendly 
individuals, including Sun Fo. Following the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and 
German war success in Europe during 1940, Sun argued on 2 July 1940 that the 
European war had shown that Britain was powerless, and that a Nazi German victory 
was within grasp (Yang, 2010a, 37).186  Sun’s remarks and Zhu’s congralutation of 
Germany reflected an increase in German-friendly rethoric in Chongqing, which is best 
summarised in Chiang Kai-shek’s comment that almost everybody around him was in 
                                               
184 Kirby (1984, 245) quotes: DGFP, D, 7, mo.327, 333, memorandum by Weizsaecker, 26 August 1939.  
185  Leutner (1998, 132) printed the following record: “Aufzeichnungen des Staatsekretärs Ernst von 
Weizsäcker, AA über seine Unterredung mit Botschafter Chen Jie”, Berlin, 26 August 1939, ADAP, Serie D, 
Bd. VII, Doc. 327, p.278. 
186 Sun Fo’s quote is found in two diaries: Wang Zizhuang “Riji”, Volume 6; Wang Shijie “Riji”, Volume 2, 
quoted in Yang (2010a, 37).  
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favour of an alliance with Germany in January 1941 (Yang, 2010a, 38). This internal 
German-friendly and especially Soviet-friendly sentiment of some Chongqing Chinese 
politicians was also noted by the US ambassador to China Nelson T. Johnson. 
Ambassador Johnson also mentioned that  
“some Chinese leaders…advocate a strengthening of Sino-German ties in 
the belief that Hitler’s policy will be to urge Japanese expansion in the 
South Seas at the expense of the democratic powers while he sees to ith 
that China is encouraged to develeop alnge Fascist lines as an 
independent state” (FRUS, 1955, 406-407).187  
 
This possible development is surprising if we consider that Soviet aid had made up 
most of Chongqing China’s foreign aid since 1938, and that German support had 
dwindled to almost nothing. Even if this idea was entertained by a great number of 
individuals in the German- and Soviet-friendly camps, the same cannot be said about 
Chiang Kai-shek. In contrast to a great number of Chinese civil servants, such as Zhu 
Jiahua, Chiang, did not publicly take a very German-friendly stance. However, Zuo 
Shuangwen (2008, 40) cites Wang Zizhuang’s diary, in which is a statement by Chiang 
Kai-shek showing a positive and supportive attitude to Germany’s victories in Europe. 
Chiang Kai-shek is quoted as saying that just as Hitler had to fight for his success in 
the last few years, China will also have to fight the War of Resistance and for the 
rebuilding of the country.188 
Even though Chiang did not consider China to be at war with the Third Reich as 
late as spring 1940 (Tyson Li, 2006, 160), the foreign policy approach to Germany was 
characterised by “dui De bu yin bu buli” (neither be too faimiliar not too distant to 
Germany) (Yang, 2010a, 37-38). While this statement originated from May 1938 when 
the Third Reich recalled the German military mission for the first time, it still holds value 
for Sino-German relations after September 1939. Moreover, this approach to Sino-
German relations clearly fitted within the overall pragmatic foreign policy approach 
practised by Chiang Kai-shek and his aides.  
                                               
187 Ambassador Johnson sent a telegram from Chongqing to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 24 July 
1940. In this telegram Johnson expressed his opinion on the impact that the war situation in Europe had 
on Chongqing China.  
188 Wang Zizhuang Diary, Volume 6, 9 July 1940. Published in Taipei Zongtong Jiang gong sixiang yanlun 
zongji, zhengli fabiao gaozhong weijian, Book 17, pp.392-399, quoted in Zuo (2008, 40).  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
128 
 
Even though the atmosphere in 1940 and 1941 Chongqing seemed German-
friendly, Foreign Minister Guo Taiqi and Chiang Kai-shek maintained their official anti-
Axis foreign policy. With the appointment of Guo Taiqi as Foreign Minister in 1941, 
German observers feared an alignment toward the US, and the US-friendly actions and 
comments by Guo further contributed to that fear (Leutner, 1998, 159).189 A US-friendly 
faction in Chongqing was to be found surrounding Soong May-ling, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
wife and also situated in the Chinese Foreign Office (Leutner, 1998, 159).190 Repeated 
calls for a closer alignment with the Anglo-Saxon Powers surfaced as early as 
September 1939 in the Chinese Foreign Office, as did calls to withdraw the Chinese 
ambassador from Berlin (Garver, 1988, 91).191 
While the Chinese Foreign Office is largely seen as having been a US-friendly 
organisation, internal documents circulated by the National Resource Commission in 
October 1940 shed more light on behind-the-scene discussions on the course of 
Chinese foreign relations.192 If this paper was indeed written by the National Resource 
Commission, it came from an organisation that was closely linked with Chiang Kai-shek. 
Originating from the National Defense Planning Commission, the National Resource 
Commission emerged in 1938 (Kirby, 1984, 91). The Commission consisted of several 
branches, of which the foreign one focused on “foreign economic enterprises in China” 
and was deeply involved in Sino-German trade (Kirby, 1984, 92, 101). Since 1935, the 
Commission had been under the control of the National Military Council, whose leader 
was Chiang Kai-shek to whom the National Resource Commission answered directly 
                                               
189 Leutner (1998, 158-160) printed the following record: “Lagebericht des Mitarbeiters der deutschen 
Transozean, Wilhelm Trendel“, BArch R901, DBC, No. 1600, Bl. 92-108.  
190 Ibid. 
191 PA AA, Bestand Peking 1, No. 165, Telegram by Mr Bidder to German Foreign Office on 19 October 
1939. Bidder, the German Charge d’Affairs in Chongqing reported on a meeting with General Changchun, 
who informed him of attempts to recall Ambassador Chen Jie.  
192 The document in question is part of a publication of archival resources by Leutner. According to Leutner, 
the document has been circulated by the Chinesische Rohstoffbehoerde, which would translate to 
resource commission in English. Leutner (1998, 139-144): “Außenpolitisches Strategiedokument aus der 
Rohstoffbehörde der chinesischen Regierung“(Foreign Policy Strategy Document from the Resource 
Commision of the Chinese Government) [Chongqing, October 1940], 2 HACh, 28 Rohstoffbehörde der 
Nationalregierung, No. 246.  
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(Kirby, 1984, 92-93, 98).193 There is good reason to assume that this specific document 
was meant for internal circulation, as it outlined Chongqing China’s objective to 
maintain relations with all sides in WWII, despite the obvious conflict that existed 
between the foreign nations in question.  
Within this strategy document, steps for clandestine foreign policy activities 
were outlined, as well as Chongqing China’s approach to the US, Britain and the Axis 
Powers. Overall, the paper clearly shows that Chongqing China aimed to have as 
many friends as possible, while having as few enemies as possibIe (Leutner, 1998, 
142). In detail, the paper called for the forstering of diplomatic relations with the US, 
based on common objectives, such as the maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific, 
and a shared goal to fight aggressive countries to defend democratic ones (Leutner, 
1998, 142).194  Chiang Kai-shek shared the hopes for a US entry to the war with British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Iriye, 1987, 179, in Taylor, 2009, 186). However. 
Churchill’s attempt to regain the British Empire clashed with Chiang’s anti-imperialism 
that touched upon issues such as Hong Kong or Indian independence (Yan and Li, 
2008, 267).  
However, at the same time, proposals by Chinese politicians to “focus on one 
line [side of the conflict] were discouraged, as such a move would easily lead to fixed 
alliances and carried great responsibilities with it. The alternative was an approach that 
saw the simultaneous approach to the US and the Third Reich (Leutner, 1998, 141-
142).195 Main focus was put on Sino-US relations, however, neither relations with the 
Third Reich nor Italy were to be neglected. Instead, in the commission’s own words: 
“we have to carry out a gewundene [lit. translation: flexible] foreign policy and develop 
                                               
193 The National Military Council “replaced the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force” (Kirby, 1984, 89). The chairman of this council, Chiang Kai-shek, also acquired wide-ranging civilan 
powers and gained an additional basis of support (Kirby, 1984, 89).  
194  The document in question was stored in a folder with documents from the Chinesische 
Rohstoffbehoerde (Chinese Resource Commission). “Außenpolitisches Strategiedokument aus der 
Rohstoffbehörde der chinesischen Regierung“(Foreign Policy Strategy Document from the Resource 
Commision of the Chinese Government) [Chongqing, October 1940], 2 HACh, 28 Rohstoffbehörde der 
Nationalregierung, No. 246, printed in Leutner (1998, 139-144). 
195 Ibid., pp.141-142.   
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secret activities behind the scenes” (Leutner, 1998, 143).196 Behind-the-scene activities, 
as mentioned above would have included the appointment of Gui Yongqing and Qi Jun 
to Germany. The appointment of a trusted aid of Chiang Kai-shek to Berlin, at roughly 
the same time as T.V. Soong’s appointment to Washington, clearly reflects a “flexible”, 
or, in other words, a pragmatic foreign policy.   
This document circulated three months after China’s National Assembly had 
called for efforts to improve ties with Germany and Italy (Zuo, 2008, 40). Chiang Kai-
shek also surprisingly ordered research into policies on how to improve Sino-German 
relations in July 1940.197  
From the above presented information it emerges that Chiang Kai-shek in 
general allowed a foreign policy approach that would allow Nationalist China to foster 
relations with all sides of the conflict, without leaning too far to one side. However, 
internal competition over foreign policy intensified with the outbreak of the war in 
Europe, and especially during the years of the “phony war”, with German-friendly 
groups gaining a significant amount of influence and publicity. Rumours of German-
friendly rethoric in Chongqing even forced Chiang Kai-shek and Guo Taiqi to publicly 
re-confirm China’s stance on cooperation with Britain and the US in July 1940 (Zuo, 
2008, 40).198  
 
The existence and influence of a German-friendly group in leading decision 
making circles in Chongqing was known to Britain and the US as well. Diplomatic staff 
and private observers informed London and Washington continuously of developments 
in China’s political circles, with German-friendly developments receiving particular 
attention. Chiang Kai-shek indeed seems to have been an important factor in British 
                                               
196 Ibid.,p.143. 
197 AH, “Shilue gaoben (Manuscript)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document 
Number: 002-060100-00142-009, Entry Number: 002000000622A; document dates from 9 July 1940. 
198 Guo Taiqi has been identified by academics as a supporter for better Chinese relations with the US and 
Britain. Subsequently, he pursued an anti-Axis foreign policy. Guo was a US-educated returned student, 
who joined the GMD and rose up the ranks, so that during the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931, Guo served as 
ambassador to Britain (Craft, 2001, 198). Guo supported an official Chinese alliance with Britain and 
France in September 1939 (Garver, 1988, 91).  
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strategy, and British Ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr stated that it should be Britain’s 
“chiefest of our concerns…should be to hold the confidence of the Generalissimo…” 
(Thorne, 1978,67-68). 199  Amongst these foreign observers Chiang Kai-shek’s and 
Soong May-ling’s former advisor William H. Donald stood out.  
According to Donald in 1940, and in accordance with British observations in 
early 1942, Zhu Jiahua was the centre of German-friendly forces in Chongqing, with 
great numbers of sympathisers hailing from military circles (Leutner, 1998, 146).200 
Other prominent members of the German-friendly camp were Minister of War He 
Yingqin and General Yu Dawei.201 Moreover, Donald argued, Chiang Kai-shek himself 
leaned towards the Axis powers or had been pushed in this direction by his German-
friendly military advisors.202 Donald also noticed that the British had failed to show any 
kind of commitment to China, despite several offers from the Chinese side (Leutner, 
1998, 146).203  Whether Chiang had indeed been leaning towards the Axis Powers is 
impossible to determine at this stage. However, it should be remembered that Donald’s 
work with Chiang had ended in mid 1940 with a fight, because the latter did not see 
Germany as an enemy (Tyson Li, 2006, 160). As a result, Donald’s narration of events 
may not be objective.  
                                               
199 Thorne (1978, 67-68) quotes: Clark Kerr to Foreign Secretary, 3 Feb. 1942, FO 800/300. FO 371, 
F3572/60/10; F11662/145/10. 
200 The document published in Leutner’s (1998) work is described as having been written by a Walter H. 
Donald. After careful studying the India Office Records in the British Library, and reading Earl Albert 
Selle’s Donald of China (1948), I am certain that “Walter H. Donald” should actually be “William H. Donald”.  
For Leutner’s reference (1998, 146) see: TNA (PRO), FO 371/24702, F5084/3281/10; Letter of the 
Australian finance adviser of Chiang Kai-shek Donald to the British Foreign Office, Berkeley Gage, 30 
October 1940.  
201 In Wilhelm Trendels Transocean report, General Yu Dawei, Minister of War He Yingqing, Zhu Jiahua 
and others are named as members of a German-friendly lobby. BArch. R901, DBC, No. 1600, Bl/ 92-108, 
“Lagebericht des Mitarbeiters der deutschan Transozean Wilhelm Trendel (Observation by the staff of 
German Transozean Wilhelm Trendel)“, printed in Leutner (1998,158), 14 August 1941.  
Around three years later, German observers included these German-friendly individuals in a list of anti-
communist individuals, which also included Minister of Education Chen Lifu (C.C. Clique) and General Dai 
Li (the head of the Chinese secret service). Chiang Kai-shek was said to be totally identical with the group, 
and said to uphold the picture of a “moderate” Chiang for political considerations (see: PA AA, R102007, 
Abwehr Berichte u. Meldungen des KO China (Reports by the Abwehr and the KO China).  Telegram from 
Shanghai to Berlin, on 16 May 1944, sent by Stoller).  
202 TNA (PRO) FO 371/24702, Political Far Eastern/ China Files 3150-3357, File 3821, Telegram by Sir A. 
Clark Kerr, 13 May 1940. 
203 Leutner (1998, 145-147) printed the following record: “Schreiben des australischen Finanzberaters von 
Chiang Kaishek, Walter H. Donald, an den Sekretär des britischen Foreign Office, Berkely Gage (Writing 
by Chiang Kai-shek’s Australian Finance Advisor Walter H. Donald to the secretary of the British Foreign 
Office.Berkley Gage), Public Record Office London (PRO), FO 371/24702, F5084/3281/10.  
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Nonetheless, attempts to influence Chiang Kai-shek towards a German-friendly 
foreign policy existed, as German journalist and Wehrmacht intelligence agent Wolf 
Schenke noted (Kirby, 1984, 249). Apparently, German-friendly military forces tried to 
influence Chiang in favour of Germany when the latter was out of range of “the 
missionaries”. As a result of this lobbying by military forces, Schenke observed that 
“weird people, from whom you would not expect it, suddenly show interest in 
Germany… order came from above” (Leutner, 1998, 135-136). 204  The term 
“missionaries” probably referred to Chinese Christian Nationalists, of which Soong 
May-ling was one.  
 
At the beginning of this sub-chapter I outlined how external events helped to 
raise the profile and arguments of German-friendly individuals. At the same time, and 
perhaps because of the intense focus on Sino-US relations, the US and British 
reactions to the Sino-Japanese war were perceived as having been too passive. 
Despite her association with a strong American-friendly stand, Soong May-ling had 
also voiced disillusion with the Western powers in May 1938 in a letter to a Chinese 
friend. A copy of this letter was then conveniently published in 1940. An open warning 
to the foreign powers, the letter stated:  
I have expressed the hope that we would tread the democratic path, but I 
have to mention that while the desire to adhere to the democracies is pretty 
widespread and substantial at the moment, there is a school of thought 
developing which is asking with some impatience, but also with some 
persistence, "What have the governments of the democracies done for us?" 
(Soong, 1940, 234-235) 
 
According to scholars, such as Leutner (1998, 45), this internal debate over the course 
of Chinese foreign policy ended in the summer of 1940 and one might assume that 
German-friendly individuals would have turned into US/British-friendly ones. However, 
even on 13 February 1942, the contemporary observer R.M. Dougall reported an “anti-
                                               
204The Schenke document is printed in Leutner, (1998, 135-136), Letter of the journalists Wolf Schenke 
and Karl Laverentz, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro Shanghai (letter was also sent to the German embassy in 
Shanghai), BArch, R9208, Nr. 3376, bl. 295-296.  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
133 
 
British atmosphere in Chungking”, and that Foreign Minister Guo Taiqi “was said to 
have been dropped from FO [Foreign Office] partly because he committed China to war 
with Germany…”.205 British ambassador to China Sir Horace Seymour even received 
information that the slow advance in the Pacific in summer 1942 had led to an increase 
in anti-British sentiment. At the same time, Seymour also referred to information that 
Chongqing China rejected British request for armaments, as the US had been unable 
to deliver enough war-related material to Britain.206 This telegram by Seymour likely 
refers to the fact that large amounts of US lend-lease material were being stockpiled in 
India in 1942. It was impossible to transport significant amounts over the Himalayas, as 
weather conditions and topography only allowed for the transport of 186 tons out of 
promised 5000 tons monthly, to Chongqing between May and June 1942 (Sherry, 1996, 
9). Even in 1943 British observers complained about China not being a “whole-hearted” 
ally and the situation in China for British subjects as being unsafe.207  
 
Gui and Qi in Berlin: pre-July 1941 
 As I outlined above, this pragmatic and at times contradictory Chinese foreign 
policy advocated the maintenance of relations with all sides in the conflict, even though 
the primary focus was on Sino-US relations and Chongqing China received far more 
aid from the Soviet Union than she ever had from Germany. As part of this foreign 
policy approach, special representatives were send out to the major powers involved in 
WWII, including the Third Reich.  
Due to the fact that Chongqing China officially took a more US/British-friendly 
position and linked the Axis-powers with Japan, fostering of Sino-German relations 
required less visible behind-the-scene activities. The strong Japan-friendly position of 
the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop clearly also contributed to the decision to 
                                               
205 British Library (IOR) M/3/860, Report: “Anti-British Atmosphere in Chungking”. 
206 TNA (PRO) WO 208/376A, British prestige in China: notes by Assistant Military Attache, Chungking 
reports and correspondence; War Cabinet Distribution from China from Chungking to Froreign Office, Sir H. 
Seymour, 1 August 1942.  
207 TNA (PRO) HS 1/165, Far East China: OSS/SEO Co-Operation. 
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work outside of diplomatic front channels. Chiang Kai-shek personally decided the 
appointment of Gui and Qi to Berlin (Zuo, 2008, 43), thus allowing Chonging China to 
gather information, keep all doors open and be up-to-date on developments in 
Europe.208 
 “Diplomatic blunders” by Chinese Ambassador Chen Jie in Berlin and other 
Chinese embassy staff between 1938 and early 1940 further encouraged the 
appointment of the two men (Liang, 1978, 162). These blunders may refer to 
information Liang (1978, 162) provides on negotiations carried out by Chinese 
Counsellor Tin Wen-yuan with the German Foreign Office, and Chen Jie’s attempt to 
secure Swedish explorer Sven Hedin for propaganda purposes in March 1940.209 
Apparently, Hedin had written a book sympathetic to Chiang Kai-shek in 1939, which, 
together with the explorer’s good standing with Hitler, was seen as a potential lobbying 
and propaganda tool (Liang, 1978, 162).210 
Kirby (1984, 251) describes Gui to be the leader of a delegation that had the 
orders to foster relations and arrange a German-mediated peace. The possible reason 
for the choice of an alternative diplomatic channel, the above mentioned “blunders” had 
contributed to the deterioration of Chinese influence in the Third Reich, at a time when 
German-friendly Chinese called for better diplomatic relations. In contrast to 1937, 
when then Chinese ambassador Chen Tianfang had been recalled due to failures in 
fostering Sino-German relations, Chen Jie and his staff stayed in Berlin. Japanese-
friendly newspaper Shanghai Times211 even reported on 6 June 1940, while Gui and Qi 
were travelling to Europe:  
Faced with the difficult choice of supporting the Allies in the European war 
or seeking friendship with Germany, Chungking diplomatic leaders were 
                                               
208 Tang Zong (1991, 143), quoted in Zuo Shuangwen (2008, 43). 
209 Sven Hedin supported German National Socialism and travelled to Berlin several times, where he met 
with Adolf Hitler (Demko, 1989, 321). C. P. S. (1953, 253) termed Hedin a Nazi by temperament, and 
pointed out the latter’s support for both the last German Emperor Wilhelm II in 1914 and Adolf Hitler in 
1933.   
210 Liang (1978, 162) quotes: Sven Hedin, Ohne Auftrag in Berlin (Tuebingen and Stuttgart, 1949), pp.83, 
97. Sven Hedin, “Zu der japansichen Biographie Chiang Kai-shek’s,” in Das Neue China, 6 Jhg. No. 38, 
March 1940, pp.329-33. 
211 The Shanghai Times was reportedly owned by a British individual, but had been supported through 
“subventions by the Japanese government”, which resulted in the newspaper pursuing a Japanese-friendly 
line (Wasserstein, 1999, 63). 
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reported today to be heading gradually toward a rapprochement with Berlin. 
Despite statesmen in the wartime capital of General Chiang Kai-shek who 
have urged a pro-democratic front with the Allies and the United States, the 
desire of Chungking has been growing for a pro-Nazi policy in the light of 
German successes, it was understood. Mr Chen Chieh [Chen Jie], 
Ambassador to Berlin, has reportedly been instructed to promote greater 
Sino-German friendship and is understood to have enlisted the aid of 
German army officers who were military advisers to Chungking in the 
past.212 
 
German observers in Chongqing believed that German-friendly circles were gaining 
influence. Mr. Altenburg, of the German consulate in Shanghai, reported to the German 
Foreign Office that the European war successes had led to an increasingly German-
friendly public and an increase in German-friendly voices in the Chongqing government. 
Stating that Sino-German relations had never been better in these last two years, Mr. 
Altenburg further claimed that the Chongqing government and the Collaborationist 
government in Nanjing were both interested in fostering relations with Germany.213  
German observers also claimed that by August 1941, the Soviet Union was no 
longer seen as a possible bridge to foster Sino-German relations, but as a common 
enemy. Apparently, German-friendly groups spoke up in support of a German-Soviet 
war, which would ultimately cut the supply lines to Yan’an, as the Soviet aid would be 
needed at the European front (Leutner, 1998, 158).214 Whether these claims were only 
wishful thinking by the German side, or actually reflected a strong anti-communist 
sentiment and planning in certain circles in Chongqing is impossible to determine. The 
fact is that the Soviet Union had been the most important armament supplier to 
Chongqing until December 1941. However, it is also known that the German attack on 
the Soviet Union in June 1941 diverted invaluable resources to the Western Front and 
away from China. Moreover, the Soviet Union had signed the Soviet-Japanese 
Neutrality Pact in April 1941. Of those two the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact had the 
worst impact on Sino-Soviet relations. Even though Chiang Kai-shek stated on 19 April 
                                               
212 PA AA Peking, 185, Akten der Deutschen Gesandschaft in Peking,China-Deutschland (Files of the 
German legation in Peking, “China-Germany“).  Shanghai Times, 6 June 1940 “Leaning to the Reich”. 
213 PA AA Peking, 185, Shanghai, 30 July 1940, Altenburg and AA, Telegramm/ Report “Chinesisches 
Liebeswerben um Deutschland“ (Chinese courtship for Germany). 
214  Leutner (1998, 158-160) printed to following record: “Lagebericht des Mitarbeiters der deutschan 
Transozean Wilhelm Trendel (Observation by the staff of German Transozean Wilhelm Trendel)“, BArch. 
R901, DBC, No. 1600, Bl/ 92-108. 
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that his attitude to the Soviet Union had remained unchanged, relations worsened and 
by mid-1941 Soviet volunteers were recalled from China and all shipments to 
Chongqing stopped (Slavinsky, 2004, 58-60).  
 The increase in German-friendly individuals and calls in Chongqing had 
repercussions for individuals who had a troubled past with the Nazis, such as (the 
Jahnke agent) Walter Stennes. Supporters of a German-friendly foreign policy (who 
anticipated an early win for the Nazis) feared complications over Stennes’ presence in 
Chongqing, while the British and the Soviet Union rejected the presence of a German 
close to Chiang Kai-shek (Tyson Li, 2006, 160). As a result, Stennes’ position as the 
Generalissimo’s head bodyguard became “untenable”, and he relocated to Shanghai in 
early 1940, while still remaining in Chiang Kai-shek’s services (Tyson Li, 2006, 160).  
 
Following the arrival of Gui and Qi in Berlin in autumn 1940, it is very likely the 
set up of back channels to leading Nazis would have followed a similar pattern as Gui’s 
late 1944 appointment as military attaché in London. Shortly after his appointment to 
London, Gui approached members of the British government and asked if he could be 
introduced to an influential politician. The reason for this request was to engage in 
“quite unofficial” conversations with that specific politican on matters of interest for both 
Chongqing China and Britain. Orders for Gui came directly from Chiang Kai-shek.215  
I would argue that Gui’s work in Berlin until July 1941 puts him in a similar 
special representative position as T.V. Soong and Yang Jie. Reflecting Chiang Kai-
shek’s foreign policy approach in targeting directly members of the Nazi German 
administration, Gui’s work included discussions on Sino-German relations. Meetings 
with leading Nazis included Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, who had been 
approached by Chiang Kai-shek’s special representatives in the past (i.e. Jiang Baili). 
From amongst the group of leading Nazis Göring had been identified by Qi Jun in 
                                               
215 TNA (PPRO), WO 208/483, Kwei Yung Chin; Major General J.A. Sinclair to recipient in the British 
Foreign Office.  
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summer 1941 as China-friendly, together with the Minister of Economic Affairs Funk.216 
In the course of two weeks (6 October 1940-15 October 1940) Gui and Göring met at 
least four times. On several occasions, Göring expressed his sympathy with China and 
Germany’s hopes for a quick reconciliation between China and Japan.217 Gui, on the 
other hand, sought to foster renewed Sino-German relations when he reminded Göring 
on 15 October 1940, that “my country [China] is a good friend of Germany, while Japan 
is just an ally”.218  
Communication between Gui and Göring appears to have run through “an aide 
of Göring” (probably Jahnke), who arranged for clandestine messages to be directly 
delivered to Göring. Jahnke also arranged for Göring’s support for the connection with 
Gui, against interference by Japanese-friendly Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop (Liang, 
1978, 163). In October 1940, Göring had complained to von Ribbentrop about the 
three-year break in Sino-German relations, and in general had supported a more 
Chinese-friendly foreign policy. Gui even recommended that if “we had anything 
important to transmit, we should send it to Göring in written form”.219 The content of 
Gui’s meetings with Göring were sent to the bureau of the chairman of the Chinese 
Military Commission, who was Chiang Kai-shek.220 These reports were written partially 
by Qi Jun, whose actual role in the pre-July 1941 channel is difficult to establish, but it 
appears that he functioned as a kind of secretary or report writer, apart from the 
connection he established with the Resistance.221  
                                               
216 AH, “Dui Deguo waijiao (About German Foreign Relations) (6)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, 
Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080106-00060-008, Entry Number: 002000001283A. 
217 AH, “Dui Ying Fa De Yi guanxi (Material on foreign relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy) 
(6)”,”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-090103-00016-163, 
Entry Number: 002000002105A. 
218 AH, “Dui Ying Fa De Yi guanxi (Material on foreign relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy) 
(6)”,”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-090103-00016-167, 
Entry Number: 002000002105A 
219  Leutner (1998, 145) printed the following record: 2. HACh, 762, Buero des Vorsitzenden der 
Militärkommission (Bureau of the Chairman of the Military Commission), No. 1662. This writing from Gui 
(12 October 1940) was addressed to Chiang Kai-shek directly.  
220 Ibid.  
221 AH, “Dui Ying Fa De Yi guanxi (Material on foreign relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy) 
(6)”,”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number:  002-090103-00016-163, 
Entry Number: 002000002105A. 
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Even though the meeting between Gui and Göring may have been arranged in 
the context of military relations, the content of their discussions was clearly foreign 
policy related, hence it exceeded the framework of Gui’s position as military attaché.222 
This episode in Sino-German diplomacy sidelined the German and Chinese Foreign 
Office, and enabled Chiang Kai-shek to approach the Nazi leaders directly through his 
envoys, to whom he likely issued personal directives. 
 
Intelligence flows between China and Germany and the end of relations 
Throughout this time until July 1941, Chiang Kai-shek’s un-official clandestine 
information channel to the German Resistance, Lin Qiusheng, appears to have worked 
well, as several reports sent in the time from 1939 until 1940 show. As a result, Chiang 
was always fully aware of developments and plans in Europe, because Lin received his 
information from the military members of the German Resistance who, for example, 
forwarded German attack plans on Belgium and the Netherlands in early May 1940,223 
or general German attack guidelines for France and Britain on 30 October 1939.224 This 
approach by the Resistance was part of a wider strategy to inform the international 
community of Hitler’s plans, in a bid to have the Western democracies stop him 
(Deutsch, 1981, 328). Approches to foreign governments took place as early as 1938, 
and in particular Britain was seen as a powerful and influential entity in Europe with the 
might to derail any of Hitler’s war mongering efforts (Hoffmann, 1991, 438).225 Other 
approaches were made to the US and the governments of the Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The inclusion of China may appear odd, especially since China was not a 
major power involved in 1938 Europe. While communication with China after 
December 1941 seemed to have been an attempt to contact the Western Allies through 
                                               
222 The role of a military attaché focuses more on the military development in the host country and the 
development of new weapon systems (Cullen, 1985, 67), as well as providing bridges between the two 
countries’ armies.  
223 AH, “Yiban ziliao yi chengbiao huiji (General information collection) (100)”,”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenu “, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080200-00527-066, Entry Number: 002000001916A. 
224 AH “Yiban ziliao yi chengbiao huiji (General information collection) (93)”,”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080200-00520-062, Entry Number: 002000001909A. 
225 Hoffmann (1991, 438) quotes: DBFP 3,II, (1949), 683-6; Hoffmann, Peter (1977), The history of the 
German resistance 1933-1945, London and Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
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one of their allies, the situation in 1938/1939 was different. The fact that China did not 
play a major role in 1938/1939 is clear if compared to the great number of meetings 
between Resistance representatives and members of the British government compared 
to those between Lin and his informants (Hoffmann, 1991, 438-445). 
The knowledge that Chiang Kai-shek had been informed about Nazi war 
strategies and attack plans would lead to questions such as what Chiang Kai-shek 
actually did with this information. Documents exist that highlight the exchange of 
intelligence between Chiang Kai-shek and other Allies. President Roosevelt had been 
informed by Chiang Kai-shek on 13 May 1941 about an imminent German attack on 
the Soviet Union (FRUS, 1956, 186-187). Besides informing Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-sek 
also forwarded the intelligence he received on Operation Barbarossa to Stalin (Taylor, 
2009, 181). The latter, however, did not believe the Chinese information. The source of 
this information was apparently Walter Stennes, Chiang Kai-shek’s chief bodyguard. 
While Taylor (2009, 181) argues that Stennes had received this information from the 
Soviet spy Richard Sorge in Shanghai, it is equally possible that the information had 
come from Kurt Jahnke, as Liang (1978, 164) argues. The close connections between 
Jahnke and Stennes would also support this theory.  
Apart from intelligence discussions, Jahnke discussed Sino-German foreign 
policy and relations with Gui, and proposed Sino-German military alliances. It seems 
that Jahnke had not given up on his plan for Sino-German cooperation, and he argued 
that “…after Germany had first defeated Russia, she would help in China’s economic 
development… and the two countries would next collaborate - against Japan” (Liang, 
1978, 164).226 Gui seemed to have agreed with some of Jahnke’s plan, as he advised 
Chiang Kai-shek on 25 January 1941 that in case China did not wish to engage in an 
alliance with the US and Britain, she should send a high-ranking official to Germany to 
                                               
226 Gui, Unpublished Memoirs, quoted in Liang (1978, 164). 
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hold secret negotiations, and also to uncover Japan’s newest plans (Leutner, 1998, 
151).227  
From the above outlined passages on Gui’s links to leading Nazis and their 
associates (Jahnke) it is clear that Germany increasingly thought of China in terms of a 
military alliance. Approaches by Germans with Chinese connections further continued 
to include Hjalmar Schacht, who contacted the Chongqing Chinese government on 23 
May 1941, with a proposal through which Germany would abandon Japan and enter 
into a rapprochement with China (FRUS, 1956, 975). Chiang Kai-shek declined this 
proposal and informed the US of it. Whether Germany was serious about this proposal 
is not important at this point. However, it is clear that the Nazi government was well 
aware of which individuals it could use to approach Chongqing: the Chinese-friendly 
Germans.  
Qi’s report from November 1941, which will be further discussed below, 
provides an understanding on how the German government and related institutions 
such as the army were perceived. Chinese caution over the involvement of the German 
Foreign Office and German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop becomes clear. This 
perception sheds light on the choice of contacts in Berlin. Qi included a list of 
individuals in the German government, army and industry, divided by their affection for 
either Japan or China. The China-friendly group in this list includes names such as 
General Thomas, Hjalmar Schacht, a number of German generals and staff at the 
German Ministry of the Economy. In description about the individuals, Qi Jun very often 
uses the criteria “(good) friend of Klein”.228 This can be interpreted to mean that Hans 
Klein’s name had a good reputation or that his “friends” are trustworthy. In the foreword 
to this list, Qi Jun puts the blame for deteriorated Sino-German relations on one man in 
                                               
227 Leutner (1998, 151-151) printed the following record: “Telegramm des Militärattachés Gui Yongqing, 
Berlin, an Chiang Kaishek (Telegram by military attache Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek)“, 2 Hach 762 
Bureau of the head of the military commission No. 1662.  
228AH, “Dui Deguo waijiao (About German Foreign Relations) (6)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, 
Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080106-00060-008, Entry Number: 002000001283A. 
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particular: Joachim von Ribbentrop,229 who was the German foreign minister from 1938 
until May 1945 and known for his Japanese-friendly stand. Qi refers to the time before 
1936 (the date of von Ribbentrop’s return from a post in England and hence the 
perceived starting point for the deterioration of Sino-German relations) as a time during 
which Hitler listened to his ministers Schacht and Blomberg (both known as Chinese-
friendly) and Sino-German relations prospered. Moreover, Hitler fostered positive 
diplomatic relations with the US and Britain as well. However, with the arrival of von 
Ribbentrop the situation changed, and in cooperation with Japanese Ambassador 
Oshima,230 von Ribbentrop allegedly “destroyed” Sino-German relations. Chiang Kai-
shek reportedly never trusted von Ribbentrop and became worried over the course of 
Sino-German relations.231 
These clandestine talks in Berlin, as part of a modified special envoy back 
channel, and as a predecessor of the post-1941 back channels, ended in July 1941. I 
agree with other scholars that the recognition of the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist 
government in July 1941 meant the end for official Sino-German diplomacy, in turn also 
effecting the application of clandestine channels. Liang (1978, 164) proposed a second 
possible reason for the end of relations. Jahnke’s secretary Marcus believed that the 
clandestine talks between Jahnke and Gui had been leaked to Foreign Minister von 
Ribbentrop, who, enraged, called for the expulsion of the entire Chinese embassy staff. 
Liang (1978, 164) speculated that this information was leaked by someone inside the 
Chinese embassy, in order to discredit Gui and eliminate him as a competitor in foreign 
policy. If this claim has some credibility, then it suggests that there existed competition 
between the regular embassy staff, and the Chiang-appointed envoys. Yang Jie’s 
mission to France in 1938 had also generated difficulties between the special 
representative and China’s ambassador to Paris. Embassy staff complained about the 
appointment of a non-professional military man for such important missions, reflecting 
                                               
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid.  
231  BArch, N/246(Falkenhausen Nachlass, Überarbeitete Fassung der Memoiren (Kap. I-XIV)/48, 
(Falkenhausen documents, revised version Ch. I-XIV) p.202.  
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a position that was likely shared by other professional diplomatic staff in Chinese 
embassies around the world (Chen Yan, 2002b, 235-237; Kuo, 2009, 228). 232 
Whatever the reason was, by July 1941, the Chinese embassy in Berlin had been 
vacated, and much of its staff had returned to China via Switzerland, while Gui 
remained on a post inside the Chinese consulate in Berne.  
While Hu stated that Gui was posted to Berne as Charge d’Affairs, Swiss 
archival material recorded that he was appointed as military attaché to the Chinese 
consulate. This sudden appointment of Gui as military attaché met with resistance from 
Swiss authorities, as they had not been informed of this move, and in general objected 
to the increasing number of military attachés in Berne. Complaints to the Chinese 
embassy in Berne failed, as the Chinese consulate staff had apparently only been 
informed of Gui’s appointment shortly before the Swiss authorities had been notified.233 
The diplomatic blunders continued, as the Swiss authorities had not given their 
approval to military attaché Gui, which is standard procedure every time a military 
attaché is appointed to a foreign post (Berridge and James, 2003, 243). Not 
surprisingly, the federal political department in Berne objected to the appointment of 
Gui, despite him being a close friend of Chiang Kai-shek.234  
Notably, the Swiss authorities were worried by the increasing number of 
intelligence operations that took place on their territory. As a neutral entity in Europe, 
and a direct neighbour of the Third Reich, Switzerland had to uphold her neutrality, 
while controlling foreign secret agents, who might endanger the carefully protected 
neutrality. As a consequence, the Swiss Federal Council issued a statement to all 
provincial governments on 27 May 1943, which stated that the increasing number of 
intelligence operations and diplomatic espionage had reached dangerous levels that 
                                               
232 Chen Yan (2002b, 237) quotes: Gu Weijun Huiyilu, Volume 4, pp.125-126. 
233 It appears that Swiss authorities felt deceived by Chongqing China, as they were initially asked to 
provide visa for transit for the staff of the former Chinese embassy in Berlin. Suddenly, they faced a 
military attaché who had entered the country without the proper visa. The military department, however, 
did not agree with the political department’s view of events and approved Gui’s appointment.  
234  CH-BAR#E2001D#1000/1553#1271*, Dossier: Kwei, Yun-Chin, Legationsrat. “Eidgenössisches 
Politisches Department, Bern den 15 Juli 1941, an das Eidg. Militärdepartement Bern” (Political 
Department Berne to the Military Department Berne, 15 July 1941).  
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endangered Swiss neutrality. Hence, the federal council reminded the provincial 
governments to have a close and careful eye on any intelligence operations, be these 
of economic or political nature. If the careful balance was not maintained, Switzerland 
would be in danger of becoming involved in the conflict.235  
 
 
Section 3: Post-July 1941 clandestine diplomatic back channels 
The following section of this chapter will be split in two parts, reflecting the split 
of the clandestine Chiang-Germany communication channels. First, I will present the 
findings concerning the “Berlin-Chiang Channel”, followed by the “German Resistance-
Chiang Channel”. Due to the fact that this chapter contributes a large part to this 
dissertation, the most important issues raised below will be summarised in a final 
section, before I continue to analyse the findings presented here in Chapter Seven.  
 
Gui and Jahnke: prospects of a Sino-German alliance? 
In the course of 1942, Jahnke and Gui met on several occasions and discussed 
different options for Sino-German cooperation. The objectives of both sides did not 
necessarily complement each other, especially since Chongqing China had just 
entered into an alliance with the Allies. There is not enough evidence to suggest that 
Chiang considered other options than the US to change the course of the war in East 
Asia. However, the archival material in this sub-chapter will clearly show that Sino-
German communication continued after Pearl Harbor, and should be seen in the wider 
context of Chiang Kai-shek trying to keep all doors open and the flow of information 
going.  
                                               
235 CH-BAR#E2001E#1972/33#4527*, Dossier Gisevius Hans Bernd, Vizekonsul, Zürich. “Kreisschreiben 
des Schweizerischen Bundesrates (Entwurf) an sämtliche Kantonsregierungen betreffend den 
informationsdienst der ausländischen diplomatischen Vertretungen und Konsulate in der Schweiz“ (Writing 
by the Swiss Federal Council to all Canton governments in regard to the intelligence work of foreign 
diplomatic consulates and embassies in Switzerland), 27 May 1943.  
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The Third Reich’s likely goals, on the other hand, would have been reached 
with a Sino-Japanese peace deal. Peace in China would have offered two benefits to 
Germany: one would be renewed access to Chinese raw resources in non-occupied 
China, which would inject the struggling German armaments industry with much 
needed ores; the second objective would have had much wider implications, as it 
concerned the release of several hundred thousand Japanese soldiers from the 
battlefield in China, which potentially could either attack the Soviet Union or support 
their fellow soldiers in the Pacific. As will become clear, this idea to free large numbers 
of Japanese soldiers from the fight in China was a returning theme in RSHA 
discussions with China in 1942 and in 1944 (Ratenhof, 1987, 532).236 
As a result of the eagerness on the German side for Sino-German cooperation 
and alliance, the content of Jahnke’s and Gui’s meetings mainly centred on foreign 
relations. Academia Historica papers revealed that on 26 January 1942, Jahnke 
proposed, during a three day and night meeting with Gui, that China and Germany 
should cooperate, due to the fact that Chongqing China could not rely on either the US 
or Britain. Jahnke based this proposal on the assumption that the Pacific War would 
remain a stalemate, with “the USA and Britain unable to launch an attack on Japan for 
at least two to three years”.237 The German proposal, in the opinion of the RSHA, would 
allow for the “control of Japan”, but also “stop Japan being pinned down”, and enable 
Germany to send aid to China, as well as to put the Third Reich and Chongqing in a 
position to keep the Soviet Union in check. Moreover, it was proposed for both sides to 
exchange “useful, but harmless information”. 238  “Control of Japan” is the literal 
translation and could refer to Germany, as an Axis member, being able to exert control 
over Japanese actions in China. In summary, the RSHA hence offered Chongqing 
                                               
236 Ratenhof (1987, 532) quotes: Reichsicherheitshauptamt an OKW-Feldwirtschaftsamt, 8 June  and 28 
July and 20 September 1944, BA-MA, Wi II C. 5.4.  
237 AH, “Geguo gingbao (Intelligence reports from various countries (3)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.57. 
238 AH, “Geguo gingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu“, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A. 
27 January 1942. 
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China an option to ease the fighting in East Asia, and supply China with armaments 
and technology. Knowing that this would be an important decision, which could not be 
made hastily, Jahnke offered to Gui to return at a later point in February 1942, to allow 
the General enough time to confer with Chiang Kai-shek.239  
This proposal by the German side came at a time when it was almost 
impossible that Chiang would have considered it. As Greig and Diehl (2012, 136) noted, 
mediators initiating a mediation attempt tend to choose the wrong time. In January/ 
February 1942, and despite disappointment over the “Europe first” strategy, Chiang 
Kai-shek fully supported and welcomed the alliance with the Western Allies. Hence, the 
fact that Jahnke did not receive a reply from Chongqing, after his return to Berne in late 
February 1942, is not surprising. Instead Jahnke was forced to return to Germany, with 
the hope of receiving Chongqing’s approval, therefore confirming that he had the 
support of Hitler’s inner circle.240   
 
 Even though it is highly unlikely that Chiang even considered the RSHA’s 
proposal, mere communication between Chongqing and Nazi-Germany would have 
met with consternation from the Allies, on whose aramament supplies Chiang Kai-shek 
depended for victory. Hence, the discovery of this clandestine back channel was out of 
the question. Gui’s information exchange and discussion with Chiang Kai-shek took 
place under strict secrecy, precisely because the existence of this back channel had to 
be hidden from the Allied powers.  
Chiang Kai-shek therefore briefed Gui on communication guidelines in March 
1942. In order to prevent the disclosure of Jahnke’s existence, Chiang Kai-shek 
ordered Gui not to use the old code book to encrypt the telegrams. Instead, he was told 
to cooperate with Qi Jun, who in March 1942 was on his way to Switzerland. In the 
                                               
239 AH, “Geguo gingbao (Intelligence reports from various countries (3)”, ”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number:  002000001306A, 
p.57. 
240 AH, “Dui Ying Fa De Yi guanxi (Material on relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy (5)”, “Jiang 
Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-090103-00015-001, Entry 
Number: 002000002104A. Given Jahnke’s work in the RSHA, these cadres are likely Walter Schellenberg, 
Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich. 
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future, Qi’s codes were to be used to encrypt telegrams, and each code would only be 
valid once.241 These safety measures were implemented for a good reason, because 
Switzerland had become the “centre” of various intelligence services during WWII. 
Different intelligence organisations (Allies and Axis) spied together, but also against 
each other in this neutral European state. The British National Archive revealed 
documents that showed that Chinese transmissions were likely intercepted by the 
British.242 As a result, Chiang Kai-shek’s fear of intelligence leaks in Switzerland (during 
the transmission of telegrams) as well as in the Allied-friendly quarters of Chongqing 
was very real. The disclosure of this clandestine back channel would have had serious 
repercussions for Chongqing China from the Allies.  
  
 On the Third Reich’s’ side, the war in East Asia was important, due to the fact 
that it had the potential to derail British and US war efforts, in particular if British India 
was under threat. The content of Gui’s and Jahnke’s discussions therefore also 
touched upon German proposals for a Sino-German alliance directed against British 
India (Liang, 1978, 164).243 Significantly, Chiang Kai-shek had just visited British India a 
few months before in February 1942, in a bid to convince Congress leaders Mahatma 
Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru to support the British fight against the Third Reich. 
Chiang’s pleas fell on deaf ears, and he failed to gain Gandhi’s support (Tyson Li, 2006, 
174).   
 The findings made in Taiwan already highlight the foreign policy content of the 
“Berlin-Chiang Channel” communication, and can be further substantiated and 
explored if linked with German sources. Until now, I have presented mainly the 
Chinese perspective of events. On the side of the RSHA, Walter Schellenberg recalled 
                                               
241 AH, “Jiao nigao jian – minguo sanshiyi nian sanyue zhi minguo sanshiyi nian liuyue (Relations Draft- 
March – July in the Year 31 of the Republic)”, ”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong”,  Guoshiguancang,  
Document Number: 002-070200-00014-026, Entry Number: 002000000922A. The code Gui is asked to 
use is actually that of Qi Jun, but it should only be used once. 
242 TNA, HW 1/1620, Signals intelligence passed to the Prime Minister, messages and correspondence; on 
17 April 1943 the Chinese embassy in Berne informed the Foreign Office in Chongqing that the Third 
Reich had requested the right to cross through Switzerland, if the Allied forces were to land in either 
Southern France or Italy in later years.  
243 Dossier, “Gen Kwei Yun Chin,“, Federal Archive Berne, EPD 1943/45, quoted in Liang (1978), p.164. 
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the content of the clandestine Sino-German back channel. Jahnke’s contacts in 
Switzerland included Hu Shize, Gui Yongqing’s predecessor, who was sent to the US 
upon Gui’s arrival, where he worked together with T.V. Soong (Hoo, 1998, 64-65).244 
Gui was very likely the contact Schellenberg (1956b, 302-303) described as being a 
close acquaintance of Jahnke, and a member of the Chinese Secret Service. This (in 
the memoirs) unnamed figure apparently reported to Jahnke Chiang Kai-shek’s hopes 
that “pro-Chinese groups” in Germany would be able to influence Hitler to press for a 
Chinese-Japanese “compromise peace” (Schellenberg, 1956b, 303). One of a few 
scholars, Ratenhof (1987, 532), pointed out that connections between Chongqing 
China and the Third Reich increasingly used intelligence channels.  
The prospect of a Sino-Japanese peace agreement had been eagerly pursued 
by the German side, which meant that a Chinese approach for German mediation 
between China and Japan was met with interest in Nazi circles. According to 
Schellenberg (1956a, 233), Jahnke was approached by the Chinese Secret Service via 
Gui and Hu Shize. Contrary to Schellenberg’s recollection, Gui was likely the only 
higher representative who approached Jahnke, due to the fact that Hu Shize had 
already left Switzerland by September 1941 (Hoo, 1998, 65).  
 Initially, the plan for German mediation was to announce this proposal to Japan 
by the Third Reich, by using the influential Chinadeutschen (lit. translation: China 
Germans).245 The Chinese Secret Service was keen to portray the image that this 
proposal originated with the Third Reich, as this would have minimised any negative 
backlash had these negotiations ever become public knowledge. In exchange for 
German mediation, the Chinese Secret Service proposed to enter into cooperation with 
its German equivalent. Such a move would have been beneficial for the Third Reich, as 
China had direct access to Whitehall and the Kremlin (Schellenberg, 1956b, 303). 
                                               
244 For the reference for Jahnke’s connection to Hu Shize see: IfZ, ED90, Band 1-7, Schellenberg, Walter. 
SS-Gruf. Memoiren, 1939-1944; Volume 5, p.629.  
245 “Chinadeutschen” may refer to influential merchants that dominated German East Asian trade for a long 
time. Hans Klein for example was such a person.  
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 Initially, before any negotiations started, the matter was discussed internally 
between Himmler and Heydrich, who then submitted the proposal to Hitler. Foreign 
Minister von Ribbentrop was left out due to his anticipated lack of support. Hitler was 
apparently very interested in this proposal and acknowledged the trustworthiness of 
Chiang Kai-shek (Schellenberg, 1956a, 234). Himmler was then authorised to follow up 
the Chinese offer, without involving the German Foreign Office and von Ribbentrop. 
Negotiations were to take place only between the Chinese and the German Secret 
Service (Schellenberg, 1956b, 304). Von Ribbentrop still became involved at a later 
stage, as Hitler apparently informed the Foreign Minister of the talks, despite the 
agreement with Himmler not to do so (Schellenberg, 1956a, 234). Von Ribbentrop thus 
became part of the negotiation channel, as he apparently discussed the information 
Jahnke received in Berne with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Berlin 
(Schellenberg, 1956a, 234).246  
The process of diplomacy through back channels in this case involved Jahnke 
as the individual who travelled between Berlin (where the Japanese embassy was 
based) and Berne (where Gui Yongqing was based). Negotiations started a few 
months after the initial proposal was forwarded to Hitler and the Japanese. The 
Japanese side wished to know details of Chinese demands, which were, as had been 
the case before, too high and difficult to forward. These demands obviously touched 
upon territorial issues, for example, Chiang Kai-shek chose as a basis for further 
negotiations the withdrawal of all Japanese troops, the return of all Chinese ports, and 
only in some port cities would Japan receive special treatment (Schellenberg, 1956a, 
235). These ports could range from a number of places, but would surely include 
Shanghai, China’s financial hub. The demands of the initial Chinese response which 
were considered too difficult were “toned down,…, considerably” by Jahnke, who had 
                                               
246 Another narration of these events by Doerries (2003, 95) reads: “The conversations were vigorously 
pursued for some three months on the basis of a possible mediation by Germany between the two 
countries which Koursi put forward would be agreeable to the Generalissimo. This information 
Schellenberg passed to Himmler, but the latter refused to take any action as first he believed that it was a 
matter for Hitler’s personal consideration and secondly he acknowledged that it was a question exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of Ribbentrop. In the meantime Jahnke had kept in touch with Koursi who was in turn 
in radio contact with Chiang Kai-Shek.“ 
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been granted the right (by the Chinese government) to amend certain points 
(Schellenberg, 1956b, 305). 247 Such a right of amendment is evidence of the trust that 
the Chinese side (including Chiang Kai-shek) must have placed in Jahnke. On the 
other hand, he was probably the best representative who could take part in the 
negotiations, since Gui was unable to travel to Germany, as both countries were 
nominally enemies. In the course of negotiations, Jahnke, in cooperation with 
Schellenberg, decided to send an envoy to Chiang Kai-shek in person, as some of the 
Japanese questions were too delicate to discuss via telegram (Schellenberg, 1956b, 
305). The German activity, however, did not bring forth any peace agreement or 
ceasefire between Chongqing China and Japan, as the Japanese side lost interest in 
the mediation attempt in September 1942 (Schellenberg, 1956b, 305).  
Scholars familiar with other wartime mediation attempts between Chongqing 
China and Japan may feel reminded of the events surrounding attempts such as 
Operation Kiri or Operation Qian (Ch’ien). As mentioned beforehand it is impossible to 
verify whether this mediation was indeed honestly considered or merely an attempt to 
stall Japanese advances. Considering that other direct mediation attempts between 
Chiang Kai-shek and Japan had been used to undermine the position of the Wang 
Jingwei Collaborationist government in Nanjing, it is likely that this specific attempt 
using Nazi Germany did not carry any significance for China’s relationship with the 
Allies.248 Moreover, given that Chiang Kai-shek’s demands on Japan in this mediation 
attempt would have been unacceptable to the Japanese, we might speculate that this 
channel never had a chance to actually succeed. The Schellenberg memoirs do not 
provide any indication on whether or not the Chinese proposal was genuine. However, 
from the activities of the German side, it appears that the proposal was at least 
perceived as being genuine. 
                                               
247 IfZ, ED90, “Schellenberg, Walter SS-Gruf. Memoiren 1939-1944“, Volume 4, p.630. 
248 Indeed, Wang Jingwei’s Collaborationist government suffered under the continuous involvement of 
Chongqing. For example, the official announcement of the government had been postponed several times, 
because Japan preferred to pursue peace with Chiang Kai-shek (Boyle, 1972, 301). 
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 This new clandestine back channel matches many of the descriptions applied 
by Wanis-St. John (2006) and Ò Dorchtaraigh (2011), such as two states in conflict, 
with a mediator approved by both sides. In contrast to the Oslo negotiations, however, 
Japanese and Chinese individuals did not meet, but had Jahnke travel between Berlin 
and neutral Berne to deliver information. Furthermore, the mediator (the Third Reich) 
can hardly be called neutral, due to the fact that she and Japan were nominally at war 
with Chongqing China. Considering Bercovitch’s theory that the approach by the 
parties and the context of the mediation are, amongst other factors, important for the 
success of any mediaton attempt, it is evident that this specific mediation attempt 
between China and Japan had a high chance of failure (Bercovitch, 2011, 7-8). The 
territorial nature of the Sino-Japanese conflict played a major role in hampering this 
meditation effort, as the demands of Chiang Kai-shek all touched upon territorial 
questions. The lack of neutrality would have been an important issue in BCD theory, 
but has been identified as less important as long as the mediator is able “to influence, 
protect or extend the interests of each party in conflict” (Bercovitch and Houston, 2011, 
45).249 However, the lack of direct meetings between the agents and the possibility that 
the mediation proposal was not genuine would have undermined any mediation efforts. 
The effect of infighting on either side of the conflict is impossible to assess at this stage, 
as the archival material does not provide information on that. The nature of this special 
back channel and possible questions that it raises will be further discussed and 
analysed in Chapter Seven.  
The implications of this failed mediation attempt had a far greater impact on the 
German side than on the Chinese one. Nazi-German plans to influence the cause of 
war and derail Allied war efforts in the Pacific or Siberia failed, and “Berlin” failed to 
gain access to strategic resources in China. If it is considered that Chiang Kai-shek 
was unlikely to agree to a German mediated peace and give up his alliance with US, 
then there were no negative implications for Chongqing China as a result of this failed 
                                               
249 Bercovitch and Houston (2011, 45), quote: Faure (1989); Kressel and Pruitt, 1985; Smith, 1985; Touval, 
1985; Touval and Zartman, 1985. 
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mediation attempt. Rather, Chongqing succeeded in keeping all channels open and 
interest in China alive. Interestingly, however, the existence of these mediation 
attempts as well as the communication channels with Germany were kept secret.  
 
The back channel between “Berlin”, Chiang Kai-shek and Japan is only one 
example of the extensive use of clandestine mediation attempts by all three sides. The 
experience with Operation Kiri and other peace negotiation attempts between 
Chongqing and Japan may have undermined any mediation attempts by the German 
side. Despite being approached by “Berlin”, Japan did not appear to take these 
mediation attempts very seriously, but showed more enthusiasm for their own 
mediation attempt between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich, which took place at 
roughly the same time as the Sino-Japanese mediation between March and September 
1942. Japan initiated these talks, since she feared that the Soviet war machine would 
sooner or later be able to stop the German advancement, and drive the Wehrmacht 
westwards (Schellenberg, 1956b, 299/300). Rumours intercepted by the British 
intelligence service shed more light on this topic. The negotiations brokered by Japan 
would have seen the Third Reich and the Soviet Union divide and respect their 
respective spheres of influence. In the case of the Third Reich, the Soviet Union was 
meant to accept the German exploitation of Ukraine, while the Soviet Union’s power in 
Asia and Iran was secured.250  
A mediated peace with the Soviet Union, however, did not gain Hitler’s support, 
in particular after von Ribbentrop learned of this, and similar initiatives, through a 
Japanese approach to the Third Reich via the German Naval Attaché in Tokyo, and 
succeeded in convincing Hitler not to go ahead (Schellenberg, 1956b, 301). The 
                                               
250 TNA, HW 12/277, intelligence report No. 105643 from 12 June 1942. The Turkish minister in Lisbon 
informed the Turkish ambassador in Rome of these events.  
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existence of this Japanese initiative likely resulted in the slow start of the German 
mediation via the “Berlin-Chiang Channel”.251  
 Evidently, German Nazi groups attached importance to the clandestine Chinese 
communication channel, and Jahnke continued to meet with Gui in October 1942, even 
after the above mentioned BCD attempt failed. Gestapo chief Himmler and 
Reichsmarschall Göring had been ordered by Hitler to take up the discussion of post-
war Sino-German cooperation, likely in the belief that Nazi Germany was still going to 
win the war. In order to facilitate these plans, the “German government prepared to 
obtain official relations with the Chinese one [Chongqing]” and asked for “both sides to 
secretly appoint official envoys”.252   
The information flowing through the channel from Gui to Chiang Kai-shek did 
not only contain German proposals for cooperation, but also facts on developments 
inside Germany and the war.  For example, Jahnke seemed to have had more private 
conversations with Gui, during which Jahnke asked for the latter’s opinion on Germany 
and her military strategy (March 1943). In the same discussion, Jahnke also 
complained that it was becoming increasingly difficult to settle a peace agreement. He 
further informed Gui, and subsequently Chiang Kai-shek, about internal frictions and 
the plans of single Nazis to topple Hitler and to seek a compromise with the Soviet 
Union.253 Jahnke’s close ties with the RSHA and Schellenberg put him close to a circle 
of Nazis that “had been looking to desert the severely listing Nazi ship of state for some 
time already” (Hassel, MacRae and Ameskamp, 2006, 196), and, in Gui’s words, that 
worked toward the establishment of a military government in Germany. 254  The 
                                               
251 Despite the Japanese hesitation to use the “Berlin-Chiang Channel” for mediation, German intelligence 
reported that Japan attempted to form an “Asian Block” in August 1943. This block would include the 
Soviet Union and China; and also included the termination of Axis treaties. For reference see: TNA (PRO) 
GFM 33/2726, German Foreign Office Files, Serial 6524 (E487437-E487444); “Von Der Chef der 
Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Berlin, 12 August 1943, An das Auswärtige Amt, z. Hd. Herrn Leg. Rat 
Wagner” (From the Chief of Security Police and the SD, 12 August 1943, to the Foreign Office, to the hand 
of Mr Legate Wagner). The Swiss entrepreneur informed the SD-agent of Japan’s intentions. 
252  AH, “Geguo qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)”,”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.63, Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek, Berne, 22 October 1942. 
253 Ibid., p.77. 
254 Ibid., p.78. There exists speculation that Schellenberg attempted to convince Himmler to seek a peace 
deal with the Allies, in particular in 1944 (Wistrich, 1995, 222). 
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existence of these peace feelers had been known to the Western Allies, and mediation 
took place, for example, through the Swedish Count Bernadotte. However, research on 
Himmler’s peace feelers has so far failed to highlight that Chongqing China was as 
much aware of these peace efforts as was the US and Britain.  
Himmler and his associates, amongst others Schellenberg, tried to seek a 
separate peace arrangement with the Allies, and would secretly approach Britain after 
the establishment of a new German government, according to Jahnke in March 
1943.255 In the international community rumours of such peace feelers between Britain 
and German groups already existed, and caused discomfort in Japan. Even though 
these rumours were regarded as enemy propaganda, they were not rejected outright. 
Hence Foreign Minister Togo ordered the Japanese ambassador to Berlin to inform 
him immediately of any information on this matter. 256  The ambassador indeed 
investigated the rumours and reported back that “…it is beginning clearly to look at first 
sight as if high quarters are involved [sic.]”, however, the approval of the German 
government in this matter was not known; rather, the ambassador speculated that a 
faction inside the Third Reich independently pursued this matter.257 
With a German defeat increasingly obvious by 1944, the maintenance of the 
“Berlin-Chiang Channel” was not important anymore. Gui Yongqing’s appointment as 
military attaché to Britain in late 1944 speaks of the end of this communication channel. 
Any information coming from “Berlin” would not have had any importance, especially 
since the Allies were about to win the war. Jahnke’s attempts to influence the war did 
not stop here; he attempted to arrange for peace talks with the Allies in 1944 by 
sending his secretary Carl Marcus across enemy lines in France.  
The diminishing “star” of his mentor naturally had an influence on Marcus, who 
was not able to avoid military service anymore (Schlie, 2001, 106). Marcus defected to 
                                               
255  AH, “Geguo qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries (3)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu“, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.77. 
256 TNA HW 12/277, intelligence document no. 105506.  
257 TNA HW 12/277, intelligence report No. 105588. 11 June 1942, Foreign Office Tokyo to Japanese 
ambassador in Berlin.  
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the Allies at the Western Front; but Schlie (2001, 107) argues that he merely used the 
name of Jahnke and a peace proposal to gain access to the Allies. Marcus was 
captured by French soldiers and kept in Paris. In Paris on 12 December 1944, Marcus 
received surprising support from Gui Yongqing, who informed the British Secret 
Service of Marcus’s captivity in Paris. 258  Gui interpreted Marcus’ mission as very 
important, and, as archival material reveals, only delivered the news of Marcus’ 
captivity to leading members of the British Secret Service.259 In a telegram to Chiang 
Kai-shek, Gui informed the Generalissimo of the events and confirmed that Marcus 
was sent by Jahnke.260 As a reason for his mission, Marcus stated that he wanted the 
Allies to know about the real situation inside the Third Reich and that Jahnke wanted to 
get into contact with so-called “Vansittart Bureau”.261 Jahnke’s goal was to “find a way 
whereby the war could end more quickly so that they could build up a government in 
Germany which would bring Germany back into the concert of all the powers in 
Europe”.262 Contact was not established, one reason being the Allies’ doubts regarding 
Marcus’s story and credibility. At this point the communication between “Berlin” and 
Chiang Kai-shek appears to have ended, since neither could be of any further use to 
the other.  
 
 On the last few pages above, I outlined the findings on the “Berlin-Chiang 
Channel” from the Academia Historica archives and the German sources. Certain facts 
can be established that are new to our understanding of Sino-German relations. 
Diplomatic communication between Chongqing China and the Third Reich did not end 
                                               
258 TNA (PRO) KV2/755, 27January 1945; It is reported that Marcus was not allowed by the French to 
contact the British. Only with the help of Gui was he able to do so. 
259 TNA (PRO) WO 208/483, Kwei Yung Chin; 11 December 1944, From Military Attache Berne to M.I. 3.  
260 AH “Dui Ying Fa De Yi guanxi (Material on foreign relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy) (6)”, 
“Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-090103-00016-192, 
Entry Number: 002000002105A. 
261 TNA (PRO) KV2/755, 30 December 1944; Marcus is giving information on Jahnke while in French 
captivity. The “Vansittart Bureau“refers to Robert Vansittart, who shaped British foreign policy during the 
1930s as Permanent Undersecretary of State (Ferris, 2005, 45). Upon his appointment as Permanent 
Undersecretary of State, Vansittart “oversaw all of Britain’s official sources of overseas intelligence and 
directected all of its secret ones” (Ferris, 2005, 48). 
262 TNA (PRO) KV2/755, 30 December 1944; Marcus is giving information on Jahnke while in French 
captivity. 
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in July 1941, but both sides were motivated by different objectives to communicate with 
each other. Chinese circles, such as the Chinese Secret Service and Chiang Kai-shek 
maintained open a line of communication to “Berlin” through which, on the one hand, 
they could keep interest in Chongqing China alive and gather intelligence. Interestingly, 
this connection still existed at a time when Chongqing China was already allied with the 
Western Allies. If we consider the pragmatic nature of Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy, 
the existence of the Sino-German back channels should not surprise us. Ideology 
certainly did not play a large role in Chinese foreign policy approaches, as Nationalist 
China’s switch from one main partner and arms supplier to the next between 1938 and 
1941 shows. Given the fact that even in the alliance with the Allies each party thought 
about their own respective objectives, it was only logical to maintain connections to all 
sides in the war. The Third Reich also hoped to profit from new Sino-German relations, 
as I would argue that a separate Sino-Japanese peace would have freed hundreds of 
thousands of Japanese soldiers, and opened the Free China market to Germany. 
 
Qi and the German Resistance: honest support or a “foot in the door”?  
 What kind of objectives was Chiang Kai-shek pursuing by cooperating with the 
German Resistance? As I mentioned in the literature review, the possibility of 
connections between the Chinese Generalissimo and the German movement is hard to 
comprehend by some (e.g. critiques of Yang, 2010b). The possible Chinese objectives 
of these clandestine connections are clear, especially if one reflects on how such a 
communication channel would actually be of use to Chiang Kai-shek and China.  
Based on the archival research I carried out in the course of this dissertation, I 
would argue that Chiang Kai-shek indeed knew about and supported the German 
Resistance. Both sides may even have been driven by objectives that complemented 
each other. In line with the pragmatic foreign policy approach that had characterised 
late 1930s and early 1940s foreign policy, Qi’s appointment to Berne as a middleman 
between Chiang and the Resistance can be seen as “keeping a foot in the door” of 
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Sino-German relations. Whether Chiang Kai-shek actually believed that the movement 
had any chance for success is unclear. However, we know that Chiang had good 
connections to some of the movemen’s members, such as Falkenhausen and Schacht. 
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the movement are possible. Moreover, as will be shown below, the “Resistance-Chiang 
Channel” allowed Chiang Kai-shek to raise China’s profile internationally.  
The Resistance Movement, on the other hand, approached Chiang Kai-shek for 
the foreign support the other Western Allied powers had denied it. By appealing to 
Chiang Kai-shek’s excellent relations with several Resistance members (Schacht, 
Thomas, and Falkenhausen), the German Resistance movement hoped to tone down 
Allied demands for unconditional surrender. An end to the war in Europe was one of 
the Resistance’s motivations, but not to similar conditions as in 1919 (Hoffmann, 1986, 
6).  
The information in this dissertation points towards the initiation of another BCD 
attempt, this time with Chongqing China in the role of the mediator between the 
German Resistance and the Western Allies. This was one of the first times that 
Nationalist China had been called upon to act in the role of mediator between major 
powers and a European political group. 
In this section of the chapter, I will present information from around the time of 
July 1941, when Germany and Chongqing China ended official diplomatic relations. 
The records of meetings that took place at that time are stored in Academia Historica, 
and are further supported by German archival records and Qi’s Swiss reports from 
1943.  
In 1941, the German Resistance had tried several times to gain support from 
the British and US governments through direct channels to leading individuals in both 
countries and through Pope Pius XII, but none of these advances succeeded 
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(Hoffmann, 1991, 447). 263  I agree with Deutsch (1981, 327), who criticised the 
perception that the Resistance movement aimed its efforts solely at the London 
government. The Western academic focus on Resistance peace feelers to the Western 
Allies excludes the option of connections to other foreign governments. The good 
relations that men such as Schacht and Falkenhausen enjoyed in China should be 
taken into account as much as their connections to European or American individuals.  
This dissertation shows that Resistance members who had been instrumental in 
1930s Sino-German relations, such as Schacht and Thomas, approached Qi in Berlin. 
There are two possibilities that explain how Qi got into contact with them: either Lin 
Qiusheng introduced Qi to the German group, or these individuals approached Qi 
independently. In either case, the approach of foreign representatives very likely had 
the backing of the highest Resistance movement leaders, General Kurt Beck and Karl 
Goerdeler (Klemperer, 1981, 351-352).   
The content of Qi’s report, covering June/July 1941, clearly shows that the 
Resistance movement approached Chiang to serve as a mediator between them and 
the Roosevelt administration in Washington (Yang, 2010b, 7).264 Hopes were high that 
Chiang Kai-shek would help the German Resistance to inform Roosevelt and Churchill 
that there “exist a strong and influential number of people who prepare to change the 
current political situation [in Germany]”.265 In Schacht’s opinion, the only statesman 
suitable to represent Germany (the German Resistance) in discussion with the Allies 
was Chiang Kai-shek.266 The Resistance members’ idea for this BCD attempt was to 
have Chiang Kai-shek send T.V. Soong to Washington. Soong would then establish 
contact with President Roosevelt and forward the position of the German 
                                               
263 Multiple reasons existed for the failure of Resistance-Allied cooperation, amongst others, mistrust on 
the British side, and the fact that the Resistance could not accept a declaration of unconditional surrender. 
For more information see: Hoffmann (1991).  
264  Archival material in Academia Historica also supports this argument. AH, “Dui Deguo waijio (On 
German Foreign Relations) (6)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document 
Number: 002-080106-00060-008, Entry number: 002000001283A, p.40.  
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid.   
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Resistance.267 In these discussions, Qi was neither negative nor supportive; rather he 
tried to assert the Resistance’s motifs and plans. His questions focused on how China 
would benefit from lending support to the Resistance movement, thus reflecting the 
mind set of Chiang Kai-shek and his circle in this relationship. If China was to suffer 
from a relationship with the Resistance movement, the relations might have been cut 
off.  
The end of Sino-German relations in July 1941 presented Qi with the chance to 
travel back to Chongqing and to inform Chiang Kai-shek personally. Aware of the recall 
of the embassy staff, Resistance members, such as Schacht, prepared personal pleas 
to Chiang, in which they hoped that Chiang Kai-shek would be able to propose a peace 
deal good enough for all sides in the conflict (Britain, the US and Germany) to accept 
(Hoo, 1998, 62-63). The German Resistance also asked Chiang Kai-shek to send Qi 
Jun back to Europe to serve as a contact between Chiang and the movement (Yang, 
2010b, 8). Following the Germans’ plea, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Qi as Economic 
attaché to the Berne legation in January 1942, where he arrived in March of the same 
year. Chiang Kai-shek marked these events in his diary with the words: “Support for the 
German anti-[Hitler] movement is under way” and “sent Qi Jun to Switzerland” (Yang, 
2010b, 4). 268  The back channel that started with Qi’s meetings with Schacht and 
Thomas would take on wider aspects and continue after Qi’s arrival in Switzerland.  
That the appointment of Qi occurred under the umbrella of support for the 
German Resistance was missed by British observers, who described Qi as a 
“henchman” of Zhu Jiahua, the leader of the German-friendly clique in Chongqing.269 
Ambassador Horace Seymour concluded that this information indicated “the Chinese 
have kept open the pipe-line to Berlin through Berne”,270 a development termed as 
                                               
267 Ibid. 
268 “Jiang Jieshi Diary” Script, 10, 11, and 14 January 1942, Hoover Archive, quoted in Yang (2010b, 4). 
269 British Library, India Office Record (IOR), L/ P&S/ 12/ 2293, China, Sino-British Relations File 15, Sep 
36-April 46. Telegram sent from Chongqing to the Government of India, Supply Dept. to Secretary of State 
for India. Calcutta 20 March 1942. 
270 British Library, (IOR), L/ P&S/ 12/ 2293, China, Sino-British Relations File 15, Sep 36-April 46.  From 
Chungking to Foreign Office, from Sir H. Seymour. April 2 1942. 
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
159 
 
“disturbing” by the British secretary of state and the undersecretary of state.271 Despite 
the anticipation of a clandestine Berlin-Chiang “pipe-line” there are no indications that 
Chongqing China suffered any implications such as a public denunciation or a break of 
relations, thus underscoring the importance of China for the Allied war strategy. 
 
Intelligence Connections in Switzerland 
The presence of a Chinese informant enabled Chiang Kai-shek to receive the 
same information on the German Resistance and developments in Germany as the 
Washington administration received from its own agent: Allen Welsh Dulles. This was 
possible due to the fact that Qi very likely established contact with Resistance member 
Hans Bernd Gisevius, who had been recommended to him by Schacht and Thomas.272 
I argue that this was very likely the case, because meetings between Qi and Gisevius 
were not recorded. Gisevius, however, was in repeated contact with Chiang Kai-shek’s 
agent Gui Yongqing. On several occasions in 1942 (for example in October 1942) 
Gisevius and Gui discussed matters of the German Resistance, its plans to oust the 
Nazi government and to immediately initiate peace talks. The plan included sealing an 
armistice with the Soviet Union as soon as possible, so that China, Russia, Britain and 
the US could deal with Japan.273 Gisevius was therefore aware of the Chinese agents 
in Switzerland, and if he knew Gui it is equally likely he was an acquaintance of Qi as 
well.  
In post-war British, German and Swiss records on Gisevius there is no mention 
of any Chinese contacts in Switzerland. Only the Taiwanese archival material mentions 
this fact. In his post-war memoirs, Gisevius also refrains from mentioning anything on 
China, except for the Nuremberg Trials, where he mentioned the general Chinese-
                                               
271  British Library, (IOR), L/ P&S/ 12/ 2293, China, Sino-British Relations File 15, Sep 36-April 46.  
Attached to the telegrams concerning Qi Jun is an internal note, signed and annotated by the secretary of 
state, as well as the undersecretary of state. 
272 AH “Dui Deguo waijiao (On German foreign relations) (6)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu”, 
Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080106-00060-008, Entry Number: 002000001283A, p.48.  
273  AH, “Geguo qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)”,”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A. 
p.62. 
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friendly stand of the Resistance members.274 It becomes evident that China did not play 
a major role in the post-war perception of US and European individuals.  
Throughout Qi’s time as Chiang Kai-shek’s contact to the German Resistance, 
he kept the Generalissimo up to date about the Resistance’s movements. Evidence on 
what Chiang Kai-shek did with this information is scant. However, archival files reveal 
that the Washington administration had been informed about Chiang’s clandestine 
communications. Indeed, Chiang Kai-shek noted in his diary that he planned to “tell 
Roosevelt about the German army resistance movement plans…” (Yang, 2010b, 4).275 
On two documented occasions, in June 1942276 and December 1943,277 Qi informed 
Chiang Kai-shek on the ever-growing split between Hitler and leading military 
officers,278 while Qi pointed out in December 1943 that the German army would be 
essential to carrying out any kind of coup, and indeed wanted to do so. The only issue 
that would hinder the army to carry out such action was the Allied demand for 
unconditional surrender.279  
 
Even before the arrival of US spy Allen Welsh Dulles in Switzerland in 
November 1942, Chiang Kai-shek had established a good working connection with 
German Resistance members and sympathisers. 280  The German contacts that 
supported Qi’s work in Switzerland were Hans Klein, and, as I argue, Gisevius. Klein 
has never been identified as a Resistance member, but I would argue that he remained 
sympathetic to Chongqing China, and was involved in the clandestine “German 
Resistance-Chiang Channel” communications from the beginning. The evidence for 
                                               
274  Nuremberg Process, Day 114, Afternoon Session: Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal (1947, 223). Furthermore, papers of Resistance movement leader Goerdeler 
reflect the positive position of the movement toward China. Goerdeler stated that the movement has 
always respected China and believed the War of Resistance to be justified (BArch, NS/6(Attentat auf Hitler. 
August 1944-24 August 1944)/9.  
275 “Jiang Jieshi Diary” Script，10, 11, and 14 January 1942, Hoover Archive, quoted in Yang (2010b, 4). 
276 AH, “Geguo qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)”, ”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.14. According to Qi, the split between Hitler and the Generals came over the war progress and strategies. 
277 Ibid., p.37. 
278 Ibid., p.14. 
279 Ibid., p.37. 
280 Dulles arrived in Switzerland on 8 November 1942. For more information on Dulles’ work in Switzerland 
see: Petersen (1996). 
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this assumption is found in Qi Jun’s November 1941 report to Chiang Kai-shek, in 
which Resistance members Schacht and Thomas ask Qi Jun to work together with 
Klein and Gisevius in Switzerland.281 
Contemporary witness Hu Shizu mentioned in his diary a meeting with Klein in 
summer 1941 in Switzerland, during which the latter showed knowledge of Qi’s journey 
to China, and the German Resistance’s request for mediation (Hoo, 1998, 62-63). That 
Klein had contact with Chinese embassy staff is no surprise, as he had been appointed 
as Chinese honorary consul on 1 August 1940, long before the end of Sino-German 
relations (Liang, 1978, 114).282 Klein was able to serve as an honorary consul of China, 
because he held both German and Chinese citizenship, and had received this post 
because of his good relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. 283  However, Qi stated in 
February 1945 that Klein had received the post because of his economic merits for 
China.284 Apart from his work with Qi, Klein also worked together with a Chinese by the 
name Lo-Ta-Kang since 16 July 1942, who in 1944 had been confirmed to be a 
secretary of the Chinese consulate.285  
Klein’s role in this back channel and possible connections to the German 
Resistance are difficult to establish. The connection between Klein and prominent 
Resistance members such as Schacht and Thomas has been established already by 
the archival material presented in this dissertation. Despite the excellent connections 
Klein enjoyed in higher Nazi echelons in the early 1930s, this had changed by the time 
                                               
281 AH, “Dui Deguo waijiao (On German foreign relations) (6)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu, 
Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080106-00060-008, Entry Number: 002000001283A, p.48. 
282 Liang (1978,114) is citing: Interviews, Lily Abegg, Robert Chi in this sentence. For reference on the time 
Klein was appointed Honorary Consul see: CH-BAR#E4320B#1984/29#652*. The position of an honorary 
consul does not provide the same priviliges as a regular, non-honorary position. As Berridge and James 
(2001, 116) noted: “An honorary officer performs consular functions, and he/she is permanently resident in 
the receiving state. An honorary consul is not a member of the sending state’s diplomatic service”.  
283 Swiss sources recalled that Klein gained this post because he was a personal friend of Chiang Kai-
shek. For reference see: CH-BAR#E4320B#1984/29#652*, Dossier Hans Klein. Inspektor Ulrich, Berne, 
14 February 1945. On Klein‘s Chinese citizenship please see: Ibid. Bundesanwaltschaft Polizeidienst an 
Politisches Department (Federal Prosecutors Office, Police service, to the Political Department), 7 January 
1950.  
284Ibid. Inspector Ulrich (probably) met Qi Jun on 21 February 1945. The Swiss authorities first learned 
about Klein’s position as an Honorary Consul because he had put up sign at his house that informed 
visitors of his position amongst the Chinese embassy staff. During Ulrich’s meeting with Qi Jun on 21 
February 1945, it emerged that Klein already worked on post-war economic cooperation between China 
and Switzerland, and China and Germany. This may be one reason why Klein was still in contact with the 
Economic Legate Qi.  
285 CH-BAR#E2001E#1967/113#3183*; contains the dossier on Klein, Hans, Honorary Consul, Lucerne. 
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WWII broke out. According to Swiss records, Klein had a fall out with Göring shortly 
before the war, and settled in Switzerland.286 According to Qi, this exile of Klein in 
Switzerland highlighted that Klein was not a Nazi.287  
Further support for Qi came in the fact that Klein let him stay at his house in 
Switzerland.288  The Swiss archival material reveals that even though Qi had been 
appointed to the Chinese consulate in Berne, he had asked to receive an authorisation 
of residence for Klein’s villa in Meggen in June 1942.289 The town of Meggen is not part 
of the Canton Berne, but of the Canton Lucerne that borders the Canton Berne. Travel 
between the two places may not have taken too much time considering the situation in 
1942-1945, but may have been a reason for the fact that Qi and Gui did not meet often, 
as reported by Gui in August 1943. 290  Initially, Qi asked for an authorisation of 
residence for a year, but records show that even after the end of WWII, Qi still spent 
much of his time in Meggen and had his post redirected to this location.291  
This connection between Klein and Qi was known to the German Secret 
Service Abwehr that interviewed Klein at the end of January 1944. The interviewing 
agent, listed simply as “A.F.”, was a Hungarian national and a “researcher” in Turkey. It 
is not clear whether he worked for the German Resistance arm of the Abwehr, but he 
portrays substantial background knowledge of ideas to topple Hitler, which he 
discussed with Klein, amongst other matters, such as the possible replacement of 
Hitler and international relations.292  
                                               
286  CH-BAR#E4320#1984/29#652*, Dossier Hans Klein. Inspector Ulrich wrote report on information 
gathered by informant M on Klein, 14 February 1945.  
287 CH-BAR#E4320#1984/29#652*, Dossier Hans Klein. Inspector Ulrich (probably) met Qi Jun on 21 
February 1945. 
288  AH, “Geguo Qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)”,”Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu”, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.82. 
289  CH-BAR#E2001E#1967/113#2452*, Chi Robert Tsun, Handelsrat. “Fremdenpolizei des Kantons 
Luzern, 9 Juni 1942 an Eidg. Fremdenpolizei Bern“ (Police responsible for foreigners of Canton Lucerne to 
Police Berne, 9 June 1942). 
290 AH, “Geguo qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu“, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.82, 28 August 1943, report by Gui Yongqing from Berne. 
291 CH-BAR#E4320B#1990/266#6431*, Chi Tsun Robert, 1905. “Eidg. Politische Department Berne, 25 
November 1949“ (Political Department Berne).  
292 BArch R/58(Aussenpolitische Ziele der USA und GB. Insb. Verhaeltnis zur Sowjetunion. Meldungen 
von V-Leuten ueber Aeusserungen von Staatsangehoerigen dieser Laender und neutraler Staaten und 
Pressemeldungen)/1123. (Foreign relations objectives of the US and Britain, especially relations to Soviet 
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The discussion between Klein and A.H. focused mainly on Chongqing China, 
her relations with the Allies, and Chiang Kai-shek’s apparent actions in favour of 
Germany. It is necessary at this point to highlight that it is unclear whether the 
information in this paper constituted actual information coming from Chongqing, or only 
Klein’s Wunschdenken (wishful thinking). Despite these issues, the information Klein 
provides sheds light on the image that Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed in German circles, 
such as the Resistance and the Abwehr. This perception does not necessarily reflect 
the reality of Sino-Allied relations. In general, this image portrays Chiang Kai-shek as 
the most approachable of the Big Four, with German-friendly attitudes and doubts 
about his relations with the Allies.  
In detail, Klein claimed that Chiang Kai-shek’s relationship with the Allies was 
very ambivalent and that the Generalissimo only joined the Allies because Germany 
rejected putting any pressure on Japan in regards to China. Furthermore, Klein argued 
that if Hitler had waited ten more years with his attack on the Soviet Union, then China 
would have served as a willing partner.293 In later years (November 1943), according to 
Klein, Chiang Kai-shek showed German-friendly tendencies, when he rejected a post-
war split of Germany during the Cairo Conference.294  
Klein also believed that Chiang Kai-shek would be willing to serve as a mediator 
between the US and Germany. The fact that Klein then talked about the option that 
Hitler should be removed from office and replaced by H.H. (presumably Heinrich 
Himmler) implies that A.H. may have been working for the RSHA, which had taken over 
Abwehr business by mid-1944 (Schellenberg, 1956, 412). Given Klein’s position as 
                                                                                                                                         
Union. Information collected by informants on statements of citizens of those states, neutral countries and 
press), 4 February 1944, Anlage zu Anlage 1 zu Abwehrstelle im Wehrkreis X „Referat Roland“ Meldung 
über die in Teheran getroffenen russisch-amerikanischen Vereinbarungen bezüglich der sowjetischen 
Haltung im Fernen Osten. (Attachment to Appendix 1 to Abwehroffice in OKW, Information of Russian-US 
negotiations regarding the Soviet position in the Far East). 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid. There are several publications on the Cairo-Conference, the most informative being Sainsbury’s 
(1985) work on the Moscow, Cairo and Tehran Conference. One major hindrance Sainsbury encountered 
is that there exist no minutes from the meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. 
Therefore it is not possible to further substantiate Klein’s claim. 
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
164 
 
Chinese honorary consul and his connections to China, he was likely visited by a 
number of individuals with questions on East Asia.   
There may also exist a link with Dulles in this area, because the original 
rumours about Himmler’s peace feelers originated with Dulles. The peace feelers had 
delivered messages to the Allies signalling willingness to cooperate.295  The information 
subsequently reached Klein via Qi Jun, implying that Qi and Dulles communicated with 
each other. This knowledge, in turn, indicates that a hitherto unknown communication 
line linked Washington and Chongqing through Switzerland. This possibility is further 
underscored by the fact that Qi had been working with Gisevius months before Dulles’ 
arrival in Switzerland in late 1942. Since Gisevius was to be become the most 
important connection between Dulles and the Resistance movment, it is highly likely 
that Qi Jun, as an acquaintance and representative of Chiang Kai-shek, had been 
introduced to Dulles as well.  
According to Klein, Dulles sought him out on several occasions, during which 
the two men discussed issues such as the Atlantic Charter, the planned split of 
Germany into occupation zones, and the question of whether the US should attack 
Japan as soon as possible. The meetings were sometimes brokered by Qi. 296 
Interestingly, similar to the “Berlin-Chiang Channel”, the Swiss archives do not reveal 
anything on a connection between Dulles and Klein, while the role of the latter as 
honorary consul to China was known.  
In summary, the combination of archival documents from Germany and Taiwan 
highlight that the communication channel that Chiang Kai-shek maintained to the 
Resistance and other German individuals in Switzerland still existed in 1944, and had 
indeed included Dulles as well. Despite Qi’s presence in Switzerland and his 
connections to Dulles and Gisevius, it appears that the Resistance movements’ request 
                                               
295 BArch R/58/1123, 4 February 1944, Anlage zu Anlage 1 zur Abwehrstelle im Wehrkreis X “Referat 
Roland”, Meldung ueber die in Teheran getroffenen russisch-amerikanischen Vereinbarungen bezueglich 
der sowjetischen Haltung im Fernen Osten. (Attachementto Appendix 11 to Abwehroffice in OKW, 
Information of Russian-American negotiations regarding the Soviet position in the Far East). 
296 Ibid. 
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for Chiang Kai-shek’s support does not seem to have had any influence on the Allies 
attitude to the movement.  
 
 In general, the issues that hampered this mediation attempt with Chiang Kai-
shek in the role as a mediator may have failed for similar reason as did the “Berlin-
Chiang Channel” attempt. This becomes clear when looking at BCD and mediation 
theory. Factors that had been identified as important by theorists for the success of 
back channel mediation attempts were no present in the Chinese mediation channel 
between the Resistance and the US administration. Hence, it can be argued that the 
mediation attempt had a very high chance to fail right from the beginning.  
 A crucial factor influencing the success of mediaton is timing. Mediation should 
happen when the time is ripe, meaning when both sides realise that a continuation of 
conflict was too costly (Bercovitch, 2011, 137). Hence, both sides would agree to 
mediation taking place, as was the case with Israel and the PLO in 1992. In the 
“Resistance-US” mediation attempt after July 1941, however, this was not the case. 
The one-sided approach came at a time when the Allies had joined forces, and had 
rejected cooperation with the Resistance. Moreover, a mediator was chosen, who, 
despite being a member of the Big Four, had the least amount of influence on Allied 
decision making in regard to Europe. Low-level and middle-level mediators are indeed 
less likely to succeed in mediation than high-level ones (Bercovitch, 2011, 31). Also, 
the perception of the issue of unconditional surrender likely contributed to the failure of 
the mediation attempt. The approach of this issue by the Resistance and Allies was 
incompatible. Another issue was the lack of high-ranking envoys sent by the 
Resistance and the Allies which could help to build trust. Confined by then available 
transportation, and the limited possibility of meeting in a neutral location, efforts were 
hampered. Evidently, these measures may have helped to facilitate cooperation 
between the two sides, because at least Allen Dulles built trust with the Resistance 
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through personal contact and lobbied for them in Washington. His superiors, though, 
were unable to relate in the same way with the Resistance movement.  
 Moreover, from Yang’s research it appears that apart from sending Qi Jun to 
Switzerland and asking T.V. Soong and Soong May-ling to speak to Roosevelt about 
the Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek does not appear to have done much to further raise 
the case of the movement (Yang, 2010b, 13).297 This would raise questions about how 
seriously Chiang took the mediation attempt and whether he considered it to be 
successful. Mediation theory argues that a mediator brings his own agenda to the 
mediation, which clearly influences the mediation approach (Bercovitch, 2011, 5). 
However, the existence or lack of willingness to mediate has so far not been mentioned, 
for the likely reason that any side taking up the role as a mediator does so because it 
wishes to find a solution to a conflict. Hence, the lack of further support indicates that 
the mediation outcome could have been secondary for Chiang Kai-shek. As a result, 
the fact that intelligence on Germany could be gathered, as well as raising China’s 
profile, would appear to be the primary objective of Chiang Kai-shek as a mediator in 
this channel.  
 For the Resistance movement, this situation meant that their attempt to gain 
Allied support through an alternative channel than the ones in Europe had failed, hence 
contributing to the indeciveness over action that characterised the movement’s history.   
 In summary, it emerges that Chiang Kai-shek was more involved in international 
war affairs and events in Europe than earlier studies have anticipated. The connection 
between Chiang and the Resistance also expands our knowledge of the movement’s 
history and foreign connections, by shifting the focus of research from Resistance-US/ 
British relations to those with Chongqing China.  
 
 
 
                                               
297 Yang’s references are not very clear. However, Yang (2010b, 13) quoted the T.V. Soong Papers, 47-2. 
For further information see Yang (2010b, 16).  
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Short summary of major points of this chapter: 
In summary, this chapter sheds new light on hitherto unknown aspects of 
wartime Sino-German relations. It began with information on the pre-war dynamics and 
players in Sino-German relations, who as I argue would later play a role in clandestine 
relations between Chiang Kai-shek and the two German groups.  
I argued and explored how the initial appointment of Gui and Qi reflected an 
internal competition over Chinese foreign policy and the use of special representatives 
by Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing in 1940 and 1941. While the findings do not question 
the fact that Chiang Kai-shek sought an alliance with the Allies, they highlight the 
pragmatic foreign policy in Chongqing, which is reflected by the appointment of Gui and 
Qi. Previous research has presented the extent of US-friendly factions or Japanese-
friendly factions in the government, but failed to achieve the same in regard to a 
German-friendly faction during the war years. This dissertation sheds light on the 
existence and influence of the German-friendly lobby in wartime Chongqing. While 
Chiang Kai-shek had made his decision in favour of an alliance with the US and Britain, 
the chapter shows that communication with Germany did not end with July 1941, but 
continued through clandestine channels until late 1944.  
Not only has this research extended Chiang Kai-shek’s pragmatic foreign policy 
approach to Germany, but also countered previous research that has limited Sino-
German relations to July 1941. The existence of Chiang Kai-shek’s clandestine back 
channels to ”Berlin”, but more surprisingly, also to the German Resistance support this 
theory.   
It emerges that the channel to Chongqing had greater importance for the two 
German groups. Nazi German individuals believed that cooperation with Chiang Kai-
shek and a Sino-Japanese appeasement would aid Germany by releasing great 
numbers of Japanese soldiers from the battle in China. Without considering that 
Chiang Kai-shek would have made a much worse “deal” by accepting Japanese 
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demands than by staying with the Allies, “Berlin” believed that Japan would indeed use 
these troops to support Germany in her attack on the Soviet Union.  
The members of the German Resistance that had been in contact with Chiang 
Kai-shek’s representative Qi Jun hoped to use Chiang’s position to approach the 
Western Allies, who until then had shown hardly any interest in cooperation with the 
Resistance movement. Initially weary of the movement, Chiang Kai-shek, Qi Jun and 
other Chinese Nationalists must have seen the benefit of raising China’s profile with the 
Allies that arose from cooperation with an organisation in the anti-Hitler camp. The 
connection between Qi Jun and Hans Klein sheds further light on the “German 
Resistance-Chiang Channel”, their sympathizers and connections to the US. Several 
facts arising from the Chinese archival material have been proven, such as Chiang Kai-
shek’s willingness to mediate between the Resistance and the US. Other issues 
emerged, such as the connection between the OSS and Qi. Academics knew and 
explored the relations between Dulles and Gisevius, but have never included the 
possibility of Chinese involvement on the side of German Resistance.    
British observers anticipated the existence of a communication “pipe-line” 
between Berlin and Chongqing, but may have only heard rumours about this. I 
mentioned above that these rumours did not have any known implications for 
Chongqing, but may have furthered British mistrust. However, this episode 
underscores the importance of Chongqing China to WWII, as I question the severity of 
the Allies’ reactions, had they ever found out about the actual “Berlin-Chiang Channel” 
in Switzerland. Chongqing China was too important an ally to lose. 
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Chapter Seven: The success or failure of Sino-German back channels 
 
In Chapter Six I presented the main evidence on the clandestine back channels 
between Chiang Kai-shek and the two German groups: “Berlin” and the German 
Resistance. The archival material presented the political background that contributed to 
the creation of these back channels, as well as the content of secret conversations 
between Chiang Kai-shek’s agents and the Germans. The chapter also drew first 
conclusions over the objectives of the participants in the clandestine back channels. In 
this chapter, I will further analyse these findings and show what the archives reveal 
about wartime Sino-German clandestine relations, and in the wider context, about 
wartime Republican Chinese foreign policy.  
 
This chapter will be roughly divided into two sections: the first dealing with the 
analysis of the pre-July 1941 period; the second with the post-July 1941 archival 
material. Throughout these sections, I will show how Sino-German relations evolved 
from 1938 until 1941, and how the influence of German-friendly individuals in 
Chongqing in combination with a pragmatic foreign policy influenced the development 
of Sino-German relations. By starting with an interpretation of pre-July 1941 archival 
material, it is possible to show the evolution of Sino-German communication channels 
and the motives that shaped clandestine relations in the pre-1941 period. The section 
on post-July 1941 archival material will then analyse the objectives that were linked to 
the foreign relations proposals that were discussed between “Berlin” and Chiang Kai-
shek. I will also analyse the objectives and implications of the “German Resistance-
Chiang Channel”. In both sections, I intend to shed light on the question of whether 
these back channel mediations were genuine by analysing their chances for success. 
In order to do that, I will compare the factors in BCD and mediation theory that have 
proven to influence the outcome of a mediation channel with the Sino-German 
mediation efforts (Bercovitch, 2011). In a last step, I intend to analyse whether these 
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clandestine connections between Chongqing and Nazi Germany had any impact on 
Sino-Allied relations. 
The support for the pragmatic foreign policy approach that emerges from this 
dissertation challenges the accepted narrative as it was presented in official Nationalist 
Chinese publications of the day (see Chapter Four)—one which, ironically, continues 
well into the present, with the standard histories of the era supporting the belief that the 
Republican Chinese government broke off all relations with Nazi Germany in July 1941 
and stayed largely aloof from any Allied developments that included Nazi-Germany and 
Europe, instead focusing on its main enemy in East Asia, Japan (see Kirby, 1984; Fox, 
1982; Chen Renxia, 2003; Yu, 2006).   
In contrast, my evaluation will show that Chiang Kai-shek was driven by a very 
pragmatic foreign policy, which kept doors open to all sides in the war, including Nazi 
Germany. Closely linked in Chongqing Chinese propaganda with Japan, Germany 
became an enemy of China. However, this research reveals the existence of 
communication back channels, which show certain similarities with the peace feelers 
that were kept between Japan and Chongqing China in the early 1940s. The existence 
of these clandestine channels to “Berlin” and the German Resistance movement were 
driven by several factors, for example, by the wish to gather intelligence on Axis-related 
developments, to raise Chongqing China’s international profile, but also to maintain a 
number of communication channels with Germany, and towards Japan via Germany.  
A pragmatic and manipulative foreign policy approach towards the Allies had 
been earlier proposed by scholars such as Kirby (1984, 251; 2011, 33), Yang (2010a; 
2010b), and Taylor (2009, 211), who identified it as a tool to acquire US aid. However, 
as I show in this dissertation, this pragmatic foreign policy approach went further, and 
allowed China to maintain clandestine channels through which to gather information 
and also to keep German interests in China alive. Chongqing China’s pragmatic foreign 
policy meant that she preserved communication with Germany while officially 
cooperating with the Allies.  
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In comparison, Chiang Kai-shek appears to have put less importance into these 
clandestine channels than the two German groups did. The objectives of the three 
sides involved in Chongqing’s secret network to Germany differed fundamentally; 
however, it becomes clear that many of the war-related proposals actually originated 
on the German side, at a time when the initial Nazi attack plans had failed. The 
Resistance on the other hand had been in contact with Chiang Kai-shek through a 
number of special envoys since 1938.  
Chongqing China’s limited actions following German proposals, and even the 
degree of help given to the German Resistance, indicates that Chiang Kai-shek did not 
see these channels as vital, but used these to maintain contact with individuals in the 
Axis camp. On the contrary, the two German sides hoped to use Chongqing China’s 
support to either win the war (“Berlin”) or to end it (German Resistance). Despite the 
difference in objectives, Sino-German communication had to be hidden, hence the 
option by all sides for back channels. As the analysis of the back channels and the 
various mediation attempts shows, pre-July 1941 mediations failed for a different 
reason than post-July 1941 one, hence indicating a different approach to the mediaton 
attempts by the sides involved.  
I will also argue that the presence of a German-friendly group in Chongqing, as 
well as Allied suspicions over on-going links between Chongqing and Germany 
contributed to a deterioration of Sino-Allied relations. This suspicion would be only one 
of a number of factors that led to an erosion of trust between Chongqing China and the 
Western Allies. 
 
 
Section One: Analysis of pre-July 1941 Sino-German diplomacy efforts 
Jiang Baili, Woidt and Schacht 
The analysis of Jiang Baili’s, Woidt’s, and Schacht’s missions sheds light on 
several aspects of Sino-German relations. As the archival materials and exisiting 
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research reveals, the wartime objectives of Chiang Kai-shek’s China were manifold. 
The period between 1938 and July 1941 was characterised by China’s fight against 
Japan, but also by her search for official allies, with the main focus on the Western 
democracies, including France, Britain and the US (Yu, 2006, 9). The deterioration of 
Sino-German relations, following the Nazi consolidation of power and Germany’s 
increasing affiliation with Japan damaged diplomatic relations on a large scale. 
However, these events did not prevent the governments on both sides for approaching 
one another. The major goal of China-friendly and German-friendly individuals on both 
sides of relations in this same period can be narrowed down to one major goal: the 
revision of German East Asian foreign policy in support of Republican China. Jiang 
Baili’s mission shows that German-friendly Chinese and China-friendly Germans 
attempted to influence men surrounding Nazi Germany’s main decision maker - Hitler.  
These objectives, however, were contrary to the objectives of the Third Reich 
during this time, which was more interested in the economic exploitation of China than 
giving up on the alliance with Japan. Woidt’s mission in 1938 came at a time when 
German-Japanese trade negotiations in Northern China had failed to pay off for 
Germany. At the same time, China-friendly individuals, in competition with their Japan-
friendly counterparts, “worked to salvage and rebuild” relations (Kirby, 1984, 245). 
However internal competition over the course of German foreign policy continued to 
hamper and complicate plans, resulting in a diplomatic approach by German-friendly 
Chinese and China-friendly Germans through back channels.  
The attempts to rectify Germany’s East Asian foreign policy and to gain support 
against Japanese aggression in China started in autumn 1937. As Chapter Six shows, 
Jiang Baili’s mission objectives were to secure German neutrality in the East Asian 
conflict. Support inside Germany for Jiang’s mission came from Chinese-friendly 
German groups and individuals, which proposed Sino-German cooperation. It can be 
assumed that the proposal of Sino-German cooperation Jiang Baili suggested also 
found support in German-friendly Chinese circles, such as the German industry and 
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military (see Chapter Six). Interestingly, this discussion of Sino-German cooperation 
continued between Jahnke and Gui after July 1941.  
These developments in Sino-German relations reflect Chiang’s pragmatic 
foreign policy, since they took place despite the fact that China received large amounts 
of aid from the Soviet Union by the summer of 1938, and had also continued with 
efforts to gain US and British aid. The Woidt mission shows that German proposals and 
chances to foster Sino-German relations were not rejected. On the contrary, Woidt and 
Kung reached a new barter agreement in summer 1938. Even though this agreement 
became void as soon as Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop heard of it, it does signal 
China’s willingness to work with a pre-war Germany.  
 
While the details of Woidt’s barter agreement surely are of interest; in the 
framework of this research project, more details on the state of Sino-German relations 
and Chinese foreign policy can be drawn by analysing the diplomatic connections 
through which Woidt and Schacht worked. Most importantly, a major shift in Sino-
German diplomacy from front to back channels becomes visible. The practical 
implementation of the two Schacht mediation attempts as well as the Woidt mission 
saw the use of diplomatic measures outside the framework of the German and Chinese 
Foreign Office, similar to the mission of Jiang Baili. The missions to China took place at 
a time when Chinese and German observers must have realised that the internal 
division over German East Asian foreign policy, including the positioning of Japanese-
friendly individuals in key governmental positions, hampered any effort to foster Sino-
German relations.  
As a result, the Woidt and the Schacht mission in summer 1938 were pursued 
through diplomatic back channels. Hellmuth Woidt was sent to China as a 
representative of the German Minister of Economic Affairs Funk, who in return had 
been authorised by Hitler to approach Republican China. Hitler’s interest in Sino-
German relations raised hopes in Chongqing for a return to the excellent Sino-German 
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relations of 1936 and 1937 (Ratenhof, 1987, 510). The reason for this hope lay in the 
history of early 20th century Sino-German relations. The similiarities of how the Woidt 
mission operated through non-diplomatic channels and seemed to have represented 
China-friendly factions in the German government, military and industry is striking if 
compared to how late 1920s and early 1930s Sino-German relations had evolved (see 
Kirby, 1984; Fox, 1982). Moreover, in both the 1920s and after February 1938, Sino-
German relations suffered under a German Foreign Office that, for different reasons, 
rejected a China-friendly foreign policy approach.   
Whether Chiang Kai-shek actually envisioned a return to Sino-German relations 
similar to those prior to July 1937, and whether these relations would have come at the 
price of the loss of Sino-Soviet relations, is difficult to assess. However, as the archival 
material and existing research reveal, interest in Nazi Germany continued to exist, 
probably fuelled by that fact that Germany had not been fully associated with Japan yet. 
While the Anti Comintern Pact and the 1938 German recognition of Manchukuo 
shattered Chinese trust in Germany, it was the Tripartie Pact that irrevocably linked 
Germany and Japan as the Axis Powers. This is also visible in the speeches presented 
in Chapter Four in which Germany had been closely associated with Japan and the 
“aggressive countries” after September 1940.  
However, as I have shown throughout this dissertation, a break of relations with 
Germany would run counter the pragmatism that characterised Chiang Kai-shek’s 
foreign policy approach. That Chiang Kai-shek was indeed involved in these diplomatic 
approaches to Germany and by Germany is proven. Liang (1978, 124) points out that 
Jiang Baili acted as Chiang Kai-shek’s “envoy extraordinary”. In regard to the Woidt 
mission, existing research has highlighted that Woidt negotiated the barter agreement 
with H.H. Kung. Chiang Kai-shek was kept up to date on developments by Qi Jun.298 
                                               
298 On 4 August 1938 Qi Jun informed Chiang Kai-shek about Woidt’s mission in China (AH, “Yiban Ziliao 
yi chengbiao huiji (General Information Collection) (74)”, Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu, 
Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080200-00501-029，Entry Number: 002000001890A).  A few 
months later on 16 October 1938, Qi Jun then informs Chiang Kai-shek that H.H. Kung and Woidt signed 
the barter agreement. (AH, “Yiban Ziliao yi chengbiao huiji (General Information Collection) (76)”, Jiang 
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The Schacht missions in summer 1938 and the first half of 1939 were also known to 
Chiang Kai-shek, who stayed in contact with Schacht via Hans Klein.  
The Schacht mediation attempts of summer 1938 and 1939 share a number of 
characteristics with the Woidt mission, but also stand out as back channel mediation 
attempts.  A characteristic that is similar to that of the Woidt mission is its back channel 
nature, as well as the involvement of Chiang Kai-shek on the periphery. Moreover, an 
individual with close ties to the German Ministry of Economic Affairs was chosen as a 
mediator. Apart from these aspects, the Schacht missions differed from Woidt’s. 
In the following section, I will focus on the conclusion in regard to foreign policy 
approaches that can be drawn from the Schacht back channel mediation attempts. As 
already touched upon in Chapter Six, the likelihood for both mediation attempts to 
actually succeed were rather limited. Numerous factors, such as the one-sided 
approach of these attempts, Chinese domestic political pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to 
fight Japan, the mediators recall in summer 1939 and a crucial lack of trust between 
China and Japan, all contributed to the failure of these mediation attempts. Despite the 
failure of these attempts certain conclusions on Sino-German relations and Chinese 
foreign policy can still be drawn.  
Communication in both cases took place through non-diplomatic channels, 
mostly via Hans Klein, which would again be due to the fact that Japan-friendly factions 
in Germany would have tried to prevent any Sino-Japanese rapprochement with 
Germany’s help. The ending of the Woidt mission is an excellent example for how the 
involvement of Japan-friendly factions could derail successful negotiations; Foreign 
Minister von Ribbentrop, after hearing of the new Sino-German barter agreement 
rejected the latter outright (Kirby, 1984, 246). Moreover, experiences drawn from the 
1937 Trautmann negotiation, its bad execution and the fact that Japan tended to time 
                                                                                                                                         
Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080200-00503-171, Entry 
Number: 002000001892A.  
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the level of demands in correspondence to victories in China (Kirby, 1984, 234),299 
would have also likely lowered Chinese expectation of the Schacht mission.  
However, more importantly, the Woidt mission took place at the same time as 
the Schacht mission. As was already stated by Ratenhof (1987, 510), Chongqing 
Chinese cirles hoped for Sino-German relations to return to their pre-July 1937 level. 
As a result, I would argue that the Schacht mission may have seemed like a waste of 
time and too risky to Chinese decision makers. Potentially gaining German support, at 
a time when “acquiring foreign support became a vital factor in China’s strategy of 
winning the war” (Yu, 2006, vii), would have been less politically damaging than 
entering into peace negotiations with Japan.  
I would argue that Schacht’s second journey to China was the result of back-
channel contacts to the German Ministry of the Economy. It is very likely that Schacht 
had been in contact with his successor, Minister of Economic Affairs Funk, and 
travelled to China via neutral countries just as Chiang Kai-shek had suggested in 
August 1938. The fact that Schacht met with a Chinese government official in Burma 
(now Myanmar) suggests that his journey to China actually had a hidden agenda, such 
as new back-channel mediation between China and Japan. In this case, the fact that 
the mediator (Germany) cancelled the mediation attempt even before it started is the 
main reason for the failure of the second attempt. 
 
 In summary, it can be concluded that a more direct diplomatic approach was 
favoured by political decision makers on the German and Chinese side. The evolution 
from front to back channels took place between 1937 and 1938. The fact that this 
development occurred at roughly the same time at which von Ribbentrop succeeded 
Konstantin von Neurath as German Foreign Minister in Feburary 1938 is no 
coincidence.  BCD theorists have highlighted the role and influence political opponents 
                                               
299 A detailed description of the German mediation attempt thorugh ambassador to China Trautmann can 
be found in Fox (1982, 260-290). For changes to Japanese demands after major military victories see Fox 
(1982, 277).  
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play as potential spoilers, resulting in them being left out of the back channel mediation. 
Von Ribbentrop was perceived by individuals in China and Germany as such a spoiler, 
who might derail any efforts to foster Sino-German relations.300 Hence, professional 
German diplomats played a minor role in Jiang’s, Woidt’s and Schacht’s cases. While 
Jiang Baili still arrived in Germany as an official envoy, Woidt and Schacht both 
operated in secrecy in 1938 and 1939. Their communication channels to China ran 
through either the Ministry of Economic Affairs or private individuals (Klein), hence 
leaving aside the German Foreign Office. Together with the assumed involvement and 
communication of Jahnke with Jiang Baili and the Chinese government, these 
clandestine communication channels are a first indicator for the development towards 
the use of back channels during 1940 until the end of the war. With the outbreak of war 
in Europe and initial German war successes, the objectives of the German-friendly 
groups in Chongqing shifted and focused on the idea that a powerful Germany could 
be used to exert influence over the other major Axis-Power Japan. 
 
Analysis of post-September 1939 relations 
 The outbreak of the European War in September 1939 complicated Republican 
Chinese foreign policy, as there now existed two war theatres and the increasingly 
visible split of the world into anti-Axis and Axis-friendly camps. Yu (2006, 49) termed 
the period between September 1939 and December 1941 as a time when “all the major 
powers in Europe [were] at each other’s throats…”. Given the volatile and unclear 
situation in WWII Europe, it is not surprising that Republican China’s early WWII 
wartime foreign policy advocated maintaining contact with all sides in the conflict, with 
the main focus being on fostering ties with the US.   
 This very pragmatic foreign policy approach saw China approach the Soviet 
Union by summer 1938, which then took over the delivery of aid that had previously 
been done by Germany. The position of the German military advisers was also taken 
                                               
300 See Chapter Six, Qi Jun’s report.  
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over by Soviet personnel, a situation that was to last until 1940/41 (Kirby, 1984, 239). 
Officially, there was never a break between Chiang Kai-shek and the Soviet Union 
during the late 1930s and early 1940s; however, relations deteriorated during the 
Soviet-Japanese rapprochement in 1940. After December 1941, much of Chongqing 
China’s aid was coming from the US, but that only represented a fraction of the aid 
reserved for Britain and other parts of the war theatres (Mitter, 2013, 245).301  
Ideology, be that fascist, communist or democratic, was not a hindrance, as 
Chongqing showed little reluctance in working with the Third Reich or the Soviet Union 
when it could. At second glance, however, it becomes clear that China had, at least in 
the case of the Soviet Union, no other choice. Neither Germany nor Britain sided with 
China during the earliest years of the war against Japan, while the US maintained a 
strict isolationism. The Sino-Soviet cooperation during the late 1930s had nothing to do 
with pragmatism or strategy, but rather with desperation on the Chinese side. Stalin, on 
the other hand, aware of China’s difficulties in her war against Japan, aimed to protect 
the Soviet Union by arming and supporting China, hence preventing a Japanese attack 
from the East.  
Indeed, throughout this period, China continued to approach the US302, Britain, 
France and the Third Reich.303 Even though neither France nor Britain offered any 
“meaningful aid” to China, and bowed to Japanese pressure to close important 
Nationalist Chinese supply lines through Burma and French Indochina in 1940, 
Chongqing China continued approaching these two states (Yu, 2006, 9).304 Approaches 
to Germany mainly took form through special envoys send by Chiang Kai-shek, such 
as Gui Yongqing in autumn 1940. However, official front channels were also used, but, 
as I would argue, only after back channels had failed. This can be noted in the formal 
                                               
301 Mitter (2013, 245) quotes Eastman (1991), p.145. According to Eastman (1991, 145) the Lend-Lease 
material allocated to China made up 1.5% of the total amount.  
302 For more information see Kuo (2009). The article explores T.V. Soong’s role as Chiang Kai-shek’s 
special envoy in Washington and his role vis-à-vis the Chinese foreign ministry.   
303 Gui Yongqing and Qi Jun’s appointment to Berlin and the order to improve Sino-German relations are 
an indication.  
304 Chinese approaches to France stopped after Germany and Japan occupied France and her Asian 
colonies respectively (Yu, 2006, 9).  
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Chinese approach for German mediation in October 1939. This formal approach took 
place after an un-official approach through the German Ministry of the Economy had 
failed in March 1939 (2nd Schacht mission). A formal approach coincided with Chinese 
proposals by H.H. Kung to negotiate a new Sino-German trade agreement, which 
would see the Third Reich receive tungsten (which had already been promised to the 
Soviet Union) in exchange for German arms (Kirby, 1984, 248).305 This "bait" was 
tailored to Chinese perceptions of a “tungsten-hungry” Nazi German government. 
Simultaneously, efforts to secure US support included the appointment of T.V. Soong 
to the US in 1940, and the start of regular radio broadcasts by his sister Soong May-
ling to the US in October 1941 (Tyson Li, 2006, 166).  
 
We have seen the official foreign diplomacy rhetoric of Chiang Kai-shek’s China 
in Chapter Four, and came to the assessment that much of the rhetoric was anti-Axis. I 
also outline how Chiang Kai-shek publicly confirmed China’s stand with the 
British/French course in July 1940. This public display of support ensured that 
Chongqing China was seen as an ally in the fight against fascism, something which 
paid off when Chiang Kai-shek was included in the Big Four. The idea that Chiang Kai-
shek’s hopes for victory lay with the US is widely accepted in academia (e.g. Zanasi, 
2006, 208). I agree with this theory, but I would also argue that this did not hinder 
Chiang Kai-shek to maintain clandestine channels to Japan, Nazi Germany and the 
German Resistance. As a result of the information presented in this dissertation, it 
becomes evident that researchers should divert from a too narrow US-centric view, and 
consider exploring other aspects of Chongqing China’s foreign relations.  
The inclusion of the Third Reich in Chiang Kai-shek’s clandestine 
communication network may seem unusual. Clandestine Sino-Japanese connections 
                                               
305 Kirby (1984, 248) quotes: DGFP, D, 8, no. 345, p.397, Bidder (Chungking) to AA, 11 November 1939.  
In the same document, also read for this thesis, Charge Bidder also mentions that these potential 
shipments should take place overland and in absolute secrecy, likely due to the fact that any shipments to 
the Third Reich of war-crucial tungsten would be seen as evidence for Chongqing China’s support for the 
Axis Powers, and might result in seriously damaged Sino-British relations (Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, 1951, 397).   
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during post-September 1939 have been proven and explored by Boyle (1972), and 
appear as a logical choice. Japan was Chongqing China’s main enemy, and the 
clandestine Sino-Japanese negotiations, such as Operation Kiri and Qian (Ch’ien), 
served at least the purpose of derailing Japanese policies and plans for occupied 
China, as well as possible avenues to conduct peace talks. Nazi Germany, and the 
German Resistance for that instance, are far less crucial for the China theatre in both 
geographical as well as war strategic terms. The nations playing a role in East Asia 
were Britain, the US, Japan and the Soviet Union. Nazi Germany’s role in WWII was 
limited to Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East. I would argue, however, that 
the archival material reveals that Germany was not omitted from China’s wartime 
foreign relations, and was, just as Japan, connected with Chiang Kai-shek through 
clandestine channels.  
While the relations to the US and other Western Powers were used to rally for 
support and to work towards gaining an official ally, 306  lines to Germany after 
September 1939 seem to have been maintained to gain intelligence, but also to keep 
German interest in China alive, and to turn, against all odds, German East Asian 
foreign policy in support of China. An analysis of Gui’s work in Berlin shows that 
Chinese-friendly Germans welcomed the General’s appointment, and arranged for him 
to speak directly to leading Nazis, leaving aside the German Foreign Office. Gui’s 
cooperation with Jahnke provided China with insight into German intelligence, which 
was used by Chiang Kai-shek to keep up to date with other powers, such as the Soviet 
Union. While Gui was seen by men, such as Jahnke, as an appropriate choice, the 
time for the mission to Germany was the wrong choice. Chongqing China did not play a 
crucial role for Germany’s war strategy until after Pearl Harbor.  
The existence of the German Resistance had been known to Chiang Kai-shek 
since Lin Qiusheng first established contact. I argue that during the early years of WWII, 
                                               
306 In the crucial years of 1940 and 1941, China had no official, important “friend … before the outbreak of 
the Pacific War“(Kirby, 2011, 7-8). The US remained committed to a non-interventionist policy, while Britain 
fought the Third Reich in Europe, and the Soviet Union entered into a rapprochement with Japan.  
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mainly 1939 and 1940, the movement did not play a major role in Chinese war 
strategies. As long as the European and Chinese conflict were not connected, 
association with the movement and its course would have had no use, except for also 
providing intelligence information to China. The involvement of China-friendly 
individuals, such as Alexander von Falkenhausen, Hjalmar Schacht and Georg 
Thomas would also indicate a more personal involvement on the side of Chiang Kai-
shek, rather than a political one. However, only with the outbreak of the Pacific War, 
did Chiang Kai-shek arrange for Qi Jun to travel to Switzerland and serve as a contact 
and special representative.  
 
Analysis of special envoy approach in diplomacy in the early war years 
The important role of special representatives to Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy 
has been highlighted in this research, contributing to recent research carried out by 
scholars such as Chen Yan (2002b). As the archival material in Chapter Six reveals, 
efforts to foster Sino-German relations after the recall of the military mission, the Nazi 
consolidation of power, and the recall of the German ambassador, depended heavily 
on special envoys appointed by Chiang Kai-shek and their cooperation with China-
friendly Germans.  
These efforts were pushed by a vocal German-friendly group in Chongqing, 
which perceived an association with Nazi Germany to be the better option in the war 
against Japan. As has been mentioned in earlier chapters, politicians in Chongqing, no 
matter which foreign nation they lobbied for, observed developments in international 
relations, and reacted to new alliances being forged between, for example, Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the initial German war successes led 
numbers of high-level politicians to believe that the European war would be decided in 
favour of Nazi Germany.  
Pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to side with Nazi Germany increased in the year 
1940, and it may have seemed that the foreign policy approach, which saw China 
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maintain contact to all sides in the conflict, came close to an end in 1940/1941. 
However, as has already been mentioned beforehand, the strong Chinese focus on the 
US, and the general pragmatic foreign policy approach forbade any change to foreign 
relations, which would have bound China to one side. As long as the US abstained 
from the conflict, official rethoric continued to court the US government and public, 
while, behind the scences, a door was kept open to the Axis Powers.  
Even though the US seemed reluctant to join the war, several facts spoke in 
favour of a US war entry against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek could rely on a strong China 
lobby in the US that constantly rallied for US support for China, hence limiting the 
chances for US-Japanese rapprochement. More importantly, however, as the October 
1940 document by the Chinese Resource Commission stated, Chongqing China 
counted on the fact that Japan would clash with the US over influence in the Pacific 
(also see Sun, 1993, 12).  
In a situation in which a clear foreign policy towards one of the major sides in 
the conflict would have closed many doors on the other side of the political divide, it 
was possible to fall back on the special envoy back channel strategy. Through non-
diplomatic back channels, relations could be fostered with all sides in the conflict, often 
ensuring direct access to the highest political decision makers (e.g. T.V. Soong and 
Roosevelt), while political opponents could be kept in the dark.  
In Chapter Four, I presented information on special envoys, highlighting that 
Chiang Kai-shek was able to influence Sino-foreign relations directly, in particular Sino-
Soviet- and Sino-US relations. In addition, Jiang Baili’s 1937 visit was mentioned in 
Chapter Six. These came in a row of special envoys appointed by Chiang in the period 
from 1937 until 1943, and have already been fairly well researched by scholars (Kuo, 
2009; Foo, 2011). In all these examples, it emerges that Chiang Kai-shek involved 
himself directly in Chinese foreign policy. While Sun Fo’s missions to the Soviet Union 
were only short-term, Soong and Fu both stayed in their respective host countries for 
several years. On the orders of Chiang, T.V. Soong successfully avoided the 
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involvement of the Chinese Foreign Office and the Chinese embassy in Washington 
(Kuo, 2009, 219-220). This included the order by Chiang to Soong not to consult with 
then Ambassador Hu Shi, who did not agree with Soong’s diplomatic approach of 
lobbying for good relations with US officials, the media and influential individuals (Kuo, 
2009, 228-229).307 Such behaviour is similar to Chiang Kai-shek’s influence on Chinese 
representatives in the Soviet Union.    
Fu Bingchang, the last Nationalist Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
appointed to Moscow in January 1943, had been imbedded in the structure of the 
Chinese Embassy in Moscow, which in theory made him answerable to the Chinese 
Foreign Office. However, he maintained a separate communication line to Chiang Kai-
shek, who was convinced that his subordinates would only take orders directly issued 
by him (Chang, 2007, in Foo, 2011, 3).  
The approach used for the appointment of Fu to Moscow shows similarities to 
the appointment of Gui and Qi to Berlin in 1940. First of all, each of these special 
envoys had been chosen due to their good connections to the host country, as well as 
their experience and expertise in dealing with that country’s specific ruling elite. T.V. 
Soong was American-educated, and mixed well in elite circles in Washington, where he 
rallied for Chongqing China’s cause. Similarly, Gui Yongqing had studied in a German 
military academy, and knew how to deal with individuals such as Göring and other 
military men. Politically, the position of these envoys and their affiliation to the 
numerous factions in Chongqing may well have differed, yet functionally they behaved 
in a very similar fashion. It is fair to assume that Gui and T.V. Soong did not share the 
same political ideas, given their very different backgrounds, but in connection with the 
evidence that Chiang Kai-shek worked together with countries that differed strongly in 
terms of ideology, it can be argued that results and not ideology were the important 
factors for Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy.  
                                               
307 Chiang to Soong, 12 July 1940, T.V. Soong Archive, Box 59, quoted in Kuo (2009, 229).  
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 There are, however, several differences between, for example, the mission of 
Sun Fo in 1937, T.V. Soong in 1940 and Gui Yongqing. These differences were due to 
the fact that the fostering of Sino-US relations and Sino-Soviet relations could occur in 
the open, whereas any efforts to maintain Sino-German relations during 1940 and 1941 
had to be masked, as any perceived Sino-German rapprochement may have caused 
deterioration of Sino-US/British relations.  
As a consequence, while the appointment of T.V. Soong to the US was publicly 
announced, and Soong engaged in many public engagements, Gui’s and Qi’s special 
envoy appointment was slightly modified. The two men were officially placed among 
the Chinese embassy staff in Berlin, but on positions that allowed a certain amount of 
freedom. As I laid out in Chapters Five and Six, the post as military attaché, or as any 
attaché, is outside the control of the ambassador, hence it allowed Gui to approach 
leading Nazis with matters of foreign policy. British anxiety over Gui’s appointment and 
the speculation that he may have been part of a Chinese military mission shows that 
the presence of a German-friendly lobby in Chongqing did not go unnoticed in London 
and Washington. It can be speculated that questions arising over the role of these 
German-friendly individuals and their influence over Chiang Kai-shek would have 
deepened already existing mistrust. 
 
Consequences of pragmatism: poisoned Sino-Allied relations 
Above I have highlighted the changes in Sino-German relations, which were the 
result of changes in both international and bilaterial relations. Moreover, it was clearly 
shown that Sino-German relations did not become as insignificant as US-centric 
research tends to argue. Instead, German-friendly pressure exerted on Chiang Kai-
shek and the perceiption of Germany as the country most likely to win the war in 1940 
emerged in certain Chongqing circles. I would also argue that Chiang Kai-shek’s 
pragmatic foreign policy approach until July 1941 and the existence of clandestine back 
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
185 
 
channels in Berne, anticipated by the British, contributed, amongst other issues, to 
mistrust levelled at Chongqing in general.  
I partially agree with Goldstein’s statement that Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy 
approach meant China’s short-term survival, but failed to produce allies in the long run 
(Goldstein, 1990, 1058). Foo (2011, 2-3), in contrast, credits Garver (1988) with his re-
evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek’s record of foreign diplomacy. However, in my view, 
while Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy approach did alienate long-term allies, it was 
very much influenced by Chongqing China’s previous experiences throughout the 
1930s and internal competition over foreign policy. The ease with which alliances and 
cooperations between major powers shifted must have fostered a foreign policy 
approach that would allow Nationalist China to adapt quickly to changes in international 
relations. Hence, Nanjing was able to secure Soviet aid after being abandoned by 
Germany for Japan in 1938. Similarly, when the Soviet Union and Japan signed the 
Neutrality Pact in April 1941, Chinese attention fully focused on bringing the US into the 
war, a move that brought Chiang Kai-shek in an alliance with British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill (Iriye, 1987, 179, in Taylor, 2009, 186). 
Scholars have pointed out that German-friendly individuals, such as Zhu Jiahua, 
openly called on Chiang Kai-shek to enter into an alliance with Britain after Germany 
signed the Tripartie Pact in September 1940 (Sun, 1993, 144). However, even this 
break with Germany did not remove all mistrust the Allies had towards the German-
friendly group. Contemporary British observers such as British Ambassador Archibald 
Clark Kerr, stated on 5 August 1941, in a letter from Chongqing to the British Foreign 
Office in London, that influential Chinese circles regretted the end of Sino-German 
relations.308  Thorne (1978, 66) also notes that the British Foreign Office internally 
admitted in 1941 that “China’s resentment against Britain was not without 
justification”. 309  Kerr’s report is just one of a number of documents read for this 
                                               
308  TNA, (PRO) WO 208/232, China, Chapter 1: Political; Chungking Government’s Relations with 
Germany, 5 August 1942, letter by Kerr from Chongqing to Foreign Office in London.  
309 Thorne (1978, 66) quotes: FO 371. F 3572/60/10. 
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dissertation, and reflected one of the fears dominant in London over Britain’s future in 
East Asia. To be more precise, London feared that Chongqing China would step in as a 
regional power wherever Britain lost her colonies, for example in Hong Kong or 
Singapore (Shai, 1984, 53). British observers complained in regular reports to London 
in May 1943 that the “Situation in China is most unhealthy for British because Chinese 
are not whole-hearted Allies with us or even with the American who often side with the 
Chinese against us”.310  
The majority of contemporary Allied observer reports in this dissertation came 
from a British source, due to the fact that I did not have the time or financial means to 
investigate US archives for more supporting information. Despite this limitation, it is 
possible to see that British observers routinely informed the British Foreign Office, 
throughout the war years, of any changes to Chongqing China’s foreign policy or of 
events indicating a lack of commitment to the Allied cause, including anti-British 
sentiments that resulted from external developments such as British pre-WWII 
appeasement measures towards Japan, the Burma Road closure of 1940, or Britain’s 
reluctance to accept the help of Chinese troops on the ground during 1942 to reclaim 
former British colonies, such as Hong Kong or Singapoure (Yu, 2006, 62).  
The British foreign policy observations were likely shared with Washington and 
Moscow,311 as the request for US observation of Gui Yongqing in Berlin shows. India 
Office Records show that these observers indeed came very close to the truth about 
continued Sino-German communications after Pearl Harbor. Ambassador Seymour 
and his colleagues in the British Foreign Office made one mistake, however. By 
focusing on Qi’s 1942 appointment to Switzerland and his connections to Schacht, Qi 
rose in the British eyes to become the middleman between Chiang Kai-shek and 
“Berlin”. Gui, however, appears to have vanished from the British radar. In this regard, 
                                               
310 TNA, (PRO) HS 1/165, Far East China: OSS/SOE Co-Operation. Telegram received from Chongqing 
on 31 May 1943.  
311 There is no evidence for this assumption, but further research in Russian archives might shed light on 
this issue. The USA and British continued to worry about the presence of Germans in Chongqing in 1943, 
who were allowed to roam the streets freely, while “friendless refugees” were interned by the Chinese. 
TNA, (PRO) FO 371/3825, File 1034/G. Telegram by Sir H. Seymour, Chongqing, 20 February 1943.   
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Qi’s appointment can also be seen as a diversion strategy, diverting Allied attention 
away from the actual contact to Berlin, which was Gui. 
 
 
Section Two: Analysis of post-1941 relations 
 The break in official Sino-German relations in July 1941 had severe 
consequences for the work Gui and Qi were carrying out in Berlin. As result of a policy 
that shared much similarity with the post-WWII Hallstein-Doctrine that West Germany 
applied to all countries that acknowledged the DDR, Chongqing China broke off 
relations with all countries that acknowledged the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist 
government. In consequence of the German recognition of the Collaborationist 
government, almost all of the Chinese embassy staff in Berlin were recalled, with the 
exception of Gui, who stayed in Switzerland, and maintained the only direct 
communication back channel for Chongqing to leading Nazis.  
 Switzerland was a plausible choice for Gui, as it was the only neutral direct 
neighbour of the Third Reich, and the alpine republic had turned into the centre for 
espionage in Europe (Read and Fisher, 1980, 113).312 It therefore became the most 
suitable location to gather and exchange intelligence information and to enable direct 
contact with Germans who still had the right to travel to Switzerland. The small number 
of documents and lack of intensity with which Chinese intelligence actions were 
observed by the Swiss authorities sheds light on the perception of East Asian affairs in 
Switzerland, and in the West in general. That the war developments in Europe were of 
greater importance to the government in Berne is without a doubt, thus more 
importance was placed on British/US and German activities. However, this lack of 
archival material also contributed to the perception in post-war research that the 
                                               
312 Other neutral European countries were Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and the Irish Free State 
(Stevens, 1999, 540). Read and Fisher (1980, 113) describes these foreign intelligence services as being 
“all heavily intertwined and interdependent”. 
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European and East Asian war theatres were separate from each other, and that 
Chongqing China played no role in developments in WWII Europe.  
 The pragmatic and gewundene (flexible) foreign policy approach, as outlined in 
the October 1940 Resource Commission paper and reflected by 1938-1941 Sino-
foreign relations, officially came to an end in December 1941. The official break of 
relations in July 1941 had already dealt a blow to German-friendly individuals in 
Chongqing, as any efforts to foster Sino-German relations or to rectify German East 
Asian foreign policy were no longer possible. Calls to declare war on Germany 
surfaced in July 1941 already, however, only when the entry of the US was secured in 
December 1941 did Chiang Kai-shek declare war on Nazi-Germany.  
The events of Pearl Harbor and Chongqing China’s alliance with the Western 
Allies did not close the two Chinese back channels to “Berlin” and the German 
Resistance. On the contrary, both channels continued to exist and allowed Chiang Kai-
shek to gather additional intelligence directly from within Germany, where, in contrast 
to the Western Powers, he had no intelligence staff. Moreover, the “Berlin” channel 
represented an alternative communication channel through which to reach Japan, as 
became evident in Chapter Six. This 1942 communication between Chongqing and 
Japan via Germany would have taken place at a time when, as Sun (1993, 145) argues, 
all secret contacts to Japan had been terminated since October 1940, following the 
signing of the Tripartie Pact.313 The channel to the German Resistance, on the other 
hand, would have raised Chongqing China’s profile amongst the Allies, especially since 
Republican China entered the negotiations as a mediator for the very first time.  
 
Analysis of Swiss channels and Chiang Kai-shek’s WWII alliance with the Allies 
The events of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 finally gave Chongqing China 
and Chiang Kai-shek the ally they had been waiting for: the US. While Sino-Allied 
relations would become strained for numerous reasons, amongst those the Chiang-
                                               
313 Sun (1993, 145) quotes: Chiang Kai-shek’s diary, September 29, ibid., 52, 61; Diary, September 22,  
DSCB, 4, part 2: 576.  
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Stilwell conflict, the failed Burma-Campaign or the issues with Allied military aid,314 
throughout the time that Jahnke and Gui Yongqing met in 1942, Chiang Kai-shek had 
no reason to mistrust his allies.  
However, as the archival material shows, two clandestine back channels were 
established in Switzerland. Directly after the break of relations, the first channel to 
emerge was the “Berlin-Chiang Channel”, as Qi Jun returned to China first to deliver 
the request for mediation by the German Resistance. From the beginning, the two 
channels were kept apart: Gui managed the communication with “Berlin”, while Qi was 
responsible for the German Resistance and contacts to the American OSS. The 
recorded communication between all parties is not the only evidence for such an 
assumption, but the evidence is strengthened by the fact that Gui and Qi seem to have 
kept a distance from each other, a fact that Gui himself reported in August 1943.315  
This safety measure limited the risk of discovery for both channels. 
By keeping these two communication lines in Switzerland apart, Chiang thus 
not only prevented discovery of his German channels in Switzerland, but also at home. 
Foreign observers kept a close eye on developments in Chongqing prior to and after 
Pearl Harbor as the British reports on Qi Jun’s appointment to Switzerland indicate. 
Complaints about the treatment of Germans in Chongqing and a perceived German-
friendly attitude persisted after December 1941.316  
 
“German Resistance-Chiang Channel” 
This particular communication channel features very little in recent academic 
research, except for work by Yang Tianshi (2010b), and its existence has even been 
dismissed on the mistaken assumption that the German Resistance would not possibly 
                                               
314 For more information on the issues of the Allied military aid to Chongqing China see Yu (2006). In this 
2006 publication, Yu highlights well the different issues that hampered US aid efforts to China, such as the 
influence Soviet spies within the US administration had on the Lend-Lease programme, which in return 
contributed to the very difficult political and economic situation the Republican government found itself in.  
315 AH, “Geguo qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong 
Wenwu“, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, 
p.82, 28 August 1943, report by Gui Yongqing from Berne.  
316 TNA FO 371/35825, Sir H. Seymour from Chongqing to London, 20 February 1943.  
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have consulted with Chiang Kai-shek in the first place. Such criticism, however, does 
not take the cordial relations between Resistance members and Chiang Kai-shek into 
account, or consider the pragmatic reality of Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy at this 
time. Yang's argument has hitherto not been supported by a large amount of 
documentary material beyond Chiang Kai-shek's own diary, either. However, if we 
consider the documents in Taiwan, Germany, and England that have been consulted in 
this dissertation, it is clear that Yang's theory is correct. This dissertation, however, 
further expands on this topic and shows that Chiang's direct communication with the 
Resistance went well beyond July 1941. Indeed, the existence of this channel and the 
aid given by China should make us re-think statements by scholars, such as Hoffmann 
(1988, 102-103), who stated that the German Resistance “remained without any Allied 
support or encouragement whatsoever”. Even though Chinese aid was limited and 
Chiang Kai-shek’s mediation attempt failed in the end, Chongqing China’s support far 
exceeded that of the British or the US government.  
Nonetheless, the question of why Chiang Kai-shek would even bother to 
support the German Resistance, when the Western Allies rejected any cooperation, is 
a legitimate one. As a consequence, it must be assumed that Chiang Kai-shek had his 
own motivations and objectives that set him apart from Allied leaders such as Churchill 
and Roosevelt.317 These objectives may have been strong enough to lead Chiang to 
accept the proposal for mediation between the Resistance movement and the 
Roosevelt administration.  
By accepting the request for mediation from the Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek 
went further than both Churchill and Roosevelt. Of Churchill it is known that he did not 
approve of any cooperation with the German Resistance, and pressed President 
Roosevelt not to support the movement either (Hoffmann, 1988, 97-98).318 Despite the 
pressure excerted by Churchill, Roosevelt appointed Allen Welsh Dulles to Switzerland, 
                                               
317 Soviet leader Joseph Stalin is excluded from this list as it is known in research that the Resistance 
movement of 20 July 1944 did not approach the Soviet Union, but hoped to cooperate with the Western 
Allies against the Soviet Union, after a new German government had come in.  
318 Hoffmann (1988, 97-98) quotes: PRO FO 371/26542/[C610]; FO 371/26543/C10855, Premier 4/100/8; 
cf. Hoffmann,“Peace“, pp.11-12 
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in order to establish contact with the German Resistance and its representatives such 
as Gisevius (Hoffmann, 1988, 102). However, even though Dulles proposed 
cooperation with the movement, the President refrained from taking action. 
As the archival material in this dissertation reveals, Chiang Kai-shek did not 
give the same kind of refusal to the German Resistance as the other Allies did. The 
reason for this kind of treatment may be down to three factors. The first such factor 
would be the good relationship Chiang Kai-shek had with some of the Resistance 
members, such as Falkenhausen or to a lesser degree Schacht and Thomas. 319 
However, the second factor is more likely. China’s position and experience as a non-
European nation may well have influenced her reaction toward the Resistance, and 
Germany as a whole. In contrast to China, Britain and other European nations directly 
felt the impact of the European war, while still having fresh memories of WWI. In their 
minds, the German war machine had to be stopped once and for all, hence the 
demand for unconditional surrender.320 Additionally, there was the so-called “Venlo-
Incident”, during which British intelligence agents, who believed they were to meet with 
Resistance members, had been kidnapped by the RSHA.321 The Allied WWI perception 
of Germany along with mistrust of the Resistance’s motivations, led the Western Allies 
to reject the movement.  
The third reason that may have led Chiang Kai-shek to support the German 
Resistance was the possibility that China’s standing amongst the Allies would have 
increased, especially since China emerged as a mediator between Western groups for 
the first time. Of a more speculative nature would be the possibility that the German 
Resistance played a minor role in Chinese war plans. As mentioned above in the 
                                               
319 In his report from November 1941, Qi Jun listed Chinese-friendly and Japanese-friendly individuals. 
China-friendly individuals include: Schacht, Thomas, and Göring. Japanese-friendly individuals are led at 
first place by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. See, AH, “Dui Deguo Waijiao (About German foreign relations) 
(6)”, “Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu“, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080106-00060-008, 
Entry Number: 002000001283A, p.23, 25, 27. 
320 The German Resistance used several channels to reach the British government, amongst others, Pope 
Pius XII. In a conversation between the Pope and the British Minister it becomes evident that Britain felt 
that “how we could make peace so long as the German military machine remaind intact” (Hoffmann, 1988, 
93) Hoffmann (1988, 93) quotes: Ludlow (1974, 337). 
321 For more information see: Schellenberg (1956a & 1956b) and MacDonald (1978).  
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dissertation, the “Europe first”-strategy met with resistance in Chongqing, which 
perceived Japan as the far more dangerous enemy. If the German Resistance had 
been successful in overthrowing the Hitler government, the likelihood that fighting in 
Europe would have ended, or at least decreased, was high. In return, a larger portion 
of the Allied war strategy would have turned to East Asia and the fight against Japan.   
Chiang Kai-shek seems to have been willing to support the movement to a 
certain degree through the appointment of Qi Jun to Switzerland. Qi Jun neither 
occupied a high level position during his time in Berlin nor in Berne, which may indicate 
that the Resistance movement was given little chance for success and that Chongqing 
merely wanted “to keep the door open”. The theory of Qi’s rather insignificant position 
is derived from the fact that he was not even included in most bibliographical 
dictionaries on Republican Chinese government officials (e.g. Xu, 1991). This 
argument is supported by the statement of contemporary witness Marcus, Jahnke’s 
secretary, who called the Chinese decision not to “become involved” (Liang 1978, 145) 
a mistake. According to Marcus’s description (Liang, 1978, 145) the Chinese failed to 
make use of a high degree of admiration for China inside the German Resistance, 
which was not limited to Schacht, Thomas and Falkenhausen, but also included 
prominent individuals such as Adam von Trott zu Solz, who spent months in Beijing in 
1937 (Liang, 1978, 149).  
 
The request for mediation by the German side, and the willingness of Chiang 
Kai-shek to support the movement’s fight against Hitler, make this a back channel as 
defined by Wanis St. John and others. The request for back-channel mediation 
stemmed from the Resistance, with Chiang Kai-shek serving as the mediator. In 
general, the process of this back channel meets secrecy requirements, as well as 
meetings at neutral locations. The objectives that emerge from the “Resistance-Chiang 
Channel” are on both sides clearly linked to European war developments. Moreover, if 
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Chiang Kai-shek had successfully brokered an agreement and the war in Europe 
ended, China’s reputation would have increased significantly.  
The potential benefits for Chiang Kai-shek by supporting the German 
Resistance may have only emerged over the course of time. Qi Jun’s initial meetings 
with Schacht and Thomas were characterised by questions on how a possible 
cooperation would benefit China. The amount of effort and support that Chiang 
invested in this channel is not clear in this dissertation, as the Chinese sources do not 
provide enough information. Future research in US archives may answer this question; 
since far more documents exist there that survived the war and that possibly contain 
discussions on Chiang Kai-shek’s mediation attempts. 
 At second glance, issues in the execution of this BCD attempt emerge, which 
have plagued almost all of the back-channel negotiations mentioned in this dissertation. 
As was the case with the Schacht 1938 mediation case, the “Washington-Chiang-
Resistance” mediation attempt was one-sided, a factor that has been identified as 
significantly lowering the success of mediation attempts. The fact that only members of 
the German Resistance proposed the mediation indicates that the time had not been 
ripe and that the Western Allies did not see the need to enter into mediation with the 
Resistance. Moreover, the crucial element of trust did not exist, and due to the 
restrictions of wartime, meetings between envoys from the US, Chongqing China and 
the German Resistance were impossible. The only exception was OSS officer Dulles, 
who met with Qi and Gisevius in Switzerland to discuss issues, but any trust which may 
have been established between these men did not include the Washington 
administration. Ò Dorchtaraigh’s research (2011, 767) pointed out the importance of a 
shared secret to establish trust, but the physical distance between the Resistance and 
Washington countered any feelings of trust that may have emerged between the 
individuals in Switzerland. Furthermore, the existence of the Resistance and the 
attempts to gain foreign support were widely known amongst the Allied leadership, and 
powerful individuals, such as Churchill, countered any rapprochement (Hoffmann, 1988, 
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97-98). Different perception of the issues that hindered cooperation between the 
Resistance and the Allies contributed to the failure of any of the approaches the 
Resistance made to the Allies.  
The increasingly negative image of Chiang Kai-shek as an anti-democratic ruler 
might have further undermined any support the Resistance received from the 
Generalissimo in Washington. Since the full extent of Chinese support for the 
movement is not clear at this stage, it can be argued that if the mediator’s effort is only 
half-hearted, as the rather small scale support suggests, then the likelihood for success 
is further reduced.  
Furthermore, it is important to note the absence of a neutral mediator, 
something which also featured prominently in the “Japan-Berlin-Chiang” back channel. 
The question whether a mediator has to be neutral is unclear, with BCD theorists 
placing great emphasis on it. Bercovitch and Houston (2011, 45), however, argue that 
“mediators can succeed if they can ‘move things about’ and not because they are 
important or neutral”. Nominally, Chiang Kai-shek was not a neutral mediator, because 
China was at war with the Third Reich, and the German army. Even though the 
Resistance members did not represent the official German government, as German 
citizens they were nominally enemies. If a mediator’s neutrality is not as important as 
described by BCD theorists, then the quality of work carried out by the mediator has far 
greater influence on the outcome of mediation. I would argue that my research of the 
Sino-Resistance channel supports Bercovitch’s and Houstons’ (2011) and Astor’s 
(2007) theories on mediator neutrality.  
 
 “Berlin-Chiang Channel” 
The sudden decision to appoint Gui Yongqing as the new military attaché to 
Switzerland was probably linked to the fact that he already offered a communication 
line to the higher levels of the Third Reich. Moreover Gui was already in Europe, and 
could take up the communication with Jahnke right where it had stopped in Berlin.  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
195 
 
The Sino-German back channels from 1942 until the end of the war raise 
questions as to why Chiang Kai-shek would have maintained these channels. While the 
objectives of Chiang Kai-shek, his aides in Germany, and the two German sides are 
clear in pre-1941 channels, the same cannot be said about back channel 
communication to Nazi Germany after December 1941. The obvious reason is that 
Chiang Kai-shek had joined the Allies in December 1941, thus realising Chongqing 
China’s main foreign policy objective. Any clandestine connections to Nazi Germany 
and Japan would have been obsolete.  
Moreover, as will be discussed below, the possibility of reaching a peace 
agreement with Japan through German mediation back channels in 1942 was very slim, 
as indicated by Chiang Kai-shek’s and Gui’s approach to the back channel. Apart from 
the way Chiang Kai-shek and Japan both reacted to the German mediation effort, other 
factors further speak for very little chance of success for any German mediation. For 
example, Chongqing China would have surely made a much worse peace deal in terms 
of regaining occupied territory through the “Berlin-Chiang Channel” mediation efforts 
than she actually gained through her alliance with the Allies. An agreement with Japan 
would have contained at least a number of demands, such as Chinese recognition of 
Manchukuo. Through the alliance with the US, on the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek 
could be sure to re-gain all the territory occupied by Japan since 1931.  
It could be argued that the differences that emerged between the Allies right 
from the beginning in December 1941, and the general perception of the Allies as 
“unreliable” (Mitter, 2013, 14) could have had an influence on the decision to maintain 
Sino-German back channels. However, any differences over the Allied war strategy 
and the treatment of Chongqing China by the Allies would not come into effect until 
later in 1942, hence other reasons must be the source for the decision to maintain 
Sino-German back channels.  
Considering the pragmatic foreign policy approach that has sofar been identified 
in this dissertation, but also in recent research, clandestine channels to Japan after 
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December 1941 are not surprising, especially given the role Japan assumed in East 
Asia as the Allies’ main adversary. Nazi Germany, on the other hand, would seem as 
an odd choice to maintain relations with, since Germany did not fight alongside Japan 
in East Asia and had no major economic or territorial interests at stake in the region. 
However, in a truly global war developments in one region may have had 
repercussions for the rest of the world. Hence, as the archival material reveals, 
Germany’s interest in Japan lay in the man power the latter could throw at the Western 
Allies. In the opinion of the RSHA, such a large number of soldiers would have resulted 
in a diversion of Allied war efforts from the European war theatre.  
Similarly, I would argue that the existence of the back channels between Chiang 
Kai-shek and “Berlin” indicates that the Generalissimo’s actions were not limited to 
East Asia. On the contrary, Chinese agents were at least involved in espionage in 
Europe. Intelligence played a major role in WWII, as the strong presence of Axis and 
Allied intelligence agents in Europe and East Asia proves. 322  The great difference 
between “Berlin”’s approach to the back channel and Chiang Kai-shek’s and Gui’s 
apparent stalling tactic when it came to provide “Berlin” with an answer to the 
numerous Sino-German cooperation proposals, indicates that the “Berlin-Chiang 
Channel” was used to keep all doors open in the conflict but also to keep German 
interest in China alive.  
In contrast, “Berlin”, concerned by the US entry into the war and a long-drawn 
out war in East Asia, saw China’s resistance as the key to solving a number of issues, 
such as war with the Soviet Union. The RSHA’s repeated attempts to resolve the Sino-
Japanese conflict first in 1942 via the “Berlin-Chiang Channel” and then by using 
German agents in Shanghai in 1944, supports this point. Ironically – given that the 
Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek had approached Nazi Germany throughout 
                                               
322 Maochun Yu (2006) provides and excellent account of British, US and French intelligence operation 
and cooperation in and with Chongqing China respectively. Moreover, Wakeman Jr. (2003) offers a great 
monograph on the Chinese secret service. For intelligence operations in Europe see for example: Mauch 
(2003).  
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the late 1930s for support - by the time the RSHA proposals had been put forward, 
Chongqing China had already irrevocably linked herself with the Western Allies.  
 The second reason to maintain clandestine Sino-German back channels 
identified in this dissertation was the fact that they represented an alternative means to 
approaching Japan. The inclusion of Japan in the back channel between Chongqing 
and “Berlin” is of interest. As the analysis below highlights, neither Japan nor Chiang 
Kai-shek seem to have given this mediation effort any chance of success. Without 
wanting to foreclose all of the back channel analysis findings in the next section of this 
chapter, I would like to focus on factors which indicate the lack of Chinese and 
Japanese willingness to mediate.  
Chapter Six presented information on a mediation attempt proposed by the 
Chinese Secret Service in early 1942. In summary the mediation attempt saw “Berlin” 
mediate between Tokyo and Chiang Kai-shek. Demands by both sides were 
transmitted to the respective other side by Jahnke and the RSHA. It was noted that the 
initial Chinese demands were far too high for Japan to ever accept. Efforts ended in 
September 1942 when Japan continued to advance further in South-East Asia.  
I would argue that the Chinese Secret Service, Chiang Kai-shek and Gui did not 
take this mediation effort as a chance to reach a deal with Japan, but as a tool to 
distract Japan, as had happened through other clandestine channels in the past (Boyle, 
1972). The unrealistic demands that Chongqing forwarded to Japan via “Berlin”, and 
the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had succeeded only three months earlier to finally enter 
into an alliance with the US, are indicators of this.  
Indeed, the interest in such a channel would have been rather low, given 
China’s fresh alliance with the Western Allies. The conflict conditions shifted with the 
attack on Pearl Harbor in favour of the Allies, thus it is highly unlikely that Chiang Kai-
shek would have risked his alliance with the Western Allies and the prospect to re-gain 
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all of China’s occupied territories for a mediated peace with Japan.323 The importance 
of the alliance with the US for Chiang Kai-shek and Chongqing is visible in the words 
used by Sun (1993, 141): “Chiang made it very clear that he had decided to throw 
China’s lot with America”. These words described the foreign policy situation in 
Chongqing in September 1939, however, they are equally valid to describe Chongqing 
China’s focus and dependence on the US after December 1941.  
“Berlin”’s mediation attempt ended in September 1942 when Japan apparently 
voiced the end of her cooperation. I would argue that the Japanese side, similar to the 
Chinese side, did not trust this mediation attempt. One indicator for this argument is the 
fact that while the RSHA tried to mediate between Tokyo and Chiang Kai-shek, an 
alternative mediation attempt took place. Several Japanese feelers contacted the 
German side between March and June 1942 in an attempt to mediate between Stalin 
and Hitler (Schellenberg, 1956, 298-301). The existence of this mediation attempt may 
as well indiciate that Japan looked for alternative means than a peace with China to 
solve the issues she faced in East Asia, and Germany faced in the Soviet Union. It can 
be speculated that this mistrust for any mediation with Chongqing may very well be 
rooted in the experience Tokyo made with previous peace negotiations, which in the 
end had turned out to be a hoax.  
 
“Berlin-Chiang Channel” back channels analysis 
The time in which Gui was active as military attaché in Berlin was characterised 
by two lines of communication. There was the back channel through which Gui 
contacted leading Nazis, which can be classified as a simple back channel, thus 
avoiding the official diplomatic front channels through the Chinese and German Foreign 
Office apparatus. This channel is rather intriguing and unusual, since Gui acted as 
military attaché and as such was not meant to carry out the duties of Ambassador 
                                               
323 See Greig and Diehl (2012, 130), who argue that conflict conditions, meaning the conflicting parties 
assessing the “success and failure of violence as a means to achieve their golas and weigh the benefits of 
shifting their strategies toward diplomatic solutions”. In the case of Chiang Kai-shek, the alliance with the 
US was the Generalissimo’s primary goal, hence any German peace mediation was unnecessary.  
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Chen Jie. That attachés may become involved in activities outside their restrictions has 
been mentioned, but their inclusion in BCD has been limited. Theorists such as Wanis 
St. John (2006) and Ò Dorchtaraigh (2011) have limited the number of players to both 
governmental, private sector individuals, and terrorist organisations. The role of official 
armies in BCD has not, as yet, been fully explored. 
I would argue that the role of attachés, and the governmental department they 
worked for, should be included as a possible influence on BCD, in particular in nations 
with a weak administration that is unable to keep a powerful army in check. This was 
the case in Nationalist Chongqing China and has been observed in more recent times 
too. In 2007 back-channel negotiations over the Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and 
India, the Pakistani Army took centre stage. This was partially due to the fact that the 
military dictator General Pervez Musharraf controlled the military and the executive, 
and got much involved in these negotiations that took place at neutral locations in 
Bangkok, Dubai and London (Coll, 2009, 1). In a strong Pakistani administration the 
military would have been unable to wield as much influence as it did. Similarly, 
Chongqing China’s administration was weak (see Strauss, 1998) and the military could 
exercise significant influence, not least because Chiang Kai-shek was a military man 
himself.    
The case of China supports the idea that if military and civilian organs are too 
interwoven with each other (Chiang Kai-shek was head of the Chinese army and in 
control of the government) the military makes use of its influence. Coll’s research into 
the India-Pakistan relations further sheds light on this development. In this dissertation, 
the available evidence provided from the observations of contemporary foreign 
observers confirms that the Chinese military and officer corps was predominantly 
German-friendly, and the influence of the Chinese military advisers on Chiang Kai-shek 
was considerable, as William Donald pointed out in October 1940.  
Up until July 1941 there existed two channels that involved Gui Yongqing, the 
second one being a clandestine intelligence channel. The latter cannot be classified as 
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a back channel, unless evidence can be found in the future that shows that the 
discussion between Gui and Jahnke had any effect on Sino-German foreign policy. 
Over time, however, this initial intelligence channel developed into a diplomatic back 
channel when all other important communication channels between the Third Reich 
and Chiang Kai-shek ceased to exist.  
The back channel in Berne transmitted foreign policy and foreign relations 
proposals between “Berlin” and Chiang Kai-shek. Even though “Berlin” constituted a 
certain number of leading Nazis, their direct contact to the main decision maker Hitler, 
and the attempt to influence German East Asian foreign policy, made this channel a 
back channel. Archival research and secondary literature clearly show that the German 
participants in this channel intended to circumvent the German Foreign Office. At that 
stage, however, the back channel had not fully evolved into a conflict solution tool 
similar to the Oslo back channel in 1992.  
However, the Chinese 1942 mediation request transformed this simple back 
channel between “Berlin” and Chiang Kai-shek in Berne. Factors essential for the 
success of back channel negotiations such as secrecy and the use of a mediator and 
neutral locations can all be found here. However, as we will see, the 1942 Chinese 
mediation request suffered from similar obstacles as the mediation attempts in 1938 
and 1939. Especially the lack of direct contact to build up essential trust has to be 
named here. 
 Elements that hampered back-channel negotiations, this time between China 
and Japan, were, amongst others, again a lack of trust. Above I concluded that the 
evidence in Chapter Six and an analysis of the mediation back channel would indicate 
that both the Japanese and the Chinese side did not put full faith in this mediation 
attempt. On the Chinese side this came down to the fact that a peace deal with Japan 
was not necessary anymore in 1942. On the Japanese side, earlier experiences with 
clandestine peace negotiations with Chongqing, as well as the attempt to find a 
solution to issues faced in the Soviet Union and China by Japan, point to a lack of trust 
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in negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. However, if trust had existed, it could have 
allowed for the two sides to generate an affiliation, hence raising the possibility of 
reaching a compromise (Spector, 1998, 54).  This trust was unable to be established 
since both sides did not meet personally, but had Jahnke travel between Berlin and 
Berne. Furthermore, the involvement of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop (who until 
then had sabotaged many attempts to foster relations and to mediate between China 
and Japan) may also be seen as an obstacle, as much as the lack of direct contact 
prevented the exchange and explanation of foreign relations positions. 
Aspects new to BCD were the fact that “Berlin” was not a neutral mediator, and 
the inclusion of intelligence channels as a means for communication. The question in 
regard to mediator neutrality has already been raised in the analysis of the “Chiang-
Resistance Channel”. Similarly, to China’s position as a non-neutral mediator, “Berlin” 
also was all but a neutral mediator between Chiang Kai-shek and Tokyo in 1942. With 
the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Third Reich ceased to be a neutral entity in the 
Sino-Japanese conflict, officially siding with Japan. Hence, it was impossible for “Berlin” 
to take a neutral position in the 1942 back-channel mediation.  
However, as long as a mediator has the “ability to influence, protect or extend 
the interests of each party in conflict” (Bercovitch and Houston, 2011, 45),324 neutrality 
is only secondary. While in this particular case negotiations took place in a neutral 
country, hence meeting some of the BCD standards, the lack of neutrality was not an 
issue. Even though Chiang Kai-shek and “Berlin” were nominally at war, behind-the-
scenes, a more ambivalent, non-conflictual relationship must have existed. As a result, 
BCD theory needs to be reformed to accommodate for a situation, in which: two or 
more participants of BCD nominally are in conflict with each other, however in reality 
share a more positive relationship. The reason to choose BCD in such a case would 
then be the fact that the existence of such a back channel has to be hidden from 
another third party, even from an ally. This necessity has only just recently been 
                                               
324 Bercovitch and Houston (2011, 45) quote: Faure,1989; Kressel and Pruitt, 1985; Smith, 1985; Touval, 
1985; Touval and Zartman, 1985 
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highlighted in the 2013 negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme, during which 
high-ranking US and Iranian diplomats conducted clandestine talks that they kept 
hidden even from US allies such as Israel, as it was probably feared that Israel would 
negatively influence any negotiations (BBC, 2013). In this specific case of the ”Berlin-
Chiang Channel”, however, the outside parties to hide from were the Western Allies, 
the US and Britain.  
The Israeli Palestinian Peace Talks, which I mentioned in Chapter One, have 
highlighted an aspect which is little mentioned in recent research: the absence of any 
chance to use a front channel. While back-channel negotiations in Oslo took place, an 
official front channel also engaged in the peace process, but with little chance of 
reaching any result (Wanis-St. John, 2006, 122). In this dissertation, the Resistance 
never had the option of operating through a front channel. Similarly, the post-July 1941 
“Berlin-Chiang Channel” also had no possibility to operate a front channel that might 
have served as a distraction.  
The last element relatively new to back-channel theory is the inclusion and use 
of intelligence channels to uphold back-channel communication. On the basis of 
evidence presented in this dissertation, I would argue that BCD theory should allow for 
the inclusion of intelligence channels as elements. The “Berlin-Chiang Channel” 
intermediaries Jahnke and Gui were both intelligence agents, and carried out their 
meetings in secrecy, with only a handful of people being aware of them.325 On both 
sides, secrecy was highly valued, in particular on the Chinese one, as Chiang Kai-
shek’s regulations on the encryption of Gui’s reports show. Chapters Five and Six 
established that both Gui and Jahnke were associated with intelligence services and 
activities. While Gui may have served officially as a member of the embassy staff in 
Switzerland, the connections of Jahnke clearly went through the Nazi party intelligence 
service RSHA before they reached Hitler. The use of intelligence channels has hardly 
                                               
325 Gui Yongqing has already been established to be a loyal follower of Chiang Kai-shek and member of 
the inner circle of the Lixingshe. Kurt Jahnke did not fully enjoy Hitler’s trust and survived a murder attempt 
in 1934 only because he was not at home (Liang, 1978, 118). However, Walter Schellenberg speaks 
favourably of Jahnke in his memoirs and seemed to have vouched for the latter. Schellenberg himself was 
protected and led by Himmler. 
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been noticed by academia, with the exception of Coll (2009, 17), who has pointed out 
the involvement of Pakistan’s Inter Intelligence Service (ISI) in the 2007 India-Pakistan 
back-channel negotiations. Apart from this case, prominent cases usually highlight the 
involvement of private individuals in BCD.  
 
In conclusion, the “Berlin-Chiang Channel” underscores BCD limitations and 
issues that have already been pointed out in regard to the “German Resistance-Chiang 
Channel”, but also opened up discussion over new aspects that constitute BCD. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have presented and analysed information that 
challenges our understanding of the historiography of Republican China’s WWII 
relationship with Nazi Germany, contributed to research on Chiang Kai-shek’s 
pragmatic foreign policy and Chongqing Chinese presence in wartime Europe.  
However, scholars so far have followed the established narratives that all 
connections to Nazi Germany ended in July 1941, and that Chongqing China stayed 
largely focused on events in East Asia and aloof from the European theatre of war. 
This narrative is visible in publications by Taylor (2009), Mitter (2013), and even 
research on intenlligence connections, such as Wakeman Jr. (2003) or Yu (2006) 
hardly explore the Sino-Allied intelligence cooperation outside of East Asia. Even 
though Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign policy was pragmatic, the argument goes that from a 
certain point onwards, China only sought to cooperate with the US, and that all of her 
efforts were focused on bringing about the entry of the US into the war, and after 
December 1941 to gain as much support as possible. In this established narrative, 
Sino-German wartime relations hardly existed. 
As this dissertation reveals, Chinese foreign policy and her relationship to the 
Third Reich has been far more multi-faceted and pragmatic than assumed. It is 
highlighted that the inter-connection between the two theatres of war and their 
dependence on each other was much stronger than realised. Much of Chiang Kai-
shek’s foreign policy pragmatism had its roots in the foreign relations developments of 
the 1930s, during which Republican China had serious problems in finding a 
trustworthy and reliable ally, as well as the fact that several Western nations rejected 
confronting Japan for a significant amount of time after July 1937. Alliances were only 
perceived to be temporarily. Hence keeping all doors open became a necessity 
whereby one could prepare for possible changes in international relations. 
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As this research reveals, decision-making individuals in Chongqing, such as 
Chiang Kai-shek, did not sit idle, but actively engaged in diplomacy through back-
channels to keep all doors open, and to avoid being overrun by events. This back-
channel strategy was rooted in the experiences of Nationalist China during the 1930s 
and in particular after the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese conflict. In the two 
years between July 1937 and the outbreak of WWII in Europe in September 1939, 
Chongqing China had already fought the Japanese for two years. Throughout these 
two years, Chiang Kai-shek failed to forge any lasting alliances. Even the Soviet Union, 
then China’s most important supplier of arms, refrained from officially siding with 
Chiang Kai-shek. The other major powers, Britain and the US, did not intervene on 
China’s behalf in the Sino-Japanese conflict either. The outbreak of the European War 
further complicated the situation, as the world’s focus was on Britain and Germany. 
Chinese attempts to gain support in Europe, and to link the two war theatres with each 
other failed.  
Throughout this time, political lobby groups, split along German-friendly and 
anti-Axis lines, competed over the course of Chinese foreign policy and relations. 
External developments and the behaviour of foreign powers influenced the political 
standing of these lobby groups. When Chinese observers witnessed a strong Third 
Reich in 1940 and 1941, calls became increasingly loud to choose the German side of 
the conflict. German-friendly forces in Chongqing declared Germany to be in the 
perfect position of power to influence Japan on behalf of China. Obviously any alliance 
with Germany would come about only at the expense of Sino-British and Sino-US 
relations. For this reason, the German-friendly lobby met with resistance, as a number 
of US-friendly individuals, such as Soong May-ling, T.V. Soong and other US educated 
Chinese also tried to influence the course of Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, Chinese 
foreign policy would maintain its pragmatic stance as long as the US refrained from 
entering into the war.  
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The German-friendly lobbying, however, did not change the pragmatic foreign 
policy approach prevelant in Chongqing. As long as all outcomes seemed possible and 
the US had not entered the war, the competition over China’s foreign policy was 
allowed to continue. It can be assumed that Chiang Kai-shek, as the individual these 
lobby groups followed, allowed and probably supported these efforts to maintain all 
diplomatic connections as long as possible. As is often the case in authoritarian 
regimes in which a single leader takes large amount of power, the Generalissimo 
involved himself in foreign diplomacy, and intentionally used the internal competition in 
Chongqing to create the impression of a China sympathetic to the ideals of all sides in 
the conflict, including the US and Germany. In order to maintain such communication 
lines, front and back channels were used simultaneously.  
 
 
The Back Channel elements in Sino-German relations 
While much recent research focuses on the conflict-solving aspects of BCD, the 
much simpler communication aspects of back channels have been overshadowed. This 
dissertation has succeeded in bringing back the focus on simple back-channel 
communication between two nations, and highlights the shift from front channels to 
back channels, and the potential for transformation of these into a conflict-solving tool.   
Chapter Six displayed the development in Sino-German relations from official 
front channels to clandestine back channels. These back channels to leading Nazis 
were staffed with Chiang Kai-shek’s special envoys, Gui Yongqing and Qi Jun. This 
change took place even though diplomatic front channels still existed, but had proven 
to be ineffective.  
The break of official diplomacy in July 1941, however, transformed the 
clandestine back channels into the only viable means to uphold communication. The 
influence of intelligence agents and services at this time increased drastically, as they 
represented the only safe communication channel in a world torn apart by war. Recent 
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research carried out on BCD by other scholars (Ò Dorchtaraigh (2011), Wanis-St. John 
(2006), Waage (2005) and others) hardly mentions the use of intelligence channels, 
even though as this example shows, they are a natural choice for governments that 
have no other means of communicating without revealing that exact channel.  
In this specific case, it is clear that the back channels underwent changes that 
were reactions to developments in Sino-German relations and the international 
situation. Back channels in Berlin in 1940/1941 were largely managed by Chiang Kai-
shek’s special envoy Gui Yongqing. Indeed, the use of special envoys can be identified 
as characteristic of this and other Republican Chinese back channels. As academics 
already argued, and as this dissertation further reveals, Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign 
diplomacy relied on “high-ranking representatives” (Foo, 2011, 6). Even though some 
of these back channels were not secret (T.V. Soong), all these channels had in 
common that they circumvented official diplomatic front channels in the sending and 
the host countries. In Soong’s case, evidence shows that Chiang had in fact ordered 
him to side-line the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C.  
The years of 1940 and 1941, with ever shifting alliances, called for an approach 
in BCD through special envoys. The reason for this strategy lay in the international 
situation Chongqing China faced and in Chiang Kai-shek’s pragmatic foreign policy 
approach. Chongqing China’s urgent need for an official ally and support had led to the 
appointment of T.V. Soong to the US. The objectives of Gui’s appointment fell into a 
similar category to those of T.V. Soong, as demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven. 
Gui’s appointment to Berlin served the purpose of stopping German support for Japan, 
although in contrast to Soong’s mission, there were no requests for loans put forward 
by Gui. Moreover, in contrast to the widely known Soong back channel, the envoys in 
Berlin, were planted amongst the Chinese embassy staff, in positions that allowed a 
certain, but crucial, amount of freedom to engage with German politicians.  
The hiding of envoys amongst the embassy staff reduced the risk of the back 
channel gaining too much attention from Western democracy observers in Berlin and 
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the Japan-friendly German factions. Hence, Chiang Kai-shek was able to maintain 
relations with the Third Reich, while at the same time, she could openly declare his 
sympathy for Britain and France, at a time when the world split along two lines, with 
each country (and its allies) firmly entrenched on their respective side.   
The direct approach of special representatives to foreign governments might 
have been the reason for Chiang Kai-shek to choose this particular strategy of 
diplomacy, as it complied with the pragmatism present in Chinese foreign relations 
throughout the 1930s. Direct contact limited on the one hand the processing time, but 
also the influence of outsiders that might disagree with the pursued strategy. Moreover, 
this direct approach is a reflection of the rather low opinion Chiang Kai-shek had of 
professional diplomats, as it circumvented the Chinese Foreign Office (Chen Yan, 
2002b, 261-262). As the evidence in this dissertation reveals, the special envoys were 
carefully chosen for their positions. Instead of relying on career diplomats, Chiang Kai-
shek chose individuals he perceived as trustworthy and suitable to deal with the 
situation in the host country. The envoys usually belonged to several lobby groups in 
Chongqing, such as the C.C. Clique, or the Whampoa Clique. However, the fierce 
infighting between these groups during the 1930s did not matter for the appointment of 
their members as special envoys. Rather, the suitability of the special envoy to deal 
with politicians in the respective host country was of the most importance.  
Fu Bingchang, for example, had close ties with Soviet-friendly forces of the 
Prince-Clique in the Nanjing administration, had been to the Soviet Union before as 
part of Sun Fo’s 1937 mission, and was chosen to go to the Soviet Union on these 
reasons (Foo, 2011, 2). US-educated T.V. Soong was the perfect intermediary 
between the US and China, and displayed strong affinity for Sino-US cooperation. Gui 
and Qi both were loyal followers of Chiang, but they were associated with the 
Whampoa Clique and the C.C. Clique, respectively. Their appointment was based on 
their loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek, but also on their great knowledge of Germany. 
Moreover, their connections to individuals in the German military and administration, 
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established during the 1930s, provided easy access to high-level individuals within 
Germany’s highly militarised and authoritarian government.  
In summary, the pre-July 1941 back channel in Berlin constituted a simple back 
channel that avoided the Chinese and German Foreign Office, and was facilitated 
through Chiang Kai-shek’s special envoys. The decision for a back channel and a 
special envoy on the Chinese side were driven by the situation in German foreign 
policy. An official special envoy to Germany (just as T.V. Soong had been to the US) 
and negotiations between the envoy and leading Nazis may have been rejected and 
blocked by Japanese-friendly German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. Instead the 
envoys were masked as simple embassy staff and communicated via back channels 
with German officials.  
 
The break of Sino-German relations in July 1941 saw the end of official 
relations between Chongqing China and the Third Reich. However, it also had a 
striking influence on the back channels, as both Chiang Kai-shek’s special envoys and 
the embassy staff left Germany. However, the archival material reveals that the two 
back channels of Gui and Qi were “outsourced” to Switzerland. The surprising 
appointment of Gui as military attaché to Berne in summer 1941, and Qi’s posting as 
Legate of Economy at the Chinese legation in March 1942 indicates that the 
continuation of BCD with special envoys was the most suitable choice of 
communication. Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek could rely on two individuals who 
already had existing communication lines at their disposal, and at least in Qi’s case a 
request for the latter’s appointment to Berne had come from the German Resistance. 
Introducing new individuals to the process would have damaged the back channels.  
The simple back channel between “Berlin” and Chiang Kai-shek evolved further 
when approached by Japan as a tool for mediation. While I will not repeat the 
characteristics that this channel shares with more recent examples, the differences are 
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noteworthy. This BCD with Germany as a mediator between China and Japan had 
several elements that should be considered part of the BCD theory.  
This specific back-channel case encourages us to revisit some of the basic 
factors that characterise back channels. I would argue that communication channels 
that are clandestine, but where both sides are officially in a state of war with each other 
and share a far more positive behind-the-scene relationship, should be classified as 
back channels. As this case reveals, a state of war is no hindrance for clandestine and 
officially sanctioned diplomacy to take place, as communication can be diverted and 
channelled through alternative routes such as intelligence channels. Such a possibility 
may exist primarily in authoritarian governments, as both Chongqing China and the 
Third Reich were.  
Moreover, the chance for this kind of communication to take place is higher 
when groups of countries are in conflict, as happened during WWII. While Britain and 
the US had a hostile relationship with Germany that would exclude such back channels, 
the latter had a much more positive relationship with Chiang Kai-shek’s China. These 
two were officially enemies, but their armies never exchanged fire with one another, 
and from the available evidence it is clear that the relationship was far more ambivalent 
than we might expect from two states nominally at war with one another. As a result, in 
situations where two officially conflicting parties are unable to carry out diplomacy 
through official channels because the public/ third parties does not allow this to happen, 
back channels can be used to avoid detection. Clandestine back channels are 
therefore not only hidden from political opponents, but also from official allies in a 
conflict.  
Closely connected with the directly above-mentioned element is the fact that the 
Third Reich was no neutral mediator, similarly to Chiang Kai-shek’s position between 
the German Resistance and the Washington administration. In both cases, the 
mediator was allied to one of the “end-participants” of the back channel, Japan and the 
US respectively. However, this lack of neutrality does not pose a necessary issue for 
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
211 
 
the success of mediation, as Bercovitch and Houston (2011) suggest. A mediator has 
to be able to influence the mediation process, but does not necessarily have to be 
neutral. It is suggested that further research into the question of neutrality as part of 
BCD is necessary.  
The presence of the German Resistance as one of the players in BCD does not 
open up new possibilities for the application of back-channel theory. As a non-publicly 
operating resistance movement the German Resistance does not qualify as an official 
entity, but would have been described as a “terrorist organisation” by the Nazis, similar 
to the PLO during the 1980s and 1990s. In hindsight though, this term is rejected here 
for the Resistance movement.  
In comparison, the post-1941 back channels in Switzerland share some 
similarities but also differences with their predecessors in Berlin. In both cases the 
special envoys were placed amongst the diplomatic staff in the countries of questions. 
In the case of Gui Yongqing, communication with “Berlin” had been reduced to the 
intelligence agent Jahnke, who represented the only contact to leading Nazis. Gui’s 
apparent role as a leading intelligence agent in Europe could be easily combined with 
the back channel to Jahnke. Qi’s channel, on the other hand, expanded and included 
OSS agent Dulles from 1943 onwards.  
These back channels question some established aspects of BCD. I would argue 
that future research on back channels should consider looking closer at the use of 
intelligence channels as back channels and the question of a neutral mediator. 
Additionally to intelligence agents, the influence of the military on back channels, as 
already pointed out by scholars, such as Coll, should receive further attention by 
academics. This goes in particular for authoritarian regimes, in which internal 
competition in favour of the “leader” results in non-transparent decision making, and a 
potential weak administration that is unable to keep the military in check.  
 
 
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
212 
 
Wartime Sino-German relations 
One of the intentions of this dissertation was to challenge the current research 
narrative and the historiography of wartime Republican China’s relationship with Nazi 
Germany and to contribute to the research of her foreign policy approach during the 
early war years. I succeeded in bringing Germany back into the study of WWII China, 
and moved beyond the foci on the military mission, trade or German wartime relations 
with the Wang Jingwei Collaborationist government. Indeed, this dissertation 
challenged the limits research has set itself, and investigated Sino-German clandestine 
back channels beyond the important break of official diplomatic relations.   
This dissertation clearly reveals that Sino-German relations did not end with 
July 1941, but continued well beyond the outbreak of the Pacific War. These back 
channels had evolved over time, largely influenced by both China’s pragmatic foreign 
policy and the Japanese-friendly German Foreign Office that rejected fostering 
relations with China. The clear shift from official front channels to back channels 
emerged especially after von Ribbentrop had taken over the German Foreign Office, 
and further became the preferred route for Chiang Kai-shek to influence and maintain 
Sino-German relations after September 1939.  
Given the evidence presented in this dissertation, I would argue that German-
friendly individuals around Chiang Kai-shek perceived Nazi Germany as a tool to exert 
pressure on Japan from 1940 until July 1941. The reason for this assumption is based 
on the many references made by Chongqing Chinese, such as Zhu Jiahua or Sun Fo in 
1940, that the possibility of Germany winning the war in Europe put her in a stronger 
position vis-à-vis Japan. The behaviour of other foreign powers hardly changed this 
perception until Germany signed the Tripartie Pact in September 1940. The US 
remained neutral and continued to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with Japan, 
but increasingly showed signs of irritation with the East Asian nation. Britain’s position 
in China had been undermined by London’s East Asian foreign policy, which was 
perceived by Nationalist Chinese politicians as appeasing Japan.   
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It can be argued that Gui’s and Qi’s appointment to Berlin was a reflection of the 
influence German-friendly forces had in Chongqing. However, it can also be clearly 
identified as part of Chiang Kai-shek’s pragmatic foreign policy, which, as mentioned 
above, used these individuals to maintain relations with all sides and to influence 
German East Asian foreign policy. This is highlighted in the pre-July back channel 
conversations Gui had with leading Nazis, which centred on German mediation in the 
Sino-Japanese conflict, and attempts to improve Sino-German relations. These 
Chongqing Chinese efforts in 1940 and 1941 seem to have received support from 
China-friendly Germans in the German administration, military and intelligence sector. 
These combined Chinese and German efforts, however, did not result in any 
changes to Germany’s East Asian foreign policy, and the Tripartie Pact of September 
1940 further underscored the importance of a Sino-US alliance in the eyes of many 
individuals in Chongqing. The Nazi leadership evidently had not considered Sino-
German relations a priority. A long drawn out war was not anticipated in Berlin and 
Chinese resistance against Japan did not play as much a role in the mind of German 
strategists as it did only two years later. With an ever-closer relationship between 
Japan and Nazi Germany, Chiang Kai-shek’s war objectives focused increasingly on 
the US, and the objective of the Sino-German back channels changed into one of 
simply keeping the communication channel open and of gathering information.  
I would argue that the German Resistance did not play a major role in pre-July 
1941 times, as the Nazi government was not an enemy of Chongqing yet. Also, in 
regard to influencing Japan through third parties, Nazi Germany was the logical choice. 
Even though Chiang Kai-shek knew of the Resistance movement as soon as 1938, 
support for the movement only manifested itself in early 1942, after Pearl Harbor. 
Suddenly, a connection to an anti-Hitler movement, which had the potential to topple 
the Nazi government, seemed more interesting. The Resistance’s mediation request 
would have raised China’s profile amongst the Allies, as Chongqing was treated as an 
equal. Apart from raising China’s profile, it can be speculated that the possibility of an 
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end to the European war, brought about by an internal uprising against Hitler, was seen 
as an opportunity to divert Allied attention away from Europe to East Asia. Future 
research on this channel could, however, shed more light and challenge this 
assumption.  
 
The break of official relations in July 1941 represented a great change in Sino-
German relations and increased the importance of back-channel communication 
between Chiang Kai-shek and the two German sides. Official communication networks 
between Chongqing China and Berlin collapsed. Suddenly taking on major importance, 
the back-channel connection between the RSHA-agent Jahnke and alleged Chinese 
agent Gui became a main line of clandestine exchange between “Berlin” and Chiang 
Kai-shek. Officially enemies, both sides were interested in maintaining a clandestine 
line of communication, but for different reasons.  
The pragmatic foreign policy of the 1930s and early 1940s continued after 
December 1941. Given that the Allies and the Axis powers appeared equally strong in 
terms of fire power, such an approach was only logical. Indeed, as Thomas Nowotny 
(2012, xiii, in Menzell Meskill, 2012) states, a window of opportunity for an Axis win 
existed in the first half of 1942. Faced with such an international situation and, as a 
result of previous foreign relations experiences, not entirely reliable allies (Mitter, 2013, 
14), clandestine back channels to “Berlin” allowed for a continued flow of intelligence 
and a line to Japan.  The missing replies to the German cooperation proposal in 1942 
and 1943, as well as the approach to the “Japan-Berlin-Chiang” mediation process (as 
outlined in Chapter Seven) speak to the possibility that this clandestine back channel 
was used by the Chinese side to keep all doors open.  
In contrast, German objectives had taken a turn towards Sino-German 
cooperation after December 1941. I would argue that with the beginning of the Pacific 
War, and the difficulties at the Eastern Front, a Sino-Japanese peace or Sino-German 
cooperation increasingly appealed to the Nazi government. Hence, the approaches to 
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Chiang Kai-shek through Gui Yongqing in Berne. Clearly driven by strategic desires to 
ease pressure on the military and economy, “Berlin” imagined that and end to the Sino-
Japanese war would be the solution to major problems. In contrast to the situation 
between 1937 and 1941, when Chongqing had sought German support, China - 
ironically - became an important element in “Berlin”’s calculation from 1942 onwards.  
The German Resistance was desperate for Allied support and recognition. After 
being rejected by the British and the American governments, Resistance members 
continued to rally through channels in both nations. Some of them, however, 
approached Chongqing China and more importantly Chiang Kai-shek. Influential 
Resistance members enjoyed good personal relations with Chiang. The elevation of 
Chiang Kai-shek into the highest ranks of the Allies opened new possibilities to reach 
the highest levels in Washington. With Chiang Kai-shek as an intermediary, the 
Resistance hoped to influence the Americans in their favour. Hopes for this channel 
were based on Chiang’s positive connections to Germany, probably the good relations 
he had with a number of Germans, as well as his good links to Roosevelt. Interestingly, 
Chiang was not asked to mediate between the Resistance and Prime Minister Churchill, 
who had rejected any cooperation with the Resistance earlier on. A European peace 
deal brokered through Chiang Kai-shek would have, on the one hand, elevated the 
Generalissimo to an equal footing with the Western Allies, but also direct the latters’ 
attention to the China theatre and speed up the fight against Japan. 
 
 
Influence on Sino-Allied wartime relations 
 The dissertation has so far highlighted many new aspects of Sino-German 
relations and contributed to research on Republican Chinese foreign policy approaches. 
It has become obvious from the previous paragraphs that Chiang Kai-shek’s foreign 
policy approach was highly pragmatic and did not bother with ideologies; it also relied 
significantly on back channels and special envoys. This strategy has been clearly 
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
216 
 
identified as the leading approach in Sino-German relations, and has been witnessed 
in Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations too. Such an approach, paired with Allied 
perceptions of German-friendly individuals in Chonqing, would have not been without 
influence on Chongqing’s relationship with the other Allies.326  
 On several occasions within this dissertation, it has been pointed out that the 
struggle China faced to gain an official ally, and the treatment she received at the 
hands of the Western Democracies when facing Japan throughout the 1930s, has 
contributed to the pragmatic foreign policy approach of keeping all doors open. 
However, I would argue that this pragmatic approach and the existence of a German-
friendly clique in Chongqing, amongst other reasons, influenced Sino-Allied relations 
negatively and contributed to the lack of long-term allies at the end of the war. In this 
regard, the dissertation tends to agree with Goldstein’s (1990) critique of Chiang Kai-
shek’s diplomatic skills.  
In an authoritarian regime, as both the Third Reich and Chongqing China were, 
interest groups or even individuals distort the natural way in which a government 
functions. In the case of Germany and her foreign policy, information meant political 
survival, and Chongqing was likely not much different. Frequently, information meant 
for Hitler was either withheld or twisted (Shore, 2005, 6). As we know, Hitler actually 
encouraged this kind of behaviour and competition, probably without realising that it 
negatively influenced his own decision making.  
I would argue that Chiang Kai-shek similarly tolerated internal competition over 
China’s foreign policy, and used individuals belonging to different interest groups in 
Chongqing to maintain diplomatic channels to all sides, including the Third Reich. 
While the US-friendly group had a powerful supporter in Soong May-ling, the German-
friendly side could always rely on the Generalissimo’s own admiration of the German 
military system, and the significant number of German-educated military officers and 
civil servants.   
                                               
326 See the numerous British reports cited throughout this thesis, which highlight British fears over the 
existence and influence of German-friendly individuals.  
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 Chiang Kai-shek’s and Chongqing China’s tendency to open and maintain 
channels to different sides of the conflict was known to the Western Powers, as the 
archival material reveals. I would argue that a combination of Chiang’s foreign policy 
approach, the Allied knowledge of Chinese disapproval over the general war strategy, 
and the Allied perception of a German-friendly lobby, led to an erosion of trust in 
Chongqing China. British observers in particular, to whom the maintenance of the 
China theatre was crucial, watched the foreign policy development in Chongqing 
carefully. German- friendly influences early on in the war alarmed the Allies, who 
feared that these would drive Chiang Kai-shek toward the Axis Powers.  
Despite British suspicions concerning the “pipe-line” in Switzerland in 1942, 
they did not discuss with Swiss authorities the actions of Chinese embassy staff, as the 
lack of any material on Chinese espionage in Swiss archives suggests. This may have 
been for several reasons. On the one hand Britain did not have the need to ask the 
Swiss for help, as they had sufficient intelligence staff stationed there. On the other 
hand, it is also likely that as soon as it became evident that Qi worked as a middleman 
for Chiang and the Resistance any surveillance was stopped, and the actual back 
channel between Chiang and the Third Reich—Gui—remained un-identified. Possibly, 
Allied observers did not rate Chinese activities in Switzerland as importantly as the 
activities in the China theatre.  
 
This trend to overlook Chinese actions and importance in the overall 
developments of WWII continued until recently, and has been questioned in this 
dissertation and in research carried out by other academics. The more it is accepted 
that politically motivated and established narratives are up for debate, the more old and 
new archival material will be re-evaluated. For the last few years the entire 20th century 
has come under scrutiny, especially WWII and Cold War legacies and narratives.  
As this dissertation has shown there remain many unknown aspects of WWII 
that can shed further light on this crucial period in time. I would argue that the 
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application of intelligence history in combination with diplomatic history has the 
potential to complicate our understanding of wartime clandestine diplomacy, and that is 
not only the case for research on Nationalist Chinese foreign policy practices, but also 
for that of other nations that had been caught up in wars.  
This dissertation represents a first initiative to explore the wartime relations 
between Nationalist China and Germany, and Republican Chinese foreign policy. A 
number of leads were mentioned in this dissertation, which could not be further 
explored this time, such as the effect of the relationship between Allen Dulles, Hans 
Klein and Qi Jun on Sino-Resistance-US relations. In this direction, it would be of 
further interest to explore whether Chiang Kai-shek did indeed speak up for the 
Resistance movement in communication with the Allies, or gave orders to his close 
subordinates to rally for support. These leads already give an indication of the large 
potential this field still offers, and how it can further redefine our understanding of WWII 
international history.  
  
Back-Channel Diplomacy and the Sino-German relationship, 1939-1945 
 
219 
 
Glossary 
 
The names and locations in this Glossary will be written in Hanyu Pinyin, with a 
few exceptions. These exceptions include Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, both men 
who are better known under their Wade-Giles names. Wherever a name in a Wade-
Giles Romanisation comes first, it is followed by the Pinyin version of that name in 
brackets. In some cases, Hanyu Pinyin will be followed by Wade Giles in brackets. This 
is due to different Romanisation systems that were used over the decades; hence 
names referring to the same individual may look quite different in Hanyu Pinyin and 
Wade-Giles. 
 
Chinese Individuals: 
 
Chen Jie      陳介 
Chen Tianfang    陳天放 
Cheng Chen     陳誠 
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)  蔣介石 
Fu Bingchang (Foo Ping-chan)  傅秉常 
Gui Yongqing (Kwei Yun-Chin)  桂永清 
Guo Taiqi  (Quo Tai-chi)   郭泰祺 
He Yingqin  (Ho Yin-chin)   何應欽 
Jiang Baili  (Chiang Pai-li)   蔣百里 
H.H. Kung (Kong Xiangxi)  孔祥熙 
Lin Qiusheng (Lin Tsui-sen)   林秋生 
Nanjing  (Nanking)   南京 
Qi Jun  (C’hi Tsun, Robert)  齊焌 
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T.V. Soong (Song Ziwen)   宋子文 
Soong May-ling (Song Meiling)  宋美龄  
Sun Yat-sen  (Sun Zhongshan)  孫中山 
Sun Fo  (Sun Ke)   孫科 
Yang Jie     杨杰 
Yu Dawei (Yu Tawei)   俞大维 
Zhu Jiahua (Chu Chia-hua)  朱家骅  
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